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Abstract
Palliative day care is offered to patients with a life-limiting illness. It provides a range of services
to meet the varying needs of individuals. Consequently, the service is multidimensional and the
outcomes are hard to define. This means this service operates at a level of complexity that is
different from other health care services. This presents a challenge for evaluation since the
activities differ across individuals and change over time, depending on their needs. This
challenge is not unique to palliative care and is relevant to the evaluation of other services. The
published guidelines for health economic evaluation have not explicitly taken into account the
specific issues relevant to evaluating complex services. It is argued in this thesis that the 'health
gain' approach is problematic and a preference-based approach may reveal more useful
evidence for policy-makers. This has not been fully considered in empirical studies.
A study was undertaken using health-gain and preference based approaches to evaluate a new
palliative day care service. The EO-50 health-related quality of life instrument was used to
detected differences in outcome between patients who attended a palliative care day centre and
those who did not. The instrument did not detect significant differences over time. A choice
experiment was also undertaken in four POC centres. This approach estimates the relative
preferences that respondents expressed for specific service attributes. The attributes chosen for
this study were: opening hours, access, specialist therapies; medical support; hairdressing and
bathing. The results showed that specialist therapies were relatively more valued, and that
hairdressing and bathing were not important in decision-making. Access to medical care was
less important than access to specialist therapies.
The thesis critiques health gain approaches for services that have a broad range of hard-to-
define goals and aim to meet individual needs. The choice experiment provided insights into
how services are valued where these insights cannot be derived from other economic
evaluation approaches. Research methods that reflect people's preferences may provide
important analysis where very little evidence has previously existed.
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Preface
The evidence presented in this thesis is based on a multi-disciplinary palliative day care study
undertaken by a team of researchers at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine
(LSHTM) and the Department of Palliative Care, Guy's King's and St Thomas' Medical School
(GKT). The study team members were: Charles Normand (Principal Investigator, LSHTM),
Hannah-Rose Douglas (LSHTM), Irene Higginson (Principal Investigator, GKT), and Danielle
Goodwin (GKT). The funding for the study was obtained from South East Regional NHS
Executive, R&D Project reference SEC 006.
Each of the team members undertook various roles. HRD and DG managed the study on a day
to day basis and liaised with the study sites. DG's main focus was the clinical effectiveness
study, HRD's focus was on the economic evaluation. The consent form, patient information
sheet were designed by DG with contribution by HRD. Ethics Committee approval for the study
was obtained by IH on behalf of the team. IH was the main liaison with the funders. HRD was
responsible for collecting data for the cost analysis and for the choice experiment. This involved
designing and implementing the pilot study and main experiment. Additional statistical support
was provided by Jan van der Meulen at LSHTM. Interviews with patients were undertaken by
trained interviewers with palliative care nursing experience. The choice experiment interviews at
one palliative day care centre (out of four) were undertaken by HRD. EO-50 data and patient
resource use data were analysed by HRD. The choice experiment data and cost data were
analysed by HRD. The palliative care outcome data and qualitative data were analysed by DG.
Some of the qualitative data analysed by DGis presented in this thesis for completeness. This
work has been fully attributed to DG in the main text and footnotes.
The project had two main aims: to explore the clinical effectiveness of palliative day care and to
consider issues of cost-effectiveness. The clinical effectiveness data used published and
validated palliative care outcome scales. The cost-effectiveness analysis used the EO-50
generic health-related quality of life instrument to explore whether it would be possible to obtain
measures of effectiveness in units of quality-adjusted life years. The expectation was that this
methodology would not yield useful results for a group of patients who are generally well
enough physically to attend a palliative day care unit, and may only have a few weeks or
months to live.
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A previous study undertaken by the same research teams in LSHTM and GKT from 1998-2000
(The North Thames study, referred to in this thesis) had both a qualitative and quantitative
component. The quantitative study found that there was no difference in health-related quality of
life using published palliative care outcome instruments. Similarly, there was no significant
difference in costs between those who attended day care, and those who did not. It was
postulated that the EO-50 study design and palliative care outcome instruments would not show
important differences in outcome between palliative care groups.
The other focus of the empirical research undertaken by HRO in this second palliative day care
study was to explore preference-based, multi-attribute methods of economic evaluation. The
idea for using this approach came from experience of HRO in undertaking in-depth
observational and interview data collection as part of the developmental work for the first North
Thames study. The strong preferences for palliative day care had been expressed by patients in
the qualitative study. Respondents had also indicated that they might be willing to pay for some
aspects of palliative day care, such as hairdressing. This led HRO to consider whether a
preference-based approach in the economic evaluation would yield insightful findings. The
choice experiment methods in palliative care research presented in this thesis is the result of a
process of exploring the problems with a cost-consequence study (as undertaken in the North
Thames study), the EO-50 approach and other preference-based approaches to evaluating
complex services.
The choice experiment was planned to be the main component of the economic evaluation in
the second study, on which this thesis is based. Palliative care outcome instruments were
included in the clinical effectiveness component of the study since the second study used a
more robust study design. The EO-50 approach was rejected for the economic evaluation in the
first instance since the experience from the North Thames study suggested that it would not be
sensitive enough to detect the subtle changes in health-related quality of life appropriate to
palliative day care. However, the research team were challenged by the funders of the study to
provide some evidence that the EO-50 would not be a useful instrument in this context. It was
proposed by them that the EO-50 instrument should be included in the study since the effort of
collecting and analysing data for EO-50 (a five-item questionnaire) alongside the palliative care
outcome instrument was marginal. The results of the EO-50 study are presented in this thesis
as they complete the story of the investigation of palliative day care and help to explain the
development of ideas that led to the choice experiment approach.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Scope of the thesis
This thesis is about the economic evaluation of health care interventions that are complex,
multidimensional and have subtle and varied outcomes that are hard to define or measure. In
particular, it considers the contribution of welfare economics and other economic paradigms to
the understanding of how to undertake evaluation of complex interventions in health and social
care. An empirical study of palliative day care that incorporates different research
methodologies representing different ways of conceptualising value will be used to explore
these issues.
The main argument that is put forward in this thesis is that for some areas of health and social
care, economic evaluation is more difficult that in others and that this relates to the difficulty of
conceptualising and quantifying the outcomes of complex services. There are particular
characteristics of these services and how they are accessed by patients that distinguish them
from mainstream services. As a consequence, straightforward approaches to evaluation may
not provide useful information for comparison across different kinds of care and for decision-
making about resource allocation.
Like all research, economic evaluation can be difficult to do well, but in the evaluation of
complex services, there are particular challenges. The nature of this complexity and the nature
of the problems of evaluation in these contexts is the subject of the thesis. The main argument
that is explored is whether approaches that are based on the theories of choice, trade and the
satisfaction of preferences represent a way forward in evaluation.
SECTION 1. INTRODUCTION TO THE THEMES EXPLORED IN THE THESIS
The need to compare the cost and value policies that aim to improve or sustain welfare in
different ways is fundamental to making choices about how resources are used. In a democratic
society, decision-makers are charged with making choices that are may be seen as fair to
society. They must balance the interest of future people against the interests of people currently
alive, the importance of welfare in old age against welfare in youth, and of the value of
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prolonging lif-eagainst the value of improving the quality of life. Therefore the notion of valuing
and comparing welfare across different types of policy and uses of resources is inherent in the
process of decision-making.
Individuals make comparisons of welfare in their daily lives by choosing between current and
future consumption and by weighing up the costs and benefits of different bundles of goods to
maximise their own or their family's welfare. These forms of private consumption reflect the
individual's values and tastes, and it is usually unnecessary for an individual to have to justify
their choice of consumption to others. In nearly all situations, the satisfaction of individuals'
preferences is seen as contributing to the good of society as a whole.
In the use of public resources, however, there is a need for more transparency in decision-
making. Therefore choices between different uses of resources have to be based on explicit
criteria that are rational and defendable, that is, on which reasonable people can agree. It is
necessary to define what is good for individuals and for society, and how this good can be
maximised within a given level of resources. These are problems of moral philosophy as well as
of economics.
Welfare economics is a theoretical framework for considering social costs and benefits. It is
based on specific notions of how individuals behave, what motivates them, and the meaning
behind the concept of one thing being 'better' than another; of a change in policy being for the
good, making society better off, or contributing more to society's overall welfare. Within this
framework, individuals are assumed to be self-interested, knowledgeable, welfare-maximising
consumers. Preference satisfaction is the fundamental criterion for deciding what is 'good' for
society. Given a choice of A or B (two products, services, interventions or policies), A can be
said to be 'better' than B if and only if individuals prefer A to B. The strength of preference for A
over B can be measured by how much an individual, or the sum of all individuals, would pay to
consume A rather than B, (or would need to be compensated to consume B rather than A).
Therefore the individual is the locus of decision-making and preferences are expressed through
the medium of money, since money is the most divisible, transferable form of wealth.
Furthermore, since welfare economics is based on the idea of satisfaction of individuals'
preferences, the psychological processes that lead to A being preferred to B by a single
individual are not known. Within this framework, it is not necessary to understand why the
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individual prefers A to B, only to know that A is preferred. Welfare economics also lays out
specific and explicit criteria to decide whether a change in circumstances (for example a new
intervention, a change in policy, a new call on resources) improves overall social welfare. If the
benefits of a change, measured in monetary terms, to some members of society outweigh the
overall costs to other members of society, then the decision rule is that it ought to be adopted.
SOCiety is better off after such a change, regardless of who gains and who loses. The theory
therefore provides a rationale for behaviour and criteria for making socially beneficial decisions
that is internally coherent and can be defended its own terms.
There has been strong criticism of the underlying axioms of welfare economics and questions
raised about the strict assumptions of 'rational hedonism' of individuals. It is argued that self-
interested, welfare-maximisation has failed to explain important aspects of human behaviour in
the real world, such as communitarianism, caring for others, or altruism. Also, the measurement
of outcomes in monetary terms has been seen as unachievable in some contexts and even
inherently unethical where issues of life and death are concerned. These tensions are played
out in the debates about how economic evaluation ought to be undertaken and interpreted.
The economic evaluation of health and social care
The economic evaluation of health and social care has developed in a welfare economics
paradigm. Within this framework, public sector economists have had to address some general
problems of finding ways to express the benefits of health and social care, and measuring and
comparing different kinds of benefits across interventions that aim to improve welfare in
contrasting ways. Monetary valuation would indicate what an individual or society might be
willing to sacrifice (in terms of other consumption forgone) in order to access a particular service
or intervention. However, monetary valuation of the benefits of health care has presented a
serious methodological challenge to evaluators. Instead, health economists have identified other
means of expressing the benefits of care, by using notions of improved length or quality of life to
conceptualise the outcomes of different interventions. Therefore the idea of value or revealed
preference, central to welfare economic analysis, has been less important in the economic
evaluation of health care interventions. The value of the outcomes derived from health (and this
could also be applied to social care) has usually been implied rather than explicitly argued.
For some types of interventions this has not been a major problem: the definition of the outcome
or purpose of the intervention has been widely accepted. The welfare or benefits derived from
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particular interventions are well-understood by professionals and the public, and the relationship
between the intervention and the outcome is straightforward. The value of the benefits to one
person of, for example, a hip replacement operation can be assumed by most reasonable
people to be comparable to the value of the operation to another. The comparison of welfare
between individuals would be considered to be relatively unproblematic in this context.
Important progress has been made in economic evaluation from assuming the overall
comparability of welfare. This has led to the design and validation of generic measures of
outcome that are comparable across individuals and across different types of interventions.
Approaches such as the EQ-SD have been incorporated into economic evaluation to generate
estimates of additional quality adjusted life years and, by doing so, has avoided the issue of
valuing time or quality of life in financial terms. Such an approach assumes that a year of life is
an additively separable unit of outcome. It has the same value regardless of when it is received
or who receives it and is the same regardless of how much total life a person may be expected
to live. It does not take into account the additional benefits that might arise from health care, for
example, of younger people knowing that they will be cared for later in life, or that less healthy
people in society have access to the services they require now. In the context of services that
are provided to people towards the end of their lives, the value of these other kinds of benefits
may be considerable.
Evaluation of complex interventions
There are particular challenges in undertaking economic evaluation in the context of services
that could be described as inherently complex. These are services where the conceptualisation
of the welfare benefits derived from the intervention is difficult to define or have various
conflicting definitions, and therefore hard to value and measure in the context of research. It
also applies to services where the relationship between service inputs and outcomes is not easy
to describe, or that incorporate a range of different inputs so that individuals may access a
different range or intensity of inputs within the same service. The separate components of the
service may not themselves have been well evaluated, and overall, there may bea general lack
of understanding (or disagreement) about how services should be provided to maximise their
value to patients.
Palliative care is an example of a complex area of health and social care. But the issues raised
in the economic evaluation of this service are not exclusive to this type of health care. The
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problem of evaluation in this. area illustrates issues that are common across complex services.
The nature of this complexity is explored in this thesis. Palliative care is designed to be
responsive to the needs of individuals and services are tailored to their individual
circumstances. The same input may provide a different magnitude and type of benefit
depending on who is receiving it. The benefits may be diverse and not easily defined, even by
those who provide the services. However, in some palliative care contexts, the benefits are
clearer than in others. Acute pain and physical symptoms at the end of life can be reduced with
drugs and clinical management, and clearly defined positive outcomes can be measured.
Palliative day care (PDC) is an intervention that aims to meet a wide range of individuals' needs.
These individuals will already have their pain and physical symptoms under control (at least to
the extent that they are not housebound or receiving inpatient care) and their needs are more
difficult to identify since they may relate to a range of different problems to do with how they are
coping with their illness and their life circumstances. The purpose of palliative day care is to
work with palliative home care services to support patients to live independently for as long as
possible with a range of services such as physical therapies, clinical advice, counselling and
social support available at a day centre. Some people only use the service infrequently whereas
others may need more intensive support. There is also some difference of opinion as to how
services should be organised and what they are for.
Clearly, these problems also exist in other services. These are areas. of health and social care
where there are considerable difficulties in undertaking clinical trials to establish the efficacy of
the service and where it would be difficult to conceive of how such a trial could be designed.
These are.areas where, typically, little evaluative work has been undertaken beyond descriptive
analysts. The challenge is to desig~ evaluative studies that go beyond descriptive studies and
provide evidence that can be used in decision-making in contexts where evaluative evidence to
date has been minimal.
The providers of palliative day care services clearly believe that they provide a valuable service
otherwise it could be argued they would not be offering it. Many patients who are referred to
palliative cay care decide to attend, and attend more than once, so they must do so for a
reason. But the value in terms of the benefits gained from attending a centre has not yet been
established through evaluation. This means that its value cannot be compared with that
13
Chapter 1
provided by other palliative care services or with the value of using the resources employed in
palliative day care in other ways.
It may be the case that the dominant approaches to evaluating health care based on the
measurement of life years saved and improvements in health-related quality of life are not
sensitive to the nature of the benefits that may be produced by attending palliative day care.
The kinds of benefits that may be important in palliative day care might be the social aspect of
palliative care, bringing about a change in outlook in people who attend, or making them feel
more able to cope with living with advanced disease. While these benefits or changes in
welfare may be hard to define (even by the people who provide these services) this does not
mean they cannot be very significant changes in welfare to the people who experience them.
Furthermore, the value of palliative day care to those who attend may be different from the
objectively measurable changes in health gain achieved. The subjectively value of a health care
intervention could be defined as the value to the individual receiving the intervention, which may
differ between individuals. For services such as palliative day care, the value to an individual
may be different from the objectively measurable or observable change in health status as
perceived by those assessing the individual, for example a health professional, The notion of
the 'value' of a health care intervention may therefore differ depending on whose perspective is
adopted, that of the individual (defined here as 'subjective') or defined as measurable change in
health status (defined here as 'objective'). Instead of considering the value of health care in
terms of health gain, defined in terms of additional units of time adjusted for quality, it might be
more meaningful to consider what an individual might be willing to give up (in terms of financial
sacrifice or consumption forgone) in order to access palliative day care. This argues for the
return to the fundamental idea in welfare economics of value measured by the satisfaction of
preferences.
In the context of palliative care however the subjective value of welfare and objective
measurement of health gain may be at odds. Those attending palliative day care may have
strong preferences for attending a centre but objective health gain may not be measurable. In
the case of palliative day care, there may be strong preferences in society for the presence of
services for people at the end of life with needs that palliative day care can provide. The value
of subtle improvements in quality of life when faced with a life-limiting illness or towards the end
. of life may be greater than the value of measurable changes in quality of life at other times of
life.
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Furthermore, the provision of these services may be seen as important to society as a whole.
This is supported by the fact that hospices within the voluntary sector have been successful at
fundraising from the public, even though it is clear that palliative care does not lengthen (and
can even shorten) life, and may provide only a few days or weeks of benefits. Therefore there
may be something of an anomaly between the value of palliative care services as measured
using the QALY or health gain approach, and the support for these services from the general
public. This anomaly may not be specific to palliative care, but may also exist in other service.
These issues will be addressed in this thesis.
Approaches to the evaluation of complex services presented in this thesis
It is clearly important to develop methods of evaluation that can compare benefits across
different types of interventions, and it is necessary to keep the methods as simple as possible
for any given health care evaluation problem. Disease-specific outcome measures have been
adopted in the evaluation of palliative day care, but not as part of an economic evaluation. They
did not show evidence of changes in quality of life, but one argument is that they were not
designed for palliative day care settings. They focussed on domains of health related to
inpatient care (for example, on acute physical symptoms). Testing the appropriateness of using
a global quality of life instrument in the palliative day care setting is one aim of the empirical
research presented in this thesis as this has not been done before and it could be argued that a
global measure might be more appropriate for an intervention that aims to improve overall.
quality of life. However there is good a priori reasoning that the global quality of life approach
will not be sensitive to any changes in quality of life that would be expected from a complex
health service such as palliative day care as the levels within each domain are too broad and
not focussed on the domains that are most important in palliative day care. Furthermore, it is
argued that an approach is needed that reflects the value of these services to the people who
use them.
The welfarist framework has made something of a comeback in health economics, despite the
practical difficulties of this approach due to perceived difficulties of using the health gain! QALY
approach in some contexts. Other methods of economic evaluation that focus on the
satisfaction of preferences as the measure of outcome or 'good' for society may be insightful
and are considered in this thesis. Since one of the aspects of complexity in health and social
. care is its multidimensional nature, it is argued that an approach that can incorporate patients'
preferences for different aspects of services rather than the service as a whole could be a useful
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approach to adopt. Seeing a complex service as bundles of specific attributes of care may
provide insights into which aspects of care are most valued, and which aspects people might be
prepared to forego.
One approach that is seen as promising in the context of economic evaluation of health care is
discrete choice experimentation, a method in the family of conjoint analysis methods. This type
of experiment can estimate individuals' preferences for a range of aspects of care in terms of
what other aspects of care (or financial sacrifice) individuals would be willing to trade-off to have
these attributes. It has been seen as a useful approach in contexts where there is no one
primary health outcome, and as a way of incorporating individuals' strength of preference for
different aspects of care into the evaluation process. The constrained choice presented to
respondents means that not all aspects of care can be seen as highly valued simultaneously,
and people have to make choices about the aspects of care that matter most to them.
In the context of evaluating palliative day care, understanding patients' preferences for particular
aspects of care in order to provide services that reflect patients' values may be at least as
important as considering the health gain from these services. If patients' strength of preference
could be quantified, this might provide evidence on which combination of services would
optimise patients' subjective welfare, or which combinations of services are most preferred by
different groups of patients (older/younger, socially isolated/with carer support). The satisfaction
of the preferences of individuals who have advanced disease and are facing the end of life may
be seen as important to the general public as well. Where other methods may not provide any
insights at all into how resources ought to be used, this approach may provide the only kind of
economic data to inform decision-making.
SECTION 2. THE AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE THESIS
The themes that are developed in this thesis have arisen out of conceptual and empirical work
undertaken by the author in the area of palliative day care. Before this work had been
undertaken, t~ere had been no published economic evaluations of palliative day care, and little
commentary on the challenge for economic evaluation in this area. A previous study undertaken
by the author before the thesis had begun highlighted the problems that needed to be
addressed. It faced the problem that a full economic evaluation could not be undertaken without
a clear indication of the benefits (or otherwise) of palliative day care and that this would be
difficult to obtain. Building on this study, the idea for this thesis was to undertake another
16
Chapter 1
empirical study in palliative day care to explore different ways of measuring or valuing the
benefits of the service in ways that could be incorporated into an economic evaluation. Two
distinct and contrasting approaches were adopted: the first was to use a straightforward health
gain method using a global quality of life measure (disease specific measures had been
adopted in the previous study) to assess whether it would be possible to derive a quality-
adjusted life year to measure the value of palliative day care. Second, a preference-based
approach was adopted, by undertaking a discrete choice experiment in the same study. The aim
of the discrete choice experiment was to try to measure the relative value of different aspects of
palliative care to those who attended a day care centre. It was not clear at the beginning
whether a willingness-to-pay component could be incorporated into the experiment, and this
question explored in the thesis.
The aim of the thesis therefore is to contribute to the understanding of how to undertake
economic evaluation in areas of health and social care that are inherently complex and difficult
to investigate. It traces the roots of welfare economic thinking back to the foundational ideas of
utilitarianism and explores the purpose and application of economic evaluation arising from
welfare economic principles. The challenge of applying welfare economic approaches in health
and social care contexts is examined and current debates about how to conceptualise and
measure benefits are presented. The argument is that the measurement of outcomes is difficult
generally, and that the measurement of outcomes of services that are complex presents even
more difficulties. The empirical evidence that is presented is an attempt to make some progress
in this area and to find a way of presenting economic data that is useful for decision-making.
The definitions of palliative care and aims of palliative day care are presented in the next section
to provide a contextual backdrop to the rest of the thesis. It also situates the evaluation of
palliative day care in the context of current UK government health policy initiatives to bring
statutory and voluntary sector services more closely together. It considers the tensions that this
brought about by the necessity to demonstrate 'value for money' compared with other services.
These tensions are pertinent to the thesis since they highlight the need to find ways of
presenting the benefits of palliative day care in ways that are fair and at the same time not over
or under-emphasising the value of these services to the people who use them.
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SECTION 3.INTRODUCTION TO PALLIATIVE CARE AND PALLIATIVE DAY CARE
Palliative care is "the active total care of patients whose disease is not responsive to curative
treatment. Control of pain and of, other symptoms, and of psychological, social and spiritual
problems is paramount" (WHO 1990). Palliative care is also seen as unique in considering
quality of death alongside quality of life (Jarvis et al. 1996; Whynes 1997, Wallston et al 1988).
The focus of palliative care is defined primarily on comfort and support, and is a comprehensive,
interdisciplinary service for the care of patients and families facing a life-limiting illness (Billings
1998).
Some aspects of palliative care are also applicable to patients in earlier stages of illness. The
National UK Council for Hospice and Specialist Palliative Care Services has set out the stated
aims of palliative care services in the UK, outlined in box 1.1.
In the UK, there were between 100,000 and 120,000 patients with cancer who have palliative
care needs in the 1990s (Department of Health 1995). This figure does not include patients with
other diagnosis who have similar needs. The Expert Advisory Group on Cancer defined
palliative care not only as terminal care, but patents may have palliative care needs at the time
of diagnosis and should therefore be an integral part of cancer care. (Department of Health
ibid.)
Box 1.1 Alms of palliative care (National Council for Hospice and Specialist Palliative Care
Services, 1997)
Palliative care:
Affirms life and regards dying as a normal process
Neither hastens nor prolong~ living
Provides relief from pain and other physical distress
Integrates psychosocial and spiritual aspects of patient care
Offers a support system to help patients live active lives as long as possible
Offers a support system to help families cope during patients' illness and in their own bereavement
Many individuals who are referred to palliative care or hospice services have had a cancer
diagnosis (Higginson 2000). However, patients also attend who have other forms of illness such
. as HIV/AIDS, motor neurone disease (Higginson ibid.). It has been reported that there is now a
"significant investmenf' in palliative care and a high level of spending on palliative care which is
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undertaken by people who are not palliative care specialists, estimated to be about £500 million
per annum (Tebbit 1998).
There is a variety of services available for people with palliative care needs in the UK, with key
resources identified as hospices, specialist nurses working in community and hospital teams,
Marie Curie nurses who provide night sitting and other support services, and oncology and
palliative care inpatient and outpatient services (Appleby 1994). These services are offered
alongside general clinical services such as primary care (general practice, district nurses, and
community pharmacies) and other statutory community services. Nursing homes also form part
of the package of palliative care since patients may stay in a nursing home while recovering
from a hospital stay
In 1998, in a report by The National Association for Health Authorities and Trusts, the first
recommendations were made to health authorities that palliative care services should be
provided in all localities (NAHAT 1998). The recommendation was that services should begin by
providing specialist palliative care nursing, then palliative day care, and only then to provide
inpatient facilities if local needs could not be met by these first levels of palliative care. However,
palliative day care has been slower to develop than inpatient services (Higginson, Hearn et al
2000).
Hospice care has usually been offered outside mainstream statutory health care. As such, they
are often described as providing care that is qualitatively different from NHS and social services
(Torrens 1984, Abel 1986, Neale and Clarke 1992, Payne 1996). The development of palliative
care within the voluntary sector has occurred at the local level in a fairly autonomous
environment (Clarke, Neale et al 1995), and with relatively little control by central government or
the NHS (Department of Health 2000). The Calman-Hine report indicated that hospices had
developed in a random fashion in the UK, reflecting the development of other services in the
voluntary sector, and in the early days of the movement, services developed with little
consultation or contact with the NHS or other statutory services (Robbins 1998). It has been
argued that the input (or control) by voluntary organisations has led to some diversity in the
developments, and distinct philosophies of provision are visible (Spencer and Daniels 1998).
Another reason for the diversity is the independence of the funding from the NHS. Funding for
the different services may come from different health and social care budgets, and different
rules apply regarding patients' access to services. Palliative care is therefore provided in a
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complex "mixed economy" (Tierney and Siadden 1994). The reliance of palliative care on at
least some voluntary fund raising has contributed to services being perceived as "different" from
other health and social care services offered by statutory bodies (Department of Health 1996).
The range of services also offered in the hospice setting is also dependent on the availability of
local volunteers to offer specialist therapies, supportive services, and on general help.
In the past, palliative care services were run autonomously by voluntary organisations and have
therefore avoided some of the financial and service development pressures that other sectors
have faced (Department of Health 1998). However, primary care trusts can now purchase
hospice care from the voluntary sector and there are now fully funded NHS hospice services in
areas where voluntary-sector hospices have not been built (Higginson, Hearn et al. 2000). As
hospice services have grown, and the volume of funds from government sources has increased,
it has become clear that the Department of Health is taking an increasing interest in their
funding and quality.
The publication of "A Policy Framework for Commissioning Cancer Services: Palliative Care
Services' (Department of Health 1996) spelt out the domains of palliative care that have led the
way in introducing concepts of health care which are now being seen as important for a whole
range of conditions: the focus of quality of Ufe; the whole-person approach; care which
encompasses family and friends; respect for autonomy and choice; an emphasis on open and
sensitive communication.
Following this, the National Cancer Plan recommended that the NHS and the voluntary sector
ought to be working more closely together and funds have been pledged to hospices to support
their activities:
"By 2004, the NHS will invest an extra £50 million in hospices and specialist palliative care. The
Department of Health will agree with the voluntary sector the core services that should be
available, so that more patients will have access to these services, and the NHS will make a
more realistic contribution to the costs of voluntary hospices. NHS and voluntary sector services
will work more closely together. " (Department of Health 2000)
The Health Act (Department of Health 1999) created new working relationships to enable (the
old) health authorities and councils to improve services at the interface of health and social
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care. Local Strategic Partnerships were established across the country in 2001 as umbrella
partnerships with the remit to improve quality of life and governance in a particular locality
through bringing together public, private, voluntary and community sectors within which new
National Service Frameworks (NSF). The National Service Framework for Older People is only
the third NSF to be developed which indicates the perceived political importance of improving
services for this group (Department of Health 2001a). Palliative care services are used mainly
by older people so the consideration of quality of care at the end of life is given a high profile in
the NSF. The focus on end-of-life care in this document expressed the key values promoted by
the palliative care movement, that is, pain and symptom control, social care, spiritual care,
complementary therapies, psychological care, communication and bereavement support. This
indicated the extent to which palliative care philosophies have permeated into the mainstream
policy agenda (if not into practice).
The consultation paper on the NSF for older people was published in January 2002 and it
focused on how supportive and palliative care should be defined and the principles that should
be adopted. It highlights the difficulties of conceptualising an overarching definition of care for a
service for people who have different and changing needs over time. The National Institute for
Clinical Excellence has now been commissioned by the Department of Health to provide
evidence based guidance on supportive and palliative care and will report its findings during
2002/3 (Department of Health 2001 b).
These developments in defining and agreeing how palliative care services should be delivered
imply that they will be judged in similar ways to other services. The Department of Health will
want to be shown evidence of the effectiveness of palliative care services. Back in the 1980s,
the argument was set out by the hospice movement that palliative care was better than
traditional or conventional care for people with palliative care needs but there had been little
systematic evidence for this up until then (Seale 1989, Torrens 1985, Lancet Editorial 1986).
Evaluative studies that consider the outcomes of hospice care are emerging but the evidence is
not conclusive and the methods of evaluation have not been very robust. Systematic reviews of
studies of palliative care studies have not provided unequivocal evidence of the superiority of
palliative care over conventional care (Goodwin, Higginson et aI2002a). There is little published
evidence of the cost-effectiveness of palliative care (Bruera and Suarez-Almazor 1998).
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It is clear that there is a need for palliative care to present its contributions in ways that allow
comparison with other social and health services that compete for scarce resources (Webber
1996, Normand 1996). For aspects of palliative care that focus on pain control and symptom
management this is relatively uncomplicated as similar outcome measures as those used for
cancer therapies might be adopted (Brown and Sculpher 1999). These are areas where clinical
guidelines and. technology assessment face the same kinds of well-documented evaluation
problems as other types of health care (Birch and Gafni 2002). It is less straightforward for
interventions that meet more ill-defined, contested, or non-clinical aspects of care (Bosanquet
1997). This challenge is addressed in this thesis.
Palliative day care
Palliative day care is considered in this thesis as an example of a 'complex' intervention. The
nature of this complexity is explored and defined further on. It is a specialist service for people
who usually have advanced life-limiting illness and are usually able to live at home. They are
perceived to have particular needs that can be met by attending a specialist day centre (Fisher
and McDaid 1996, Tebbit 1999, Higginson et al 2000) and crosses the somewhat artificial
boundary in the UK between health and social care (Robbins 1998).
Palliative day centres are usually attached to inpatient hospices and patients may move
between these settings as the severity of their illness changes over time. Most centres have a
main social room, kitchen facilities, and therapyl consultation rooms. A centre might also have a
specially adapted bathroom/lacuzzl, arts facilities, hairdressing facilities, quiet rooms, office
space, and access to other parts of the inpatient unit, such as the smoking room and garden.
The space emphasises a non-clinical environment and is usually decorated with arts and crafts
made by people who attend, as well as work by local artists. The atmosphere is informal, and
people are encouraged to socialise and take part in group activities if they want to. Activities are
either undertaken in the main room as a group (such as creative activities, relaxation classes, or
social events) or are on an individual basis in the therapyl consultation rooms, bathroom or
hairdressing suite. There may also be talks or entertainment by outside visitors or occasional
outings, similar to other social care centres.
People who attend usually choose to have one or two therapies or consultations during the day,
and the rest of the time is spent in the main room socialising with others, taking part in group
activities or resting. Lunch is also served in the main room, and in every centre everyone is
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offered drinks from a mobile bar before lunch, which also emphasises the non-clinical
philosophy of care. The centres are run by a full-time day care leader with help from other
assistants, health professionals, therapists and others (such as religious counsellors) who may
work in the inpatient, day care and community settings. Volunteers act as general helpers and
may provide transport. to and from the centre, depending on the numbers available. Uke
inpatient hospice care, the input of voluntary support has led to some diversity in the
developments, and distinct philosophies of provision are visible (Douglas et al 2000, Spencer
and Daniels 1998).
The objectives of palliative day care have been grouped into five themes outlined in box 1.2
below:
Box 1.2 Objectives of palliative day care (Neale and Clark 1992, Scottish Partnership Agency
1995),
1. Physical well-being:
optimal control of physical symptoms and maximal functioning;
2. Psychological well-being:
improving strategies for dealing with stress, identifying depression and anxiety and increasing self-esteem
and confidence;
3. Social support:
relief of social isolation and provision of respite for carers;
4. Communication and co-ordination:
ensuring optimal communication between patients, carers and professionals, and between different
services;
5. Existential health: engendering hope and helping people to finding meaning and purpose in their lives.
Patients who access palliative care services are identified as having a spectrum of needs or one
specific need that it is proposed can be met or helped by a combination of health, social,
psychological and spiritual activities provided in the palliative day care centre (Higginson 1993).
In common with inpatient hospices and community palliative care teams, palliative day care
integrates physical care with support for emotional, social and spiritual well-being (Hearn and
Myers 2001).
There are differences in the way that services are provided across different centres (Copp,
Richardson et al 1998). Some centres encourage patients to stay all day, others set up
appointments for patients who might stay for a while before and after their appointment but then
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go home. There is some debate about how much medical support is required in a PDC centre
(Edwards et al 1997, Tookman and Scharpen von Heussen 2001), with some centres offering
appointments and medical review, with others only providing medical back-up in emergencies.
In the United Kingdom in 1991 there were 151 palliative day care centres attended by
approximately 4500 patients each week (Eve and Smith 1994). In 1996 there were known to be
230 day care centres accepting patients for one or two days a week. By August 2001 there were
260 different palliative day centres in the UK and 39 in the South-East region (personal
communication, Hospice Information Service 2002). Provision of palliative day care has
expanded rapidly, ensuring both that there is a service available in most parts of the UK,
alongside extensive developments of day care and home care teams.
This presents a challenge to evaluators, both in terms of determining the boundaries of the
intervention that is being assessed, and in terms of defining the outcomes of the intervention.
This has to be done in a way that is seen as appropriate to those attend PDC, meaningful to
policy-makers, and valid and reliable in the eyes of the research community.
The provision and evaluation of palliative day care will be explored in more detail in chapter 3 in
light of the evaluative studies and qualitative research that has been undertaken to inform the
economic studies presented as part of this thesis.
SECTION 4. THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS
The next chapter introduces the theoretical foundations on which the thesis and empirical work
is structured. It provides a discussion of the theory of welfare economics and considered
different methods of economic evaluation and why they have been adopted in different contexts.
The purpose of this is to understand the roots of economic evaluation, the theory on which it is
based, and why economic evaluation has developed the way that it has. This will provide a
foundation for understanding why there may be is a particular problem in the measurement of
complex health and social services. It is argued that some of the problems of not adhering to
welfare economic theory are particularly problematic in areas where the outcomes of
interventions cannot be easily measured in terms of health gain, or process measures. The
approaches to economic evaluation adopted in health economics are also reviewed. The
discussion examines the extent to which these methods have developed within or moved away
from the central assumptions of welfare economic theory. By moving away from preference
satisfaction to health gain, these approaches are pragmatic and have worked well in many
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contexts, but when it comes to the evaluation of more complex forms of care, they may not be
so helpful.
Chapter 3 considers the current state of economic research in palliative care as an example of a
complex area of health care. The evidence is assessed in light of the debates set out in chapter
2, especially with respect to how the outcomes of palliative care have been defined and
measured. Important gaps in the literature are identified in this review of the economic evidence.
In light of this, the practical and ethical challenges of undertaking studies in complex settings
are considered.
There is a body of evidence in the qualitative literature that provides insights into the nature of
palliative day care, and this evidence is important for the design of the choice experiment.
Evidence from a review of studies of day hospital and adult day care and of social services for
older people is also presented as these studies may provide insight for the evaluation of
palliative day care.
Chapter 4 builds on the evidence presented in chapter 3 and considers the arguments for
undertaking simple quality of life evaluation alongside the arguments for the adoption of
preference-based evaluation methodologies. Both approaches are undertaken in the empirical
investigation of outcomes for this thesis. The EO-50 quality of life instrument is introduced, and
the methods explored. The choice experiment approach to valuing outcomes is also presented
in this chapter, along with a detailed discussion of the methods of undertaking choice
experiments, and the theoretical underpinnings of this methodology, since it is less well known
than the EO-50 approach. The extent to which this methodology addresses some of the
problems inherent in the health gain approach is explored, and the possibility of deriving
monetary valuations of outcomes is considered.
Chapter 5 provides a detailed account of the methods used in the empirical study and the
design of the choice modelling experiment that was undertaken. The EO-50 study was
undertaken as part of a larger evaluation of POC that included an evaluation of the costs of
palliative day care, but the detailed methods and results are not reported since they are not
included within the overall aims of the thesis (a summary is attached at Appendix A). The choice
modelling experiment was designed in light of the qualitative descriptive evidence of palliative
day care and previous experience of trying to undertaken an economic evaluation in this
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context. This chapter describes how this study was designed from the description of the nature
of the research problem, to the final lay-out of the experiment. It refers. to other studies that have
used these methods in economic evaluation and explores the extent to which this study
emulates these studies and how it differs from them.
Chapter 6 presents the results of the two empirical studies, starting with the EO-50 study and
then presenting the results of the choice experiment. The results of the choice experiment are
reported following the analysis plan outlined in the previous chapter.
Chapter 7 discusses the important findings of the empirical studies presented in chapter 6 and
considers what this knowledge contributes. The discussion in this chapter focuses on the
contribution of this empirical work to decision-makers in areas where other forms of evaluation
have not been insightful. It appraises the strengths and weaknesses of the empirical studies and
considers whether the quality of life approach has provided sufficient evidence to support this
approach in other contexts where outcomes are not clearly defined. It then assesses whether
the choice experiment approach has provided any new or alternative insights into the value of
complex services.
Chapter 8 is the conclusion of the thesis. It revisits the main themes set out in the introduction,
and reviews the progress that has been made in tackling some of the problems set out at the
beginning. It assesses what the overall findings mean for policy, and the methodological
contribution to the evaluation of complex services. It then presents the overall contribution of the
thesis and considers the shortcomings both of the empirical study and of the thesis as a whole.
Finally, it signals areas for future research leading on from this.thesis in palliative care research,
and in the development and validation of theoretically sound economic evaluation methods that
measure complex outcomes.
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Chapter 2
Theory and application of welfare economics
and economic evaluation
Introduction
This chapter provides an overview of the theory of welfare economics as the cornerstone of
economic evaluation of health care. The focus of the discussion is on understanding why
economic evaluation methods have developed as they have and how they relate to the
underlying theory. The purpose is to consider the appropriateness of different methods for
evaluating complex services, and why some methods might be more relevant than others.
The theoretical overview in the first section is a discussion of the intellectual origins of
welfare economics and the nature of the problems that welfare economics has addressed.
The origins of this work can be traced to the ideas of 19th century economists and even
further back to Adam Smith's 'The Wealth of Nations'. The discussion highlights the key
theoretical assumptions of welfare economics and the ways in which these assumptions
have led to both theoretical and intellectual developments in health economic evaluation in
the zo" and 21st centuries.
The second section of this chapter considers the methodological developments in the field of
economic evaluation in health economics in particular, and the varying importance of welfare
economics in these developments. It reviews the debates about how to value health care,
and how far society's preferences (as opposed to objective measures of health gain) have
been included in methods of evaluation. The different methods are considered in the light of
their application to complex services to assess which would be appropriate in these
contexts.
SECTION 1. THE ORIGINS OF ECONOMIC EVALUATION IN THE WELFARE
ECONOMICS TRADITION
The forefathers of modern welfare economics were moral philosophers as well as
economists. The two disciplines were intrinsically related to one another, involving political
and moral thinking, relating values and how society ought to be (Edwards 2001). Adam
Smith's 18th century theory of laissez-faire, where egotistical individual action leads to social
good, is a founding theory. The axioms of this theory are interconnecting neo-classical ideas
of constrained choice, consumer sovereignty, consistency of tastes, perfect knowledge and
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perfect mobility of factors. This has not changed in neo-classical economics since that time.
(Blaug 1985, Edwards 2001).
Utilitarianism
The theory of laissez-faire or market economics was seen as an alternative to theories of
natural and divine law for defining the right way to live (Cole, Cameron and Edwards 1983,
Salter 1994). Jeremy Bentham, a philosopher with an interest in economics, first proposed
that consumer satisfaction was measurable. He proposed that all human beings have
roughly equal capacity for pleasure and pain; therefore equality in consumption was
desirable for the greatest happiness of the greatest number (utilitarianism).
But the psychological foundations of utility theory were crude. Bentham's work relied on the
theory of 'psychological hedonism', that all behaviour was motivated by the pleasure/pain
principle. This theory provided a rationale for consumer behaviour but the underlying
hedonistic assumptions were strongly challenged in the face of the psychological evidence
for how people actually behaved. This was summarised succinctly in the 1920s by the
psychologist William McDouglas who wrote:
"It would be a Jibel, not altogether devoid of truth, to say that classical political economy was
a tissue of false conclusions drawn from false psychological assumptions." (McDouglas
1923, quoted in Landreth and Colander 1994)
In a summary of the work of Bentham, one author has suggested that Bentham sometimes
referred to utility as it if were a state of mind related to pleasure and pain, at other times as if
it were a metaphysical property of the objects that produce pleasure or pain (Bonner 1995).
Bentham's theory of value is a more complex analysis than is commonly known in that he
acknowledges that intensity, duration, certainty, and nearness/remoteness factors are also
included in valuing pleasure and pain. Bentham also recognised that losses are more keenly
felt than future gains and that individuals differ in their capabilities. He proposed that all
policy should be assessed on the basis of its effects on human feelings, and that there were
trade-offs between efficiency, equality and happiness (Bonner ibid.).
Bentham was highly influential in promoting the ideas of utilitarianism. Bentham believed
changes in utility would eventually be measurable so that economics would have the same
precision and objectivity as the natural sciences (Mirowski 1989, in Ackerman 1997). Social
utility or social welfare was simply the sum of individuals' utility. However, although utility
was defined as a quantitative magnitude, it could not be either directly observed or
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measured. It was conceived as a latent property that could only be measured by observing
its impact on (utility-maximising) human behaviour. This is a fundamental unchanged
property of utility as defined in neo-classical economic theory today (Robinson 1964).
Utility was therefore conceptualised as an accounting unit by which different combinations of
goods and services could be made commensurable and evaluated by the individual.
Pleasure could be increased (or pain reduced) by trading and consuming different bundles of
goods and services that contained different levels of utility, as perceived by the individual
doing the trading. However, while proposing that utility could be measured this way,
Bentham never proposed a practical method of empirical measurement of utility. Smith's
laissez-faire economics had demonstrated to his satisfaction that utility is maximised by free
competition and trade, and this neatly avoided the problem of having to measure it.
There was apparently little interest in the theory of utility until John Stuart Mill proposed a
more complex approach to understanding human motivation than individual rational
hedonism (Hunt 1979). Mill rejected two of Bentham's central tenets: that all motivation could
be reduced to self-interest, and that the individual is always the best judge of his own
welfare. He also challenged the idea that different forms of pleasure could be summed
across individuals or within individuals. His idea was that different sources of pleasure
differed in quality and were not therefore commensurable units of utility. Some forms of utility
were more worthy, or more valuable to society, than others. He rejected the extreme values
of laissez-faire by observing the failures of capitalism in his day. He proposed that where
markets failed, governments should intervene in order to promote more equitable distribution
of income and to assist the poor. This difference in moral philosophy from Bentham is a
fundamental "intellectual schism" between two pathways of economic thought within neo-
classical economics. The idea that utility maximisation should incorporate some additional
moral dimensions, such as equity considerations, rather than being simply the sum of
individual utility is an important theoretical concern in modern applications of economic
evaluation. This is especially true of economic evaluation of health care.
The next generation of economists continued this intellectual schism in the theory of utility
(Black 1990). Jevons and Marshall had different understandings of utilitarianism,
representing different approaches to welfare economics. Jevons' work was based on
Bentham's theories and he opposed the re-working of utility by Mills that some forms of utility
were more or less worthy than others. He proposed an alternative "ordinalisf' view of utility
that was the foundation of the ordinalist revolution achieved by the work of Pareto
(Ackerman 1997). Jevon's work relied on Bentham's one-dimensional net sum pleasurel
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pain principles. But he proposed that measurement of utility was nearly impossible and that
utility and disutility were hypothetical constructs. This approach rejected the idea that utility
could be measured or compared between individuals. It emphasised the unpredictable
diversity of individual desires rather than their commonality. The work of Jevons (followed by
Fisher and Pareto) demonstrated that the technical theory of human behaviour could be
developed without cardinal measurement or interpersonal comparisons of utility.
Marshall on the other hand made a distinction between ethical and economic arguments
(Ackerman 1997). He proposed that utility was measurable in terms of money, but rejected
the "crude" hedonic demand principles as the theory of value. He suggested that human
motivation was more complex than a simple ledger of pleasure and pain. Marshall was
influenced by Mills in his philosophy and economic theory. However he acknowledged that
non-material values were not amenable to empirical analysis and therefore were not
appropriate subjects for economic enquiry. These ideas became detached from the technical
aspects of work by the same authors (Ackerman ibid.).
Jevons and Marshall proposed different future directions for economics: Jevons favoured
economic sub-disciplines and the development of a science of economics, akin to the natural
sciences. Marshall favoured a synthesis of disciplines and argued for a broader
understanding of human behaviour but in quantifiable terms, set against the measuring rod
of money.
Vilfredo Pareto's contribution to modern welfare economics
The fundamental principles of economic evaluation in health care are grounded in Paretian
welfare economics since Pareto was the economist who set out the strict principles on which
comparisons between alternatives polictes could be made in the utility maximising
framework. Adam Smith had already addressed the question of human welfare by proposing
that welfare could be maximised by the invisible hand of markets and trade. However, the
assumptions that underpin the economic theory (and its limitations) were made explicit by
Pareto.
Pareto set out principles of welfare economics in the late 19th and early zo" century. He was
working in a general equilibrium framework developed by Walras, an economist concerned
.with the problem of whether it was possible to define a finite level of production and
consumption where the economy would be optimised. Pareto considered the formal
conditions for optimal levels of production and consumption, which he argued would lead to
the best conditions for the welfare of individuals living in that society. The analysis was
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based on neo-classical economics, but its broader concern with the social benefits of
resource optrnatlsatlon led to a new branch of economics known as welfare economics
(Jackson 1992, Landreth and Colander 1994). It is interesting to note that Walras (who
taught Pareto) was the founder of axiomatic mathematical analysis of competitive
equilibrium, and he drew sharp distinction between applied (market) economics and what he
called "social" economics.
Pareto was a follower of Walras' mathematical theory. Pareto's contribution was to give a
formal definition to the concept of social welfare and the conditions necessary to achieving a
socially optimal level of welfare. This assumed (as for neo-classical economics in general)
that individuals are rational, welfare-maximising decision-makers, and who make decisions
to trade their wealthlincome for goods and services that improve their well-being (Winch
1971).
Pareto started to formalise the conditions, known as the 'marginal conditions', of welfare
maximisation, for achieving optimal resource allocation of society's resources (Brown and
Jackson 1978). Under these conditions, a Pareto Optimum is one where the well-being of all
individuals is maximised so that any economic change would make at least one person
worse off. A Pareto Improvement in an economy, therefore, is one where any reallocation of
resources makes at least one person better off without making anyone worse off. A move
towards these optimising conditions could be said to be an improvement in social welfare.
The marginal conditions are also the conditions necessary for perfect competition in classic
economic demand theory. Therefore, these conditions pertain to a theoretical model rather
than the conditions that are comprehensively attainable in real life (Dasgupta and Pearce
1972).
An important break from past debates on social welfare (the "Old" welfare economics) was
Pareto's rejection of the idea of interpersonal comparisons of utility and cardinal
measurement. Until Pareto, it had been accepted that individual utility could be summed to
calculate total social welfare (Blaug 1985). However, Pareto argued that the utility (or the
strength of preference) derived from a commodity could not be assumed to be the same for
two individuals and therefore could not be summed to produce a total amount of utility. This
was known as the 'ordinalist revolution'. The only type of approach that would not rely on
making comparisons between individuals' welfare was a straightforward ordinal ranking of
preferences. This meant that it was possible to know the ranking of preferences between
individuals, but not the relative strength of preference between them. Within this framework,
it could be determined that a person prefers A to B but not how much more A is preferred to
31
Chapter 2
B. If some people prefer A and some people prefer B, it is not possible to say which option
has the strongest support overall.
Pareto was concerned to maintain economics as a positive rather than a normative science
and as a consequence he narrowed the criteria for what could be known about individuals'
and society's welfare. This meant that there were only very limited circumstances in which it
could be said cateqorlcally (or positively) that a welfare improvement had been achieved. To
return to the example above, it would only be true to say A represents an improvement in
social welfare if one person or more preferred 'A to B and everyone else is indifferent
between A and B. In other words; the only changes that could be considered an
improvement in social welfare are those where at least one person is made better off and no
one made worse off.
It has been argued that Pareto's work is grounded in a school of economic thought that
considered economic theory in isolation from the practical reality of decision-making (Mishan
1988). His work is more comfortably situated in the mathematical rather than the ethical
schools of economics. But 20th century economists have argued that the conditions for
Pareto optimality were anything but politically neutral because of the assumptions about
human behaviour on which his ideas were based (Sen 1970a).
Pareto's analysis might have fallen into obscurity due to the fact that so few real life
situations exist where a Pareto Improvement might be determined. In nearly all policy
changes there will be winners as well as losers. In his context, Pareto does not provide
guidance since it is not possible to determine whether the winners win more than the losers
lose.
Later developments of welfare economics
Pareto never actually finalised the formal rules of Pareto optimality. This was undertaken in
the 20th century. Later economists distinguished between value judgments and factual
analysis, minimizing the importance of the problems of interpersonal comparisons of utility.
The results of this work were formalised in the 1950s by Arrow and Oebreu who set out the
two fundamental theorems of welfare economics (Arrow 1963). These were conditions that
would have to meet for a Pareto optimum to be realised'. These conditions made reaching a
. Pareto Optimum a theoretical concept rather than an achievable goal since the number of
situations in which there are only gainers is minutely small (Jackson 1992).
1 The first theorem states that a competitive equilibrium is also a Pareto Optimum. The second theorem states that any Pareto
Optimum can be achieved via competition if the appropriate lump sum taxes and transfers are imposed on firms.
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Before Arrow and Debreu, a second generation of "new welfare economists" of the 1930s
had attempted to make some progress beyond this theoretical impasse of the impossibility of
interpersonal comparisons of utility that had reduced Pareto's influence to almost nothing in
his own time (Jackson 1992). Pareto's work was rescued by developments in welfare
economics that proposed the concept of gainers compensating losers in policy change.
Pareto himself acknowledged the fact that if the gains from an economic change were
greater than the losses, then social welfare had increased, but he never was never able to
formalise this and maintain the strict adherence to positive economics. One of his
contemporaries, writing in 1908, Barone set out more formally the conditions under which
gains might outweigh the losses (Landreth and Colander 1994). Then in 1939, two
economists, Kaldor and Hicks - separately from each other - considered the idea of a Pareto
improvement where gainers compensated losers. The Hicks-Kaldor criterion stated that if the
gainers compensated the losers up to the point where losers returned to their original
welfare position (Le. were indifferent between their original welfare position and their new
position with compensation) and there were still overall gains to gainers, then social welfare
had increased. This was a new foundation on which welfare economics could be based, and
came to be known as the 'second welfare economics" (Hicks 1975).
The decision-rule was later refined since in many situations the costs of identifying the
gainers and losers cou!d outweigh the final benefits and make the change not worthwhile.
The Hicks-Kaldor criterion evolved into a potential compensation by gainers to losers without
any exchange of wealth necessarily taking place. This meant that Pareto's economic theory
could be translated into a practical analytical tool. It still avoided the ethical question of who
gains and who loses from any intervention or economic change. But as a tool for assessing
overall costs and benefits before the issue of distribution arose, it was judged to be useful. It
became the foundation of cost-benefit analysis.
While there were important improvements and refinements to Pareto's welfare framework in
the mid 20th century, there were important critiques of the framework. These arguments
brought about a decline in the application of the welfare economic theory to real world
problems (Ng 1990). Two of these critiques were Arrow's general possibility theorem and
SCitovsky's double criterion principle. Arrow's theorem (referred to as the third fundamental
theorem of welfare economics) proved that under a few simple assumptions there is no
logically consistent, non-dictatorial social welfare function that ranks all social outcomes
(Hammond 1987). It proved the impossibility of adding individual ordinal utilities into a social
welfare function (MacKay 1980). The second criterion, also called the reversal paradox,
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challenged the basis of Pareto's criteria that a change was always for the better if it made
one person better off without making anyone else worse off (Scitovsky 1973). What he
demonstrated was that if an allocation A is deemed superior to another allocation B by the
Kaldor-Hicks compensation criteria, by a subsequent set of moves.by the same criteria, it
could be proved that B is also superior to A. These critiques threw much of welfare theory
into confusion during the 1940s and 1950s and imposed huge problems in the practical
application of use of welfare economics.
The overall aim of welfare economics has been the maximisation of the social welfare
function derived from individual desires (Arrow 1963). Even with the theoretical challenges
set out above, economists have adhered "with tenacity" (Edwards 2001) to the underpinning
value judgements of Pareto welfarism. These are that every individual is the best judge of
his own utility and each has a specified utility function. Social welfare is defined as the sum
of individuals' utility. What has been adhered to with less enthusiasm is the notion that the
utility of individuals cannot be compared (Arrow 1963). One of the reasons for this has been
the problem of what decision rule could replace Pareto optimality (Edwards ibid.). This
problem will be returned to in later sections in the context of health economic evaluation.
Late twentieth century economists have argued that welfare economics should be rejected
since it does not provide practical, value free decision rules. Sen has shown that Pareto
optimality assumes that if a move makes everyone better off, society is automatically better
off. This may be an unobjectionable value judgement for many, but it is a value judgement
nonetheless (Sen 1987). There is also the problem that using Pareto optimality as a criterion
to determine welfare isolates Hume's dictum that you cannot derive a 'should' from a fact.
Therefore, in its pure form, Pareto optimality may have little to contribute to real world
decision-making. Almost all social policy decisions will inevitably hurt some people, even if in
a small indirect way, while helping others.
In the wake of Arrow's general possibility theorem, and other critiques, a new approach to
the problems of welfare economics had to emerge. Social choice theory set out to examine
the manner in which individual choice, preferences and welfare should enter into social
judgements and decisions about economic matters. This theoretical development coincided
with philosophical discussions of equity and ethics in economics in order to expand the
subject matter and range of welfare economics.
Sen has been very influential in this field. Sen appeals to the common sense belief that
people's experience and satisfactions are comparable and human beings act as if they could
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compare their satisfaction with others. Sen has analysed Arrow's theorem and has
questioned the strict axioms he presents, especially the rejection of interpersonal
comparisons of utility (Sen 1970a). Rarely are decisions made without some interpersonal
comparisons of utility. Furthermore, he has argued that satisfaction of private preferences
alone is an inadequate basis for social judgement. Therefore at the heart of Pareto's rules is
a "liberal paradox." (Sen 1970b). This paradox is that Pareto decision rules are incompatible
with even the most minimal interpretation of individual rights. Sen has suggested some
modification of the Pareto rule so that an individual's choices for the satisfaction of personal
preferences can be separated from an individual's preferences to be counted for social
choice.
Developments in utility theory - axiomatic utility theory
Mathematical interest in utility theory as a theory of human behaviour and motivation has
developed alongside the theoretical debates about the usefulness of Paretian welfare
economics. Its contribution is in developing the underlying theory and demonstrating a
relationship between human behaviour and the otherwise obtuse concept of value and utility.
This is a valuable contribution as it can get around some of the problems of Paretian welfare
economics of measuring utility, described earlier.
Axiomatic utility theory starts from the point of individuals' preferences. The theory proves
that, provided preferences conform to some axioms, they can be represented by a utility
function. Of two alternatives, the one that is preferred will have the higher utility value.
Values taken from this function are called utilities. In any choice content, when faced with a
set of alternatives, the utility function assigns a greater utility to the alternative that is
preferred. So utility has adopted the meaning ''the value of the function that represents a
person's preferences" (Broome 1999). The theorem of utility theory is that a person always
prefers what is best for them and a person always prefers exactly what is in their own self-
interest has been criticised as not taking into account human traits such as altruism and
imprudence. The debate is whether this meaning of utility rather than other concepts of value
or "need" are useful when applied to non-market commodities, such as health care. This
represents an important divergence of methodology in economic evaluation, as will be
discussed later in this chapter in considering health economic evaluation.
However, axiomatic utility theory itself does not make assumptions about the self-interest of
individuals or why they make the decisions they do, and whether they are altruistic or selfish.
It is only concerned that individuals conform to specific mathematical axioms of behaviour.
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One development of axiomatic utility theory has become the foundation of economic
evaluation theory is expected utility theory (EUT).
Expected utility theory
EUT has its modern roots in the mathematical decision theory developed in the context of
game theory in the 1940s by von Neumann and Morgenstern. However, its historical roots
go further back. Mathematicians in the 1ih century assumed that a rational individual would
choose to yield the highest possibility utility (in terms of money) when faced with a choice of
alternatives (Oliver 2002). Later in the same century, it was argued that the value of wealth
increases at a decreasing rate, and that utility is evaluated not in terms of expected value,
but in terms of expected subjective value to the individual. This was a cornerstone of
expected utility theory.
The work of the founders of game theory provided the first formal exposition of the axioms of
EUT as a way of considering utility that overcomes some of the problems of Pareto
optimality and welfare economics (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944). The theory of
behaviour towards risk first set out by von Neumann and Morgenstern is essentially the
hypothesis that the individual possesses (or acts as if possessing) a utility function that
adheres to a set of strict axioms of rationality. This means that, when faced with alternative
risky choices, the individual will choose the alternative that maximises expected utility. Since
the outcomes being considered could be alternative levels of wealth, years of life, commodity
bundles, or even non-numerical consequences (a healthy baby, for example), the approach
is open to a wide range of applications and choice situations. Much of the theoretical work in
the economics of uncertainty is undertaken within the EUT framework.
EUT assumes that individuals have a preference ordering over objects that may be
represented by a preference function. A particular alternative in a choice presented to an
individual will only be preferred by that individual if it is assigned a higher value in the
individual's preference function (and vice versa). There exist dozens of formal axiomisations
of EUT in its different contexts. Most start with four basic axioms: completeness, transitivity,
continuity and independence (Box 2.1).
The theory demonstrates that, if the axioms are adhered to, there exists a utility function,
where, like utility theory under certainty, the alternative chosen by an individual will have
higher utility, but in addition, it shows that the utility of an alternative is also its expected
utility based on probabilistic outcomes. This means that an individual who adheres to the
36
Chapter2
axioms of EUT will choose the alternative that has the best probabilistic outcomes under
uncertainty.
Box 2.1 The four basic axioms of Expected Utility Theory, (as described in Oliver
2002)
If preferences are transitive, then for Y1 ~Y2.andY2~Y3,then Y1 ~Y3
If preferences are complete, then either Yl ~Y2or Y2~ Yh where ~ is the preference relation
"at least as good as"
Continuity requires that if Y1 ~Y2~Y3.then for some unique probability p,
Y2= pY1 + (1 - p)Y3• where = indicates indifference
Independence requires that if Y1 ~Y2.then pY1+ (1 - p) Y3~ pY2 + (1 - p) Y3
There is good evidence that individuals in practice do not conform to the axioms of EUT
(Tversky and Kahneman 1986), although it can still be argued that rational people ought to
conform to the theory (Broome 1991). For example, it does not necessarily follow that a self-
interested but risk averse individual would automatically prefer an alternative with the best
odds, over an alternative that provided lower odds, but a certainty of at least a small win.
Broome has illustrated this with the example of a gamble of 99 units for certain, with a 50:50
chance of 200 or nothing. EUT would predict the individual to choose the latter option, but
the individual might prefer the choice of 99 units since this is the 'safe bet'.
However, the contribution of von. Neumann and Morgenstern's theory is in the
characterisation of how rational individuals should make decisions when faced with uncertain
outcomes, where probabilities are not objectively known. They outlined axioms of choice that
have become basic foundations of decision analysis. Raiffa (1968) and several others (Bell
1982, Howard 1992) have expanded this work.
The empirical findings do not violate the scientific rationality of expected utility theory per se
since the axioms need not be descriptive to be normative (Nease 1996). Because people do
not make choices that are consistent with EU theory, this does not mean they ought not to
make decisions based on EU theory to maximise their utility. It is a theory built on logical
mathematics, not on how people are observed to behave, so this is not a surprising finding.
It is argued that EUT provides a metaphor for how people make decisions under uncertainty
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(Nease ibid.) and as such can generate valuable insights, even if this is not how individuals
actually behave all the time. What is important is that the empirical work founded on the
principles of EUT recognises the normative characteristics of this theory and interprets the
findings of research in light of this. No representational system can be exact or completely
analogous with reality, nor can it generate a description of the world that matches it fully
(Bronowski 1966). This is a theme that will be returned to in later olscusslons of methods of
economic evaluation of health care.
Different intellectual pathways of economic evaluation
The arguments presented so far have suggested that the origins of welfare economics are
based on subtly different theories about the purpose of economics and the role of economics
in deciding policy questions. Utilitarianism is founded on principles that have at their heart
strong assumptions about the nature of human behaviour and how decisions about human
welfare ought to be made. This has been contested by economists who argue that every
decision rule has a value judgement and moral position on which it is based, and do not
provide technical solutions to social issues.
The difference in interpretation of how economics ought to develop has led to different areas
of focus for economics. This divergence in pathways in the development of economics is still
evident in modern welfare economics today. They remain two rival branches within the same
discipline. Sen has proposed that modern welfare economics has dual origins in both ethics
and engineering and that this explains the duality of concerns and interests (Sen 1987). This
mirrors the schism in intellectual approaches set out earlier. One pathway has been to take
economic thought (and economic evaluation) into the area of mathematical complexity, using
methods developed in operation research and statistics. The other has been to maintain
some political, ethical or moral dimension of economics and economic questions. It has been
argued that questions of human well-being and welfare have been marginalised and the
egalitarian element of the utilitarian doctrine has been sterilised by moving from utility to
physical output as the object to be maximised in modern economics (Robinson 1964).
A dominant focus in economic evaluation has been in the validity and reliability of
measurement that has attempted to mirror physical sciences. Interest in the mathematics of
human behaviour and psychology (which is important in later sections of this chapter) has
developed within this tradition. Political economy, which has at its core a moral focus on how
society ought to be, has branched into a separate discipline although the forefathers of
economics saw moral philosophy, politics and economics as part of the same core discipline.
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However, it could be argued that all economics has at its core a value base or moral
philosophy. The split between political economy and economics is over whether the
consideration of moral philosophy ought to be explicit or implicit in the analysis. The moral
philosophy in economic evaluation can be gauged by whatever is being maximised by the
rational individual. Sen has distinguished three types of motivation: self interest, sympathy
for others and duty or commitment to moral principles (Sen 1987) Economic evaluation is
usually restricted to the maximisation of self-interested individuals.
Another way in which economics has branched away has been to reject some of the central
tenets of welfarism as unworkable in the real world and to dedicate energies to ''the activities
prohibited by the theories and axioms of the hard core of the parent discipline" (Edwards
2001), specifically the interpersonal comparisons of utility. The efforts of the "extra-
welfarists" in health economics have been steered towards the search for an operational
definition of health gain as the unit for its cardinal measurement, thereby bypassing the
problem of the impossibility of utility measurement or comparison. By attempting to replace
utility with other comparative units of health, health economists in particular have moved
away from traditional welfare economics. It has been suggested that this approach has
made the discipline more vulnerable to "an intellectual vacuum [that] looms large in the
history of economics" (Blaug 1985).
Consequently, there is a tension between theoretical validity and practical application at the
core of health economic evaluation. This theme will be returned to later in this chapter and in
subsequent chapters. The next section considers approaches to economic evaluation and
the extent to which they adhere to the principles of welfare economics discussed here.
These debates are reflected in the approaches that will be outlined in the following sections
on approaches to economic evaluation since they about trying to understand what is "good"
for society and how this can be resolved. The satisfaction of individual preferences is at the
core of welfare economics, but not at the core of health economic evaluation. The question
of how to value complex service that aim to satisfy people's needs rather than to produce
objective health benefits is especially relevant to the discussion of how to evaluate services
such as palliative care.
Cost-benefit analysis (CBA)
Cost benefit analysis is the pragmatic application of modern welfare economics that
compares the overall gains to the overall losses and considers a policy to be an
improvement if there are more gains overall. In order to create the greatest benefit at the
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least cost as those costs and benefits are viewed by the people who experience them it is
necessary to aggregate individual preferences into global preferences. There is no
completely objective unit of measurement for doing this, but money can be used as a
measure of subjective value (Scitovsky 1993). CSA considers the subjective social costs and
consequences of interventions, and values them in the same common (usually monetary)
units for comparison with all other possible uses of the same resources (Winch 1971).
Decision rules of CSA Can lead to an optimal level of allocation of resources if all gains and
losses can be measured satisfactorily in this way. It has been argued that this approach can
be applied to the evaluation of market and non-market goods (Hanneman 1984).
CSA has been described as a form of "simple democracy" as it records preferences (how
much society desires something, how much they would sacrifice for it) and make
recommendations on that basis (Dasgupta and Pearce 1972). Implicit in this is that
individuals' preferences should count. The foundations of these preferences and what leads
to individuals' decisions to consume (selfish wants, desire for equity, altruism) are not
considered. It is well founded in rationality as a way of identifying what society prefers and is
able to approximate social preferences and measure social gains and losses.
This is referred to as a 'gold standard' approach in economic evaluation (Mishan 1988) as all
the costs and all the benefits (the gainers and the losers in any intervention with economic
consequences) are defined. CSA takes into account all the social costs and benefits of a
policy (or economic change) rather than making a priori decisions about which costs and
benefits are worth measuring. It has been described as ''the most powerful aid to public
decision-makers" as it attempts to replicate market processes and produces results that can
be compared with private sector appraisal techniques (Hutton 1992).
A profusion of technical and measurement difficulties surround the practice of CSA
(Ackerman 1997). One particular problem with CSA techniques in real world evaluation is
they ignore distributional equity: who gains, who loses, and the final distribution of income.
For example if a change makes people on low incomes worse off by £100 and the rich better
off by £250 , it still produces excess gain of £150 for society as a whole. CSA would favour
such a change if distributional considerations were not taken into account. As Hicks-Kaldor
type compensations between gainers and losers in an economic change are only
hypothetical compensations; a Pareto improvement is consistent with many people actually
being made worse off. This is unlikely to receive support from the public, even after the
system of taxation and subsidies to bring about a redistribution of wealth and increase
welfare more evenly (Mishan 1988).
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There has been some suggestion of weighting gains and losses to reflect equity
considerations, but Mishan has argued forcefully that this leaves CBA exposed to political
lobbying (and no better than it) since it opens the possibility of making the results seem more
favourable for particular groups (Mishan 1988). He argues that public policy changes should
meet the tests of the political process independently of CBA and leave the method of
assessing gains and losses as politically neutral as possible (within the constraints of the
explicit behavioural assumptions inherent in the methodology).
Critics of CBA have questioned the psychological realism of hypothetical valuation without
giving individuals any real context to the evaluation problem (Frank 1989). The notion that
the social optimum can be reached by satisfying private preferences has also been
challenged (Sagoff 1994), as has the idea that non-market goods such as health can be
"commodified" (Anderson 1993). This last point questions the assumption that value can be
determined by the same method as market transactions for private goods and that they are
therefore substitutable with other commodity bundles that have an equivalent value. The
approach assumes that market norms and private preferences should shape policy.
Proponents have argued that the validity of CBA is precisely because it does value non-
market goods and is oriented towards valuing all costs and benefits regardless of whether
they enter financial calculations (Campen 1986).
Mishan (1988) argued that there might be grades or stages of CBA and society can decide
how far it is willing to accept the premises of Pareto's criteria for welfare improvement.
Society must decide how much it is willing to trade Pareto optima in resource allocation for
other values it holds important, such as distributional justice. Practitioners of economic
evaluation whose analyses feed into the decision-making processes must decide which
approach to adopt. This could be the utilitarian model of welfare (Wherethe total amount of
utility is the final goal), or they could take account of the distribution of costs and benefits
among individuals in society. This has direct relevance to the current debates in health
economics on the equity-efficiency trade-off discussed further on.
Yet Mishan was optimistic about a reduced role for CBA in public policy analysis. He saw
Pareto optimality as a "guide not a religion". CBA can provide a sum of valuations given by
the public, but no warrant for asserting the ranks or preferences arriving from these
valuations that may need to take other valuations into account. This he saw as best left to
the politicians and the democratic process. This left CBA with a "more modest but useful (if .
still overrated) task" (Mishan 1988).
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Concepts of liberty and coercion and the role of government in determining what is 'good' for
society have added to the complexity of the arguments about how to determine "value" but
they have not had a major impact on the underlying core of welfare economics in economic
evaluation. These issues are not generally considered within the, economic evaluation
framework that has tended to focus.on technical concepts of efficiency. Social choice theory
has had some impact on economic evaluation, especially in the area of poverty reduction
and economic development, (Sen 1982) but this has tended to be at the macroeconomic
rather than microeconomic intervention level. The lack of a clear decision rule to replace
Pareto optimality as the yardstick by which to measure welfare change has meant that it has
not had such an impact on the microeconomic analysis.
There are problems with applying CBA to health care that have led to the development of
other methods of evaluation becoming dominant in health economic evaluation. These
problems and the reason for the dominance of alternative methods is explored in the next
section, alongside the debates about the extent to which these alternative methods have
retained or moved away from the central tenets of welfare economics. All methods of
economic evaluation make a trade-off between adherence to theoretical principles of Pareto
Optimality (and application of the logic and decision-rules arising from the theory), and the
practical need for information (without logical decision rules). The problem that this
compromise raises, and the implications for what can be measured and valued using these
other methods, is the focus of the next section.
Summary of the welfare economic arguments relevant to the thesis
This review of the origins of welfare economics and its practical application in CBA is
presented to consider the fundamental assumptions that underlie economic evaluation. It
has been necessary to go back this far in order to have a basis for understanding where
economic evaluation in health care comes from, the extent that it adheres to this underling
theory and the problems that arise from moving away from these underlying principles. This
is not to say that these principles should always be strictly adhered to, or that economic
evaluation methods that have moved away from these principles without good reason. But it
recognises that all method of economic evaluation that are not strict cost-benefit analyses
make trade-offs between theoretical validity and practical application. The argument is that
departure from theory matters in some contexts more than in others. In the evaluation of
complex areas of health and social care, where the relationship between health gain and the
value of that health gain is not straightforward, approaches that adopt the health gain
approach may not capture the value of these services to the individuals who use them, and
to society more widely.
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SECTION 2. METHODS OF ECONOMIC EVALUATION OF HEALTH CARE
The first evaluations of human life concentrated on valuing the changes in quality and
quantity of labour (the human capital approach) (Mooney 1977). This approach took as its
starting point the notion that investment in education, training, and health care would have
an effect on labour and national wealth. It did not consider the outcomes of health care
beyond the benefits to the labour market. Neither were consumer preferences included in
this valuation. In this simple framework, society has no input into the valuation either of
human life or on how public money should be used to improve life. The narrowness of focus
has meant that this approach did not have much application after the 1960s, and 1970s
(Mooney ibid.)
Dreze (1962) has been identified as the first to consider the valuation of life along lines that
link it theoretically with welfare economics, with considerations of consumer sovereignty and
with reference to individuals' preferences. He proposed that if the costs incurred by an
individual to avoid the risk of premature death could be freely determined by an individual
(unconstrained by coercion or incomplete knowledge), then the monetary value would reflect
society's preferences. Schelling (1968) emphasised the need to reflect the valuation of one's
own life rather than someone else's (therefore consistent with the individual consumer
sovereignty approach). Much of the early work focused on saving life rather than the value of
life itself, which represented a move away from the human capital approach.
The insurance-based approach might also be interpreted as reflecting a completely different
quality in the valuation of human life (fear of death, psychic attributes of life). However, trying
to establish the value of life by assessing the value of risk of death is flawed since an
individual's life is not replaceable if it ends. An individual will never be indifferent between the
risk of death and a monetary value (there is no "claims" market for one's own life) (Jones-
Lee 1976).
Mishan was highly critical of these early attempts to value life, and endeavoured to put
human valuation firmly into the methodological paradigm of cost-benefit analysis, guided by
Pareto optimality (or potential Pareto improvement) and compensating losers in a policy
change (Mishan 1988).
Advantage of CBA in health care evaluation
CSA allows all the important influences on demand for a health service and future welfare
from that service as perceived by the individual to be taken into account. For any description
of reality, or a health scenario they might face, individuals can value the consequences of
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that scenario by taking into consideration any number of variables, both known and unknown
(Pearce and Nash 1981). This includes attitudes to risk, attitudes to future health, and views
on equity (benefits to other individuals) (Mooney 1977).
The main theoretical advantage of CSA over other evaluation methods in the health sector is
that health and utility derived from health is only one argument in the social welfare function.
It starts from the assumption that the only necessary data are orderings or subjective
valuation of individual members of society. No other principles of the general good are
needed. Actual Pareto improvements are extremely rare, so the relevant question is whether
a policy or intervention brings about a potential Pareto improvement. If, in aggregate, the net
gain is greater the net loss, then there is net social benefit.
Problems of applying CBA to health care
There are specific problems in applying CSA to health care. In the 1970s, Mooney set out
the arguments for why CSA had not had a significant impact on decision-making in health
care (Mooney 1977). He argued that there had been a lack of theoretical progress since the
rejection of the human capital approach; that the power of the medical establishment had not
been supportive of introducing economic evaluation; the decision-making process was
diffuse in health care; the outputs of health care were also diffuse; and there was a lack of
information of effectiveness on treatments. Mooney also argued that only a small proportion
of resource actually saved lives as a primary outcome, while the rest was used to decrease
morbidity, the measurement of which is fraught with difficulties. Mooney also put the case
clearly that the valuation of human life -is not a numerical sum since there is no simple
calculus for comparing the cost of a health intervention with the benefits of saving or
improving a human life (Mooney 1977). There is no "market price" for life to determine its
monetary value. All these problems, he argued three decades ago, have contributed to a
lack of demand for CSA in health care.
It has been argued however that CSA is a useful conceptual idea where markets did not
exist, as addressed by Mooney:
"All we require to establish that something has a positive value for which a monetary value
could exist is that individuals in society would be prepared to pay a positive monetary sum
for that 'something" (Mooney 1977, pp56).
If market price and consumer surplus indicate the value of a commodity, then, Mooney
argued, consistency dictates that methods of evaluation should be attempted in order to
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establish the monetary value of non-market goods. The central assumption of this line of
argument however, is that the axioms of the market also hold for non-market goods.
Consumers are seen as sovereign, fully informed individuals who know how to satisfy their
own welfare needs, and their needs can be satisfied through consumption. If this is the case,
then a monetary valuation (what individuals would be prepared to pay on the open market)
would reflect the value of these commodities to individuals. These conditions may not be
achieved but it is important to remember that these are the underlying assumptions of the
approach. By the beginning of the 21st century, some of the issues had been addressed to
some extent, but barriers, both practical and theoretical, to implementation of CBA have to a
large extent remained (Dolan and Edlin 2002). The measurement of morbidity and quality of
life remains a major challenge for economic evaluation. There is also a problem in assuming
that individuals are welfare maximisers. Advertising, and differences in people's tastes mean
that people can become divorced from the value of their consumption. As a consequence,
their consumption of some goods bears no relation to their anticipated welfare.
The theoretical challenges of CBA have been expanded since Mooney's analysis. Dowie has
questioned whether the CBA approach is appropriate for the evaluation of publicly funded
interventions (Dowie 2002). He argued that the valuation of private goods and public goods
is different, and has questioned whether values for private consumption should determine
how publicly funded goods are distributed. This is somewhat similar to Sen's argument that
only some values should count in social choices (Sen 1970b). Sen's approach is based on
the assumption that the problem of collective choice cannot be satisfactorily discussed within
the confines of economics since Pareto Optimality and liberalism are mutually exclusive in
some contexts. But these arguments are not relevant to CBA alone, and could relate to all
methods of valuing the outcomes of health care. In one of the few studies that have looked
at the effect of the perspective on individuals' valuation of benefits, Dolan and colleagues
argued that whether the respondent considers his/her own (private) utility, or that of society
had no discernible effect on their views (Dolan and Cookson 2000).
Rejection to CBA and adoption of cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA)
The most straightforward and the most common form of economic evaluation of health care
interventions is CEA. Achieving the same results more cheaply represents a "classic cost-
effectiveness resulf' (Donaldson 2002). Cost-effectiveness analysis addresses the problem
of health outcome measurement by expressing benefits in physical output, rather than
metaphysical constructs such as utility. These can be improvements in physical or functional
status (Palmer et al 1999). The relationship between physical output and welfare is implied
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or understood to be direct and the same for all individuals. The concern is for economic
efficiency only without explicitly addressing issues of justice and fairness of the conclusions
of research. Increasing efficiency implies a change that is a potential Pareto improvement
regardless of who potentially gains and loses. (Kawachi 1989).
CEA is a method of comparing programmes interventions within a single disease or where
the interventions are directed towards the same health objective. Since benefits are not
measured in comparable units, the efficiency of programmes can only be gauged within one
health objective to achieve technical efficiency. Cost-effectiveness analysis adopts a more
limited view of the benefits of health care interventions. For this reason it does not
investigate whether a given health care intervention represents a Pareto improvement or a
potential Pareto improvement. Thus it is clear that an efficient allocation of resources, in line
with the principles of welfare economics, cannot be determined or achieved following the
rules of CEA.
However, the attraction of the CEA approach is that the measurement of Simple, practical
concepts of health outcomes (such as cases detected or patients treated) avoids the
problem of evaluating whether individuals are the best judges of their own welfare, and of
measuring utility. The problem is that not all aspects of utility or welfare may be incorporated
into the analysis, and preferences for the intervention (as opposed to other uses of the same
resources) cannot be considered.
This approach has taken economic evaluation in health care away from its roots in welfare
economic theory. Final or intermediate outcomes can be objectively measured if clearly
defined, and can be compared across individuals. It assumes that one person's treatment
produces the same utility/happiness/welfare as any others, which in many contexts is an
acceptable, plausible assumption. The chosen measures of effectiveness are straightforward
to conceptualise and the problem of valuing benefits is avoided. Recent work by Dolan and
colleagues have rejected the idea that CEA and CSA can be theoretically linked though the
identification of a constant willingness-to-pay for a health outcome and that these
approaches should be seen as distinct and not related to each other through some
underlying scale of utility (Dolan and Edlin 2002).
CEA has emerged as a dominant paradigm in economic evaluation in health care partly
because of these important and practical properties (objective measurement and assumption
of equal utility from the outcome across individuals) (Hutton 1992). Another reason for the
strong support for CEA studies in health economics is the dominance of economic
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evaluation alongside clinical effectiveness research. In these studies, health outcomes are
the endpoints of interest. The trend towards CEA avoids the very complex practical problem
of the multidimensionality of benefit of health care and the value-laden objectives of health
care (Brouwer and Koopmanschap 2000).
Economic evaluation guidelines have identified the important criteria for CEA: unambiguous,
simplified objectives based on existing clinical evidence (or obtained concurrently in clinical
trials) and where, if possible, there is only one major dimension of benefit. The evidence of
effectiveness, then, is "primarily an epidemiological problem" (Drummond 1997, pp98). The
'problem' for CEA is establishing the relevance of the results of clinical trials (which usually
measure efficacy rather than effectiveness) (Gray et al 1997; Torgerson and Byford 2002).
Drummond suggested that results can be adjusted to take account of this by using sensitivity
analysis to test whether different assumptions change the final result (Drummond, O'Brien et
al 1997). Much of the economic evaluation work now undertaken in health care is based on
this approach and comprehensive bibliographies of health care economic evaluations in the
1990s (Elixhauser 1993, Elixhauser 1998) have shown significant growth in the literature.
These reviews show that the literature is dominated by studies of specific prospective new
interventions compared with current practice.
The value of the CEA approach are clear: it provides a simple and straightforward approach
to comparing 'simple' interventions with the same health objectives (Brazier and Dixon
1995). "Simple" means the endpoints are well described and measurable, the intermediate
endpoints relate to final outcomes in clear and direct ways, and the intervention is
approximately the same for all patients/users (Drummond et al 1997).
One of the limitations of this approach is that it is only a partial form of analysis. Therefore it
may fail to identify current misallocation of resources by focussing on the evaluation of
technologies or strategies in a narrow field of enquiry. Thus, it cannot address questions of
allocative efficiency, that is, whether the extra cost is worth the extra benefits of a change in
policy (Donaldson 2002). The results of most if not all CEAs are so context specific that they
cannot be used to inform the wider policy debate (Murray et al 2000). While this is also a
criticism for all types of economic evaluation, it is particularly relevant to CEA where
outcomes are narrowly defined that they may have no purpose outside a highly specified
clinical area.
Clearly, there are many evaluation problems where these conditions or criteria are not met.
Where interventions have an impact on different aspects of welfare, for example on quality of
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life rather than life expectancy for example, a methodology is required that can compare
different types of outcomes.
Cost-utility analysis (CUA)
The dominant focus of CEA on only one outcome of interest to the exclusion of other
important outcomes has led to an interest in more sophisticated measurement tools to
capture multiple dimensions of benefit. There are two reasons for creating a more
sophisticated tool for measuring effectiveness than considering only "natural units" of
outcome. The first is to combine more than one dimension of benefit into a single unit, and
second, to address the value of the utility (Le. the welfare derived) from an intervention to the
individuals who receive it. This second reason is relevant since it is an important source of
contention in the literature
Researchers have been attempting to develop more sophisticated indicators of morbidity
and mortality that represent quality as well as quantity of life in one combined index. This
index should be capable of reflecting different health experiences of the population. CUA
provides a way of trading length of life with valuations of quality of life and so provides a way
of comparing outcomes from different types of health interventions (Gerard 1999). The
standard form of measurement is the quality adjusted life year (QALV)2. It captures gains
from both the prolongation and quality of life in a single measure, and can incorporate the
value that people place on different health outcomes, or their preference for different health
states. Programmes with the lowest cost per QALY would be recommended for prioritisation
with the aim of maximising health gain under budget constraints. It is therefore argued to be
a superior way of comparing interventions across a diverse range of health care (Gold,
Weinstein et al 1996). QALV analysis measures health gain in specific domains of health
status. The approach also incorporates some notion of value for specific health states.
These values can be derived other from people who have experience of a heath state (Le.
within an empirical study) or from values derived from the general population, thereby
reflecting society's value. Contrasting approaches represent different forms of CUA analysis
that make different assumptions about what should be measured and included in the
analysis. The different approaches are reviewed in this section.
The literature on QALVs is more than thirty years old. Despite differences in the theoretical
basic of different forms of QALVs, there are also important similarities. All the approaches
2 Disease adjusted life years (DALYs) are not critiqued separately, as the same debates can be
applied since both are ways of quantifying life years adjusted for differences in quality of life (Arnesen
and Nord 1999).
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assume a full year of health is scored as 1 year of life and less than optimal health is scored
less than one. The assumption of additivity means that two years of life scored at 0.5 is
equivalent to a full year of health life. This means individuals will be indifferent between
these choices and will not trade between them to reach a higher level of utility.
The increased interest in health outcomes rather than processes or throughput has
encouraged this investigation (Kind, Dolan et al 1998). Cost-utility analysis (CUA) is seen as
more compatible with the decision-making environment, especially where quality of life is the
important outcome (Torrance 1986). This class of studies are also designed to inform
decisions about whether an intervention service should be implemented.
An extensive review published in 1992 counted 51 such studies, a large proportion of which
were found to be deficient methodologically (Gerard 1992). Nevertheless, the CUA
framework has been suggested as the reference framework for health care economic
evaluation (Weinstein et al 1996). A later review of the quality of 228 published CUA studies
showed that the field had increased greatly between the mid 1970s and 1997 with a wide
variation in methods of eliciting preference weights. (Neumann et al 2000).
Preference-based versus health-state based QALVs
There is a continuing difference of opinion about whether the role of the health service is to
improve people's health as defined objectively or to improve welfare, defined subjectively
(Nord 2001, Johannesson 2001, Williams 2001). There are also contrasting approaches to
deriving QALYs based on how outcomes are defined: one approach measures outcomes as
the utility or value society places on health states (utility-based approach). The other rejects
many of the fundamental principles of welfare economics, especially its focus on utility-
based ideas of welfare, and defines the outcome as a quantity of health (the extra-welfarist
approach). Whether or not QALYs can or should be based on individual's preferences and
values has led to different approaches to QALY estimation. There have been debates
through the 1980s and 1990s on the best methods of deriving measures to reflect the true
utility from a health intervention. Much of the debate has been around the economic theory
behind the derivation of utility.
Preference-based approaches to conceptualising and measuring dimensions of
health-related quality of life
There have been attempts in the economics literature to develop generic scales that reflect
health-related quality of life using generic scales to measure cross-diagnosis outcomes. An
early example of this was the Rosser Distress and Disability Matrix (Rosser and Kind 1978)
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where utility scores were devised for specific health state by asking a sample of 70 people to
score each health state on a scale of 0 to 1. This score was used in the first derivation of the
quality-adjusted life year weights. Later examples used in the health economic evaluation
literature have been the Quality of Well-Being Scale (QWB) (Kaplan et al 1993), the Health
Utility Index which has now been produced in three versions, the HUI 1, 2 and 3 (Torrance
and Feeny 1989, Feeny, David et al 1996, Furlong, Feeny 2001a), and the 15D scale
(Sintonen 2001).
In a recent review of methods, the Rosser scale and 15D scale were considered to be
inferior because the valuation of health states as not been derived from choice-based
techniques for establishing the utility values and therefore not based on von Neumann-
Morgenstern expected utility theory. The Rosser scale has also been shown to be less
sensitive to changes in health states than the EQ-5D (Brazier et al 1999).
There have been three main methods of establishing utilities for health states: standard
gamble, time trade-off and person trade-off (Nord 1995; Dolan 2000). Each method reflects
different concerns about the way in which utilities ought to be measured. There are strong
arguments about which method (or series of methods) most accurately reflects the decision-
making context that patients have to face in reality. Standard gamble (SG) is based on well
grounded theory from operational research on behaviour under risk (von Neumann-
Morgenstern expected utility theory) but the hypothetical choice may be highly unrealistic
and respondents may have difficulty in comparing probabilities of compete health or death
versus certainty of limited health. The HUI has adopted the SG method of eliciting health
state values.
Time trade-off encapsulates choice under uncertainty but rejects the underlying von
Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility theory and the notion of risk-taking. Person-trade-off
reflects more accurately respondents' choices about social rather than individual utility (Nord
1995) but the approach has been criticised as being too high a cognitive burden on
respondents who must weigh up a large number of variables, such as severity of ill health
before treatment, after treatment, overall health gain and number of people who benefit
(Dolan 1999). The EQ-5D has adopted this approach in valuing health states.
The S~-6D, a preference version of the widely used SF-36 has been developed (Brazier,
Usherwood et al 1998). The measure was developed as a way of deriving a preference-
based utility measure from the widely used (non-preference based) SF-36 instrument.
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The recommendations of a Health Technology Appraisal that reviewed health status
measures in economic evaluation came out strongly in favour of using either the EO-50 or
the HUI (Brazier et aI1999).
A recent article has reported that, rather than attempt to replace EO-50, this approach was
developed to make use of SF-36 data that had already been collected in clinical trials and
''where there is no other means of estimating the preference-based health values for
generating OALYs" (Brazier et al 2002. ibid. pp289). The authors suggest that the SF-60
may have greater sensitivity than the EO-50 since it is derived from a much larger
descriptive system (36 domains from the SF-36), but this has not yet been tested empirically.
The authors also report that regression coefficients reported for the extremes of the scale did
not produce statistically significant estimates, suggesting that there may still be some
inconsistencies in the values derived for the instrument.
Estimating QAL Vs from health-related quality of life scales
Adopting the approach developed for the EO-50, the derivation of OALYs involves asking
individuals to rank their health state along a series of simple health dimensions. This is a
method of deriving utility weight estimates for specific health states. The dimensions are:
mobility, self-care, usual activities, pain, and anxiety/depression. For each dimension, there
are three levels an individual can classify their state of health in: having no problems in this
dimension, some problems, or having extreme problems. From this scheme, 243 possible
health states can be described. Each state of health is given a weighting that indicates how
near or far the health state is perceived to be to death (0) or perfect health on a continuum.
In theory all states of health from those close to death (or worse than death) to perfect health
can be described in a combination of these levels. Time in these health states is multiplied
by this quality of life weight to give a composite score. A OALY represents a full year in a
health state adjusted for the value of quality of life in that state. All OALYs are assumed to
be perfectly divisible, and individuals to have perfectly smooth indifference curves for quality
and quantity of life. For example, an individual is assumed to be indifferent between 4 years
in perfect health and 16 years in a health state with a weight of 0.25.
One group of economists have argued that OALYs should be based on time trade-off
methods (ITO) as the true 'gold standard' methods (Torrance 1986; Mooney and Olsen
1991) and that ITO poses the 'right' questions for OALY derivation. ITO is proposed as an
empirical substitute to standard gamble techniques that provide similar results but is easier
to administer. This means therefore that it can mirror expected utility theory even if it is not
directly derived from it. Another group has rejected this method, and developed another tool
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(Healthy Years Equivalents, or HYEs) derived directly from standard gamble techniques.
They argue that this method more accurately the true utility derived from an intervention by
incorporating respondents' attitude to risk and uncertainty about future health needs and the
effectiveness of health interventions which ITO does not (Gafni et al 1993; Gafni and Birch
1995, Gafni 1997, Gafni and Birch 1997). The supporters of the QALY derived from the ITO
approach criticised this argument, saying that HYEs derived using SG techniques were
essentially measuring the.same values (Loomes 1995), and that criticisms for or against one
methodology could equally be applied to another (Buckingham 1993, Culyer and Wagstaff
1993).
The outcome of this debate is that there are important differences between economists in
how they see the measurement of the benefits of health outcomes. Utilities represent the
subjective preferences of individuals. As measures, utility scores are meant to provide
quantitative estimates of individual preferences. In the context of health care decision
making, utilities reflect individual preferences for particular health states. Therefore, there is
a clear distinction between utility or preference-based measures of health status, and non-
preference based or descriptive measures. The utility-based measures differ from each other
in whether individuals' valuations of benefit incorporates risk and uncertainty; whether the
instrument which measures utility is too onerous on respondents and whether the decision-
making reflects the choices facing individuals in the real world.
Finally, the assumption that QALYs have cardinal properties could be said to either resolve
the problem of interpersonal comparisons of utility (ICU), or simply to side-step it. The
approach assumes that QALYs have cardinal properties, in that they can be added together
to produce a sum of total social welfare. This can be interpreted as a fundamental flaw in
terms of their adherence to the Paretian framework of welfare economics or a clever
avoidance of this complex and irresolvable problem.
Utility-based QALVs
The history of utility theory and its application to health outcomes has been reviewed by
Torrence and Feeny (1989). This approach to estimating benefit brings economic evaluation
closer to the original principles of economic evaluation than CEA as it establishes the
benefits to individuals of an economic change (an intervention) as measured by their own
valuation of that benefit (Mooney and Olsen 1991).
For utility-based measures of QALVs, outcomes are interpreted in terms of personal
valuation (reflecting individuals' preferences) rather than amount of well life (Culyer and
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Wagstaff 1993; Nord 1994). Since it is not possible to observe directly the revealed choices
of individuals for different health states, this is elicited by asking people to imagine
themselves in different health states. They are asked to assess their hypothetical willingness
to trade their wealth (or other domains of welfare) in order to change to.a better health state,
or to be compensated for remaining in a bad health state (Nord ibid.). By asking these
hypothetical questions, it is possible to establish a person's expected utility (or value) from
that health state.
Methods have been developed to measure the utilities (more accurately called QALY
weights) of particular health states. The standard gamble method asks respondents to make
a choice between the certainty of a long-term condition for a specific number of years, or a
gamble between the probability of complete recovery and a small chance of death
(Johannesson 1996). The respondent chooses between the two alternatives: certainty and a
gamble. The probabilities in the gamble alternative are altered until the respondent is
indifferent between the first (certain) choice and the gamble. The probability where the
respondent is indifferent is interpreted directly as the utility of the first alternative.
The time trade-off method for estimating 'utilities' for health states is an approximation of the
standard gamble approach that overcomes some of the problems of dealing with
probabilities. It involves the respondent making a choice between a chronic condition for a
number of years or a treatment that will result in perfect health but shorten life span. The
shorter time period is altered until the respondent is indifferent between the choices. The
utility is derived from the ratio of time in perfect health over time in poor health (Johannesson
1996).
Expected utility theory as the theory of choice under uncertainty has provided the theoretical
basis to cost-utility analysis. The validity of expected utility theory and its underlying axioms
have come under increased criticism as suggested earlier in this chapter. Empirical studies
in the health field have shown that individuals will systematically violate these axioms (Oliver
2002) and that these violations cannot be explained away by anomalies or errors or ill-
constructed thought by respondents. These axioms have also been challenged by authors of
empirical studies as too restrictive and not reflecting reality (Sackett and Torrance 1978;
McNeil and Stones 1986). McNeil found in his empirical work that older individuals were only
willing to trade longevity for quality of life when the length of time in less perfect health is
more than five years. Sackett and Torrance found that values which respondents place on
health states varied significantly with the length of time in that health state (Sackett and
Torrance ibid.). Also, there must be an independence and constancy in risk attitude to
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survival duration. However they found strong evidence that individuals exhibit both risk
taking and risk aversion, that is, no consistency.
The practical and theoretical problems remain and there are strong doubts about the
possibility of deriving valid and reliable estimates of utility weights based on expected utility
theory. (Loomes and McKenzie 1989, Dolan 1999). Patients' preferences may not fit the
model proposed from expected utility theory. Some researchers (economists and non-
economists) have questioned the predictive usefulness of EUT as a model for rational
behaviour under uncertainty leading to the development of alternative theories of behaviour
such as prospect theory (Verhoef et al 1994, Treadwell and Lenert 1999); regret theory
(Loomes and Sugden 1982, Mooney 1989, Smith 1996) and disappointment theory (Bell
1982).
Rejection of utility-based measures of benefit - Extra Welfarist approaches to
economic evaluation
This approach has developed out of a frustration with the practical problems of measuring
the utility from health interventions and the rejection of the fundamental axioms of welfare
economics. The analysis can embrace whatever maximands the customers of research may
give, or may be inferred by diligent enquiry by the analyst to be relevant.
The necessity of adhering to welfare economic principles has been interpreted as being
either not useful or too unwieldy for real-time economic problems. This has led some
analysts to reject welfarism altogether (Culyer and Wagstaff 1993, Culyer 1997). Since there
is no scientific way of resolving the problems such as the impossibility of interpersonal
comparisons of utility, one proposal has been to simply ignore this issue and instead
consider units of health as the endpoint of health interventions (Williams 1996). The
simplified argument is that other factors apart from welfare maximisation influence
individuals' consumption and preferences, and that these non-health maximising
preferences should not be used to determine health policy (Mooney 1997). Furthermore,
health care planning incorporates normative, political judgements about health care and
individual preferences cannot override these judgements in a publicly funded system.
Frustrations have arisen in health economics from trying to adhere to the criteria that must
hold for Pareto optimality. This has led to an abandonment of these principles as unwieldy
and unhelpful. (ibid.1997).
The foundation of this argument is that society has already decided (through the political
process) that health for its own sake is a desired outcome of health services. For this
54
Chapter 2
reason, it is acceptable to measure the health outcomes of an intervention without
considering the utility derived from them. The important outcomes therefore are commodities
themselves: these are commodities containing the specific characteristics to improve health
care.
The objective in this analytical framework is health maximisation rather than utility.
Distributional concerns (who gains, who loses) and equity can be addressed by additional
weights for different groups of recipients of health care (for example children, or the elderly)
which reflect the values of society rather than the value individuals place on their own
welfare (Bleichrodt 1997). Utility is therefore derived directly from a health state: the
assumption is that two individuals cannot be in the same health state and derive a different
benefit from that health state. The emphasis is placed firmly on the practical application of
cost-utility analysis. The economist is the consultant who contributes to the decision-making
process by presenting policy choice options and spelling out the consequences of these
options for the policy customer. The distinction between Paretian approach to CBA and this
decision-making approach is the focuses on addressing the needs of decision-makers and
making the evaluation consistent with their objectives. This is the important distinction
between welfarist and extra-welfarist approaches (Sugden and Williams 1978).
Sen introduced the idea of 'basic capabilities'. The argument focused on the capability to
function, what a person can do or can be. It questioned the more standard emphasis on
maximising wealth and utility and suggested replacing the immeasurable concept of welfare
with more finite objectives (Sen 1985). Within this framework, economic analysis could adopt
any objectives given by the customer (decision-maker). The task of the economist was
therefore to find out the relevant issues for the client. Sen argued that this agenda provided
a methodology that could be more thoroughly researched than the welfarist approach (Sen
ibid.).
Culyer has built on Sen's work by distinguishing between things and the characteristics of
things. His evaluation framework is based on the idea that the important outcomes of health
technology are not utilities, but objective measurable commodities (Culyer 1990). This
avoids the metaphysical question of whether the important outcome of a health care
intervention is the effect on health or on utility. He argues that since overall welfare is
beyond the remit of the health service, so utility should be beyond the remit of health
economic evaluations, with the objective of health maximisation rather than unknowable and
immeasurable latent concepts of utility.
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Williams has argued that there is a whole set of ambiguities buried in the utility-based
approach to measuring outcomes, that go beyond the objective and verifiable facts of any
comparative decision that requires comparative judgements between individuals and over
time (Williams 1992). They also concern who should be making the judgements and whether
these judgements should influence policy.
Furthermore, because the Paretian framework does not allow individuals to make
interpersonal comparisons of utility, then it was argued that the welfare economic approach
to economic evaluation is untenable and ought to be abandoned (Williams 2000). Further,
the measurement of welfare in terms of money (or willingness to pay for health care) does
not avoid this problem as social welfare maximisation is defined as the point at which no
change exists where the monetary value to gainers is greater than the monetary value to
losers. This implies comparing values between gainers and losers. This Williams called "ICU
by the back door." (Williams ibid.) He argued that Arrow's theorem could be avoided if
judgements are made explicit, and it was accepted that there is no scientific solution to this
problem.
This position has had some support in the psychology literature. Arrow assumed that the
metric underlying utility was not meaningful and not standardised across individuals.
However, later psychometric evidence now suggests that preferences can be measured
using scales that have meaningful interval scales or ratio properties (Kaplan 1993, Brazier
and Deverill 1999). If QALYs are assumed to be a cardinal measures of health, then this
also side-steps Arrow's theorem as such units of health can be measured, compared across
individuals and aggregated (Kaplan ibid.).
Critics of this method argue that the measurement of QALYs as a health status index does
not stem directly from the individual's utility function and thus only partly reflect the
individual's true preferences. This might lead to the choice of non-preferred alternative due
to the misrepresentation of the individual's preferences (Mehrez and Gafni 1992).
Fundamentally, the extra welfarist approach still requires cardinal measurement and
interpersonal comparisons of utility that is forbidden by the axioms of welfare economics.
QALVs, however they are derived, have to ignore these axioms in order to address the
practical questions that policy-makers seek guidance on.
An important difference between welfarist and extra-welfarist approaches therefore is that
extra-welfarists make health an objectively measurable commodity rather than a subjective
experience. In other words, extra welfare economics assumes that the health of an individual
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is a knowable, testable, finite and physical fact (Hurley 1998). The progress of extra
welfarism is not a fundamental challenge to the welfare economic foundations of OALY
estimation. It should be seen more as a necessary modification of theory, developed as a
response to the needs of decision-makers who must weigh up the costs and benefits of
changes in policies. (Edwards 2001). '
Measurement issues in calculating QALVs
For both the utility based and health based OALY estimation methods, the derivation of the
weighting attached to OALYs is not the only methodological issue. The methods of
estimating OALYs also have to be designed to be sensitive and specific enough to reflect
real changes in quality of life experienced by an individual. For example, the EO-50
instrument calculates the health status of an individual on five domains of health related
quality of life (EuroOol Group 1990). Each domain categorises an individual on one of three
levels (no problems, some problems or extreme problems). To detect change in (health-
related) quality of life, an individual would need to move from either have 'extreme problems'
to 'some problems', or from 'some problems' to 'no problems' on at least one of the
dimensions of health to show a difference in quality of life weighting before and after an
intervention. For interventions that have an effect on morbidity only this approach can be
problematic.
However large a change in health state, it is the quantity of life that dominates the calculation
of OALVs. A large change in quality of life (say from a weighting of 0.2 to 0.8) is equivalent
of 0.6 of a year of full life. Therefore a comparison between two interventions, one of which
brings about a large change in quality of life (0.6 OALVs) but no increased length of life will
be dominated by another intervention that brings about increased length of life by one year
of full health (1.0 OALV).
Second, there may be interventions where changes in quality of life are not captured by the
survey instrument. The EO-50 questionnaire requires changes in quality of life to be
relatively large (i.e. moving from extreme to moderate problems, or moderate problems to no
problems at ali). For people with long term illnesses or disabilities, where they would not
expected to regain full health after a specific intervention, an intervention may still leave an
individual with some problems. However, the range or number of problems may have been
reduced in ways that are important and valuable to that individual (Donaldson et al 1988).
Having fewer problems as a result of an intervention but still living with many others might
still register on the scale as 'having some problems' and so this change that is important to
the individual, does not register in a change in quality of life. They would still have to tick the
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box that recorded "some problems", indicating that their health state had not changed in that
domain. A small but significant change may be of great value to the individual.
This is an important consideration for the evaluation of complex services, especially those
for people with long-term but not life threatening illness, or people with life limiting conditions.
In neither of these groups of people would it be expected that an intervention would increase
their life expectancy. Furthermore individuals who access these services may not expect to
reach full health in the future and expect to live with some problems however good their
health and social care is. This issue is raised again further on.
It is important to make the distinction here between the measurement of health related
quality of life (HRQoL) and quality of life (QoL) in general. EQ-5D is an instrument to
measure HRQoL. The term HRQoL distinguishes the specific health determinants of quality
of life from the more general determinants of quality of life (income, status, family
circumstances, job security, food security etc). An instrument which measures QoL may be
less sensitive to health care issues as defined narrowly, but may be more sensitive or more
appropriate when considerinq interventions which aim to address wider human wants or
needs (Patrick and Deyo 1989). This is discussed in more depth further on.
An essential component of the decision about which type of instrument would be most
appropriate for a given research context is to identify what would be considered an important
change within patients or difference across patients in scores. A theme that runs through this
,
thesis is that what is seen as a relevant change in health related quality of life to the clinician
or policy-maker may not be valued the same way by the person experiencing the change.
The extent to which a change has an effect on a person's overall quality of life will change
from context to context. This is an argument for adopting the widest possible perspective in
health care evaluation.
QALYs and fairness
In health economic evaluation, there has been particular focus on whether societal concerns
for fairness can be re-incorporated into economic analysis. Equity is seen as a fundamental
aspect of health care, in the democratic tradition that no one group in society is more
deserving than another per se. However, society may value (or choose to explicitly favour)
the health of some members of society more than others. The problem is whether these
values can be reflected within QALY analysis or whether these should be considered as
separate from it.
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The constructors of the QALY approach have assumed that societal value is the unweighted
sum of individuals' health benefits with no regard for the distributional consequences.
Moreover, a gain of one QALY for person A is strictly the same as for person B (Nord 1994).
This is fair in the sense that it is democratic (no group of individuals ls more deserving of
QALYs than any other), but the approach also raises problems of equity. Some interventions
produce more QALYs for some groups than others. The argument is that QALYs
discriminate against the elderly (who have fewer years of life to live) and the long term ill
(who are not expected to return to full health) (Tsuchiya 2000). While the adherents to the
QALY approach quite openly admit that the approach should only be considered as a
decision-aid rather than decision-maker because of these problems (Loomes and McKenzie
1989), this has been a forceful critique of the method.
Arguments that QALYs violates societal concerns for fairness have been raised in the
development of QALY methods (Wagstaff 1991, Johannesson and Gerdtham 1996, Nord
1999, Johannesson 2001). Early in the development of QALYs, there were proposals to
attach weights to QALYs to reflect distributive concerns (Williams 1988, Mooney 1989,
Wagstaff 1991). There have been unease expressed in the literature about the ambiguity of
these weights and how they can be measured and incorporated into QALY analysis.
However, it is clear that individuals care deeply about equity even if it is to their detriment
and overemphasis of efficiency over equity considerations may be at odds with society's
wishes (Hurley 1998). A recent study has reviewed the equity problems and debates around
whose values should count in valuing quality of life, those who experience the health state or
whether the general public should be asked to make an ex ante valuations when they have
not experienced the state of ill health described (Schwappach 2002).
There have been a number of attempts to reflect equity considerations including the equity
adjusted year of life saved (Lindholm, Rosen et al 1998), the 'fair innings argumenf'
(Williams 1997) and incorporating caring externalities into the calculus (Culyer 2001). But
there has emerged no clear unified theory for doing this (Hurley 1998). Wagstaff had made
an early attempt to address equity by including indices of inequality in the social welfare
function, and for society's aversion to inequalities (Wagstaff 1991). But he did not pursue the
necessary experimental methods for determining the parameters of the model. These
concerns have continued into the 21st century. Nord (2001) addressed the criticism that
QALYs favour the able-bodied over the disabled by proposing that all life years saved should
be equated as one (for life extending interventions). Williams responded to this by
suggesting that this approach would mean that interventions that provide fewer overall
benefits would be equated with those that provide more benefits (Williams 2001).
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Johannesson (2001) has proposed that a solution would be to give the same relative change
in QAL Ys the same weight irrespective of the number of expected QAL Ys (and controlling
for age and gender). The average expected number of QALYs for a patient group would be
the average expected for that population of same age/gender, divided by the number of
expected QALYs for the patient group before the intervention. The problem is to know, ex
ante, the number of expected QAL Ys for any agel gender group, but this is a technical not a
theoretical problem. The idea is consistent with people having equal chance of access to
resources regardless of current health status, to resources going where ability to benefit is
greatest, and does not discriminate by age or gender.
The fact that there is no agreement on how to tackle equity in the measurement of QALYs
and that the analysis is not undertaken in a standard way leads to inconsistency in reporting
of the findings, as demonstrated in recent reviews (Sassi, Archard et al 2001, Sculpher
2002, Black and Mooney 2002). The consideration of ethics and equity in QAL Y analysis
address important issues for policy but create new problems by moving the debate away
from its theoretical origins in preference satisfaction.
These arguments are extra-welfarist, as the utility-based approach would allow for different
individuals' preferences for interventions or health states or for differential values to benefits
accruing to disabled and able-bodied people. Welfarist approaches can incorporate almost
any arguments into the social welfare function to reflect equity considerations, for example
'process utility' (McGuire, Henderson and Mooney 1988). This approach is not as restricted
as the extra welfarist methods where only health outcomes can be considered, but it is also
not as practical.
The problems that extra welfarism can solve by focussing on units of health rather than
having to measure preferences create new problems that do not arise in the welfarist
approach which can take account of unobservable arguments in the utility function (Dolan
2000). The extra-welfarists might get around the problem of interpersonal comparisons of
utility (by assuming that all QALYs are the same for all people) but are restricted to the
consideration of health dimensions only. No account can be taken of people's differences in
preferences and willingness to trade health for other forms of welfare.
Health -related versus global measures of quality of life
The debates about how to generate QALYs have to some extent avoided the issue of how
the outcomes of health care intervention are defined and determined. Supporters of the CBA
have argued that it provides the broadest approach to defining utility that should be the
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default approach adopted in decision-making (Mishan 1998). Any approach that is narrower
than this has to set out the limitations of what it can measure as an outcome.
It is important to make a distinction between health-related quality of life and quality of life
more generally. Quality of life can be defined in multiple varying ways, from vague definitions
of "whatever the individual defines it to be," "ability to lead a normal life" and "self-
actualisation," to more thoughtful and considered definitions such as those that emphasize
social, economic or personal aspects of life (Zhan 1992, Bowling 1997). The World Health
organisation has defined quality of life, as distinct form health-related quality of life, in the
following manner:
"[quality of life is] the individuals' perceptions of their position in life, in the context of the
cultural and value systems in which they live and in relation to their goals, expectations,
standards and concerns." (WHOaOL 1993)
A more existential definition of quality of life has been given as:
''the extent to which an individual is able to achieve security, self-esteem and the opportunity
to use intellectual and physical capabilities in pursuit of personal goals." (Engquist 1979).
The concept of quality of life is difficult in scientific research since it is by its nature a relative
concept (Aksoy 2000). Some commentators have also considered the ethical and political
implications of using quality of life as an outcome measure, especially in areas of health care
that cannot be easily defined., for example, the amount quality of life might an individual
might sacrifice for society as a whole (Dean 1990). Some of the problems in defining a broad
concept of quality of life may be reduced if the concept of health-related quality of life only is
the outcome of focus, although this can lead to an excessively narrow view of what quality of
life might be (Harris 1988).
The broadening of the concept of the value of health care to include social and psychological
aspects of well-being has made more progress in some disciplines than in others (Bowling
1995). Health status, on the other hand, distinguishes between health-specific determinants
of quality of life from other determinants (income, job security, living conditions, and the
personal and wider social worlds). Health-related quality of life (HRQoL) is usually defined as
functional capacity or physiologic functioning. There has been some confusion between this
concept, wider concepts of quality of life, and economic ideas of utility in the quality of life
literature (Smith, Avis et al 1999) . It has been argued that this confusion began primarily
when funding agencies began to require quality of life measures. The broad meaning of
quality of life has tended to be brought closely in line with the clinical view, neglecting ethical
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and societal dimensions (Killian and Angermeyer 1995). Researchers took health status,
disease symptom, and functional questionnaires, renamed them quality of life or health-
related·quality of life and administered them because they were already available (Smith,
Avis et al ibid.).
Preference-based (utility-based) measures of quality of life used in economic evaluation
have focused on describing and valuing a range of health outcomes or states. QALYs are in
essence health-related quality of life outcome units and do not incorporate the wider
definitions of quality of life described above (Brazier et al 1999, Blumenschein and
Johannesson 1996). There are programmes of research underway to develop approaches to
QALYs that measure concepts of social well-being using choice-based approaches (Netten,
Smith et al 2002). But in general, quality of life as defined here has not been incorporated
into QALY analysis. Instead, a broader evaluation framework using monetary valuation
approaches has developed.
Re-emergence of cost-benefit analysis and contingent valuation
There are positive and negative aspects to all current approaches to economic evaluation.
The reconsideration of CBA techniques that can incorporate wider considerations of welfare
beyond the health dimension has arisen as a response to the continuing problems of
defining and measuring quality adjusted life years, and as a way of returning to the
theoretical foundations of welfare economics (Olsen 1997).
The problems inherent in the process/ quality of life measures adopted by CEA and CUA
may be no less onerous than those in CBA. CBA also has some advantages over the other
methods. All costs and benefits are translated into the same units and are therefore
comparable (unlike CEA). The value of outcomes to individuals is reflected in the monetary
valuation and reflects social value of interventions (social value is the sum of individuals'
value) (O'Brien 1996, Klose 1999). CBA acknowledges that health is only one argument in
an individual's and (society's) utility function. Interventions can be compared across health
interventions but also with other uses of public resources, and in theory with private
consumption. CSA incorporates all values that are deemed to be important by society, not
only the values that are known and counted ex ante. This means that more complex
interactions between individuals' preferences, although not known, can be incorporated in
the analysis (Morrison and Gyldmark 1992).
Continuing problems with measuring comparative outcomes in CEA and CUA methods have
led to a renewed interest in CBA as a methodology in health economics (Johannesson and
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Jonsson 1991, Hutton 1992, Zarnke et al 1997, Mcintosh et al 1999, Donaldson et al 2002}.
The attraction of CBA is its theoretical grounding and the return to the roots of welfare
economics by including preferences and values in analysis (Boardman 2001). One health
economist called this a return to a "mode of thinking" in economic terms-(Gafni 1997b).
Since there are no prices for many health care products or interventions, it is necessary to
find alternative ways of undertaking CBA studies. Methods have been developed to estimate
value by asking individuals' willingness-to-pay for health interventions rather than by
observing people's demand for services and different prices (Donaldson 1990; Diener et al.
1998; Klose 1999). Respondents are asked to provide answers to hypothetical health
scenarios about how much they think they would be willing to pay (or willing to risk, or willing
to accept in compensation) to move in and out of health states. These are therefore stated
preference, rather than revealed demand methods of monetary valuation.
All the methods of obtaining estimates of monetary valuations where there is no market are
controversial. In the 1970s, this had already been recognised by those proposing the CBA
approach (Mishan 1988). More recent commentators have questioned the basic idea that
preferences, as expressed through some monetary valuation, are the same as values (Shiell
et al 1997). Equally the idea has been challenged that individual's preferences for health
care are stable over time (Shiell and Seymour 2002) and not constructed by the experience
of health care (Slovic 1995). Nevertheless approaches have been proposed and employed
in empirical studies. These ideas will be examined again in chapter 4 in the context of
axioms of choice experiments. The next section reviews these methods and the problems
that have been highlighted in the literature.
Contingent valuation
There are a number of approaches to assessing respondents' valuation of different
outcomes, and these methods are known collectively as contingent valuation. Contingent
valuation (CV) is a survey-based approach for eliciting the public's valuation for health care
for use in CBA (Jones-Lee and Hammerton 1985). It involves respondents evaluating, in
monetary terms, goods or services that may not be directly measurable. It estimates
respondents' stated preferences rather than their preferences as revealed through their
consumption of commodities (Morrison and Gyldmark 1992).
The willingness-to-pay (WTP) approach is grounded in Paretian welfare economics and the
axioms of consumer sovereignty. This means that WTP can be used as a measure of the
marginal benefit of an intervention, leading to a social welfare function which is the sum of
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individuals' explicit and implicit willingness-ta-pay. The methodology is rooted in the
principles of Pareto optimality and the Hicks-Kaldor compensation principle. Whether
contingent valuation studies violate the impossibility of interpersonal comparisons of utility is
a debated point as raised earlier (Blaug 1997, Williams 2000). There ts.some strong dissent
in the health economics literature about the idea of benefits of health care being translated
into money (Carr-Hill 1991, Burrows and Brown 1992). This will be discussed further on.
Willingness-to-pay
The most common approach of contingent valuation studies in health care is the
'willingness-to-pay' that asks individuals to state the maximum they would be prepared to
pay to be indifferent between a stated outcome and their current circumstance. They are
asked the amount they would pay to reach a specific improvement in health or the amount
they would need to be compensated to move to a worse health state (a willingness to accept
study). The method incorporates some notion of sacrifice such that an intervention is only of
value if a person is willing to give something else up (measured in money) in order to have it.
Methods of eliciting these values can be obtained by asking directly (within a range or open-
ended); by standard gamble techniques, visual analogues, time-trade-off and more recently,
stated preference choice experiments (also known as discrete choice experiments or
conjoint analysis).
The WTP approach has been considered to be a more theoretically correct measure of
outcome with respect to consistency with welfare economics (Morrison and Gyldmark 1992)
and its validity and reliability have been investigated and found to be acceptable as a
measure of health state preference (O'Brien 1994). Proponents of this approach have
argued for its superiority over other outcome methods. This is due to its adherence to
welfare economic principles (Gafni 1998, Birch et al 1999), its strength in considering
aspects of care which are traditionally difficult to identify and measure (Gibb et al 1998) and
as a way of involving consumers more closely in decision-making for resource allocation
(Ryan and Farrar 1995).
One of the first applications of the WTP approach was to assess preferences for NHS
hospitals and nursing homes. The results suggested that the group that preferred nursing
homes could compensate those preferring hospitals and still be better off, suggesting that
nursing homes were the more efficient alternative (Donaldson 1990).
The majority of applications of CV have been used in 'simple' interventions, for example in
.drug therapy studies (Blumenschein and Johannesson 1999, Johannesson et al 1991) and
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dentistry (Matthews et al. 1999). A recent review of CV techniques found 48 studies in health
economic evaluation using these methods (Diener et al 1998). The majority of the studies
(42/48) valued benefits in terms of willingness-ta-pay (revealed demand), with the remainder
as price! demand studies (observed demand). A review published three years later
identified 78 studies using WTP. The review considered the legitimacy of the main
arguments for WTP as a "superior" tool for economic evaluation. These were given as: the
adherence of WTP to welfare economic principles (Johannesson 1996), the inclusion of
arguments beyond health in the utility function rather than health only (e.g. Donaldson and
Shackley 1997) and the use of commensurate units for costs and benefits necessary for
assessing allocative efficiency (e.g. Drummond et al 1997). The authors of the review
dismissed the first argument against WTP (insufficient adherence to welfare economic
principles) is an insufficient condition for superiority since this would depend also on whether
the values implicit in the evaluation approach were the same as those of the society where
the evaluation takes place.
The second two arguments were assessed in light of the published evidence. Only 17 of the
studies described health states in more than one health dimension. Twelve studies included
a comprehensive description of the scenario to be valued prior to the exercise with face-to-
face interviews. The authors suggest that only for these studies could valuation of health
care beyond a primary health outcome be extracted. Only 25 studies compared costs and
benefits directly. However, the fact the many of these studies were only partial valuations
meant that it would not be possible to reach a conclusive result directly from these data.
Studies to explore the construct validity and test-retest reliability of CV studies established
that WTP is highly correlated with standard gamble methods (seen as the gold standard) for
eliciting health state preferences (O'Brien and Viramontes 1994). Two further studies
(Kartmann, Stalhammer et al 1996, Farrar and Ryan 1999) have established that the order in
which questions are asked does not appear to affect the final results, suggesting that the
WTP values are robust within the context of the experiment. A study of the relative sensitivity
of WTP and time-trade-off techniques to changes in health status found that WTP was more
sensitive to differences in quality of life between different levels of health (Smith 2001).
The issue of establishing the stability of preferences and face validity of these techniques
has been a barrier to their implementation (Johannesson and Jonsson 1991, Burrows and
Brown 1992). The data are inconclusive as to whether willingness-ta-pay questionnaires
correspond with respondents' actual willingness-ta-pay if there were a real market for these
goods and services. A study on the willingness-ta-pay for a pharmacist-led asthma
65
Chapter 2
programme suggested that hypothetical willingness-to-pay (under survey conditions)
overestimated revealed willingness to pay (measured by the payment ·to enter the
programme) although their findings were not conclusive. A later study, examining literature in
areas where there was a possibility for comparison between stated preference and revealed
preference showed that WTP was, significantly correlated with real. WTP (liljas and
Blumenschein 2000). A more recent Nigerian study has also demonstrated that the
. proportion of people who, said they were willing to pay for insecticide treated bed-nets
. corresponded to people's actual purchase of the bed nets when they became available
(Onwujekwe et al 2001).
Outside the health economics literature, a recent study of the valuation of goods to reduce
the risks of environmentally induced lung cancer has been able to assess WTP values
against actual purchasing behaviour by households to reduce the risks (Kennedy 2002).
Although the sample was not the same, it came from the same area with the similar mean
income, health states and age/sex profile. The study found that the WTP values and the
revealed preference values did in fact converge. These results differed from previous
evidence that has found that market values (defined as travel costs for example) did not
converge with WTP estimates and travel cost estimates were 25% lower that WTP estimates
(Clarke 2002). Some of the reasons given for the divergence of the values in this study were
the inclusion of use values and non-use values such as altruism in the WTP estimates.
Criticism of the willingness-to-pay approach
There has been some considerable criticism of CV techniques in health care (Burrows and
Brown 1992, Bala et al 1998) both in the methods and in the theoretical foundations of the
approach. Morrison and Gyldemark (1992) found that the empirical evidence did not show
superiority or inferiority of WTP over quality of life-based approaches to measuring outcomes
for economic evaluation of health care interventions. At that time, they judged that there was
not sufficient empirical evidence to address whether the advantages of the CBA approach
could be realised by this methodology.
One study compared methods for eliciting preferences (including WTP) for health related
outcomes for shingles and found no significant correlation of methods across individuals
(Bala et al 1998). A more recent exercise was undertaken to compare three different
methods of eliciting direct willingness-to-pay (Donaldson 2001). Willingness-to-pay for an
individual's own care did not discriminate well between respondents previous ranking of
alternatives. It was reasoned that respondents were comparing their care with doing nothing
rather than an alternative intervention. If there were a real difference in utility between
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interventions, this method would not have identified it. The willingness-to-pay by an
individual for two different interventions showed that respondents were guessing the price of
the intervention rather than estimating its worth to them (giving higher values to the
intervention they believed would have higher prices). The third method,-asking respondents
their willingness-to-pay to receive their preferred intervention (in their ranking of alternatives)
rather than a less preferred option, performed the best of all three methods. The author
pointed out the coincidence that the marginal approach is most strongly linked to the concept
of a Pareto Improvement (the Hicks-Kaldor criterion that a change should be made if the
benefits to some outweigh the costs to others). The study also examined whether ability to
pay had an important effect on willingness-to-pay and whether adjustments based on
weights attached to WTP values of respondents with different incomes had an effect on the
final result of the study. They found that, in their small sample of 79 individuals, these effects
were not important.
This study illustrates important aspects of the willingness-to-pay approach. First, it suggests
that the general population may find these kinds of questions difficult to respond to and may
consider price rather than value. Second, that the marginal utility of money (and therefore
differences in willingness-to-pay) among different income groups may be a problem for this
form of valuation. Third, that WTP values are not direct utility values (even if theoretically
they are meant to be). Like QALY estimation, WTP is a proxy for utility, rather than a direct
estimation of it.
Gafni (1998) reviewed many of the objections surrounding willingness-to-pay methods and
has categorised them into those that question the feasibility of the approach, the theoretical
underpinnings, those that misunderstand the purpose of the method, and emotional
arguments. Gafni argues that much of this argument distracts attention away from the proper
scientific debates about the importance of the theoretical foundations for economic
evaluation. Other commentators have also argued that emotional arguments have confused
the debate about the appropriateness of the WTP method (Birch et al 1999). However, it has
been argued that these emotional arguments are not as important as the problem of
individuals considering the price of health care (Ryan 1999) and their valuations being
influenced by their ability to pay rather than their need (or preference) for the intervention
(Donaldson 1999). There is some evidence that preferences differ systematically between
income groups in WTP studies (Donaldson 2001).
A UK Treasury report into the valuation of public services highlighted the disadvantages of
seeking monetary valuations of health (Cave, Cunningham et al 1993). The first is described
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by the authors as "policy or strategic bias", which arises when respondents believe the
lntormation they provide could influence policy, and therefore they tailor their responses to
achieve a desired policy outcome. The· second has been called "property rights bias"
(Mitchell and Carson 1989) but is described in the Treasury report as- "politicisation bias".
This refers to the influence of respondents' views about the appropriateness of having to pay
to acquire a service. One way around this might be to ask respondents their willingness to
accept compensation for not having a change in policy. A review in the Treasury report of
WTP and WTA studies in the public sector found WTA values tend to be significantly higher
than WTP. This finding was shown in a review of controlled experiments in environmental
economics using both methods on the same respondent group (Cummings et al 1986). The
Treasury report dealt with this issue in detail, exploring whether there is some systematic
bias that affects WTP and WTA unequally, or whether individuals do not value goods
"correctly", by maximising their utility. It concluded that the WTP method should be preferred
since the likelihood of status quo bias and the additional incentive for "protest responses" is
higher for WTA. The relationship between WTP and revealed preference (where markets
and hence prices exist) was also explored in the Treasury report, that concluded that the
evidence was inconsistent and therefore: "it would be unwise for the time being to place
much reliance on the monetary valuation aspects of public services." (ibid. pp 71) This point
is raised more generally by Willan and colleagues (Willan, O'Brien et al 2001) whose
theoretical and empirical evidence suggested that WTA is about twice as much as WTP in
health care.
Elsewhere, arguments against the direct elicitation methods have been even more critical of
these methods of contingent valuation. In the environment sector in the US, contingent
valuation methods (both using WTP and other methods of valuation of outcomes) have been
proposed as a means of determining the size of financial compensations that should be paid
out by companies. This compensation might either be to the government or to individuals for
the damage caused to natural resources by corporations (Arrow, Solow et al 1993). An
article published by the editors of the Harvard Law Review (1992) strongly criticised this
method of valuation as biased, unreliable and speculative, so much so that that the costs of
using these methods outweighed any of the benefits (in terms of their use in legal
compensation proceedings). The fundamental problem outlined in this article was that
hypothetical answers to WTP questions had no cost associated with being wrong, as they
would in real life. Therefore, there would be no incentive for respondents to make the mental
effort to be accurate. The article also painted to the problem of strategic bias where
respondents may purposefully misrepresent their valuation, and the problem of values being
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constructed for the first time during the survey leading to arbitrariness of valuation. What
this amounts to is a violation of the axioms of rationality in decision-making.
Another key argument made in this paper was that estimates for vastly different quantities of
resources tend to fall within a similar range: the WTP to preserve one acre of wilderness was
similar to that for 100 acres. The authors proposed that WTP was more commensurate with
an "imaginary gift to charity" than a reflection of a market value of a non-market commodity.
"People decide whether a cause is worthy, then pick a nice number to donate to that cause"
Harvard Law Review Editorial, pp 1993}
This position is countered (also in the field of environmental economics) by the arguments
that CV methodology is more sophisticated than simply asking individuals their direct WTP
for an environmental resources and that bias in survey design is a problem for all surveys
and not CV alone. Methods of data collection are more likely to ask the public "If it cost $X
would you pay for it! vote for it?" (Hanemann 1994). What people value should be left up to
them and reliable and replicable methods of assessing these values is still a worthwhile
activity.
These debates remain unresolved and confusing. It is hard to establish whether the
difference of viewpoint as to the acceptability of WTP and contingent valuation methods
concerns the feasibility and applicability of these methods of evaluation in the real world (in
which case they can be improved), or whether the arguments are based on the theoretical
validity (and should be abandoned).
Considering the value of care "beyond health outcomes"
Over the past ten years, the argument has been put forward that practitioners, researchers
and policy-makers need to consider the value of health and social care beyond the narrow
confines of clinical effectiveness. In one of the first articles to consider this in specific relation
to health, Mooney and Lange suggested that evaluation (and policy decisions) have often
failed to take into account the full impact of particular health care interventions that may have
a wider impact on utility than narrow definitions of health gain (Mooney and Lange 1993). In
a later article, Mooney developed these arguments by suggesting that 'the value of health
care is more than the sum of its contribution to health; that there is value in knowing that
others are cared for, and in knowing that these services will be available (and not subject to
ability to pay at point of need) when they will be needed in the future (Mooney 1994). This
debate is pertinent to the thesis since Mooney has argued for a fuller investigation of what
patients want from health and social care services (Mooney 1998). Furthermore the idea that
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people as citizens may have interests in preserving certain characteristics of the health care
system even if these may conflict with the cost-effectiveness evidence is highly relevant to
the debate on how services such as PDC should be valued. Mooney's contribution is also to
reflect on the predominant interest of researchers in outcomes as a technical problem of
identification and measurement. It has also been suggested that outcomes are not technical
entities but incorporate value that are unavoidable since the decision to focus on specific
health outcomes and not the wider contribution of health care is itself a value judgement
(Shiell, Hawe et al 1997).
Ratcliffe and Buxton have explored the idea that there are values other than narrow
measurements of health gain. They published a study on liver transplantation using choice
modelling techniques that suggested that patients were prepared to make trade-offs
between the chance of a successful transplant and improvements in the quality of care they
experienced (Ratcliffe and Buxton 1999). For services that fall outside the mainstream health
care system this evidence is informative, especially where it is highly unlikely that a full
recovery is achievable (and is not expected by the individual). There is a strong argument
that it is not only health gain that is valued by patients attending the service. Furthermore,
these arguments suggest that individuals might trade-off some aspect of individual health
gain health against other aspects of health care provision such as equity of access or other
aspects of the quality of health care. This may be particularly relevant to services such as
palliative day care where health gain may be only one of many important aspects of the
experience. This is one of the key questions explored in the empirical analysis in this thesis.
There has been progress made in developing wider definitions of quality of life for older
people (the main recipients of palliative care services). There is currently a research
programme underway funded by the Economic and Social Research Council that focuses on
the quality of life for older people (Bowling et al 2003). In palliative care, there have been
developments in the outcomes literature that attempts to incorporate concepts such as
spirituality (Brady, Peterman et al 1999, Efficace and Marrone 2002) and hope (Herth 2001)
in studies of the benefits of care. There has also been critical debate about the concept of
quality of life that has shifted the interest from symptoms to functioning. This incorporates
adaptation and "relativism in quality of life research that is seen as more relevant for people
with long-term or palliative care needs (O'Boyle 1997). These developments are extending
the meaning of quality of life beyond narrow definitions of health, but they are mainly taking
place outside the health economics literature. The debate within the health economics
literature has been concerned more with the examination of the values that are placed on
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health states (who should value them and how) rather than with the meaning of the health
states themselves.
The emergence of 'communitarian' arguments in the health economics literature
Gavin Mooney and colleagues have argued that there ought to be a re-examination of the
basis for valuing the benefits of health care and allocating health care resources (Mooney
1998). Mooney was drawing on ideas developed outside economics about the "claims" that
communities have on resources and on decision-making that are different from those made
by individuals maximising preferences (Mooney 1998). He argues for a re-examination of the
basis for valuing the benefits of health care and allocating health care resources. Earlier
writings on communitarianism emerged in the disciplines of philosophy and social science as
a critical response to the publication of the book by John Rawls in the early 1970s which
argued that the principal task of government is to secure and distribute fairly the liberties and
economic resources individuals need to lead freely chosen lives (Rawls 1971). The central
arguments of what became 'communitarianism' (to contrast it with Rawl's view of liberalism)
distinguished between three sorts of claims that a community might have over that of
individuals decision-making: methodological claims about the importance of tradition and
social context for moral and political reasoning, ontological or metaphysical claims about the
social nature of the self, and normative claims about the value of community (Avineri and de-
Shalit 1992). Etzioni has been a key proponent of these ideas and has written about them in
the context of politics (Etzioni 1993).
In health economics, communitarianism has helped to shape what is seen as an alternative
way of conceptualising consumer involvement in decision-making. This is seen as an
alternative to basing evaluation on the consumption preferences of individuals, which
assumes a narrow, consequentialist notion of benefits. Culyer suggested that evaluation and
policy decisions have often failed to take into account the full impacts of interventions, in
particular the benefit of knowing that others are cared for and for knowing that decision-
making is equitable (Culyer 1980).
Mooney has argued that communities (defined geographically, socially, and within
institutions) ought to be involved in and expressing preferences for the overall framework
within which individual decisions about health care can be made. Without the specific
knowledge of the consequences of health care interventions, individuals may not be capable
of expressing fully formed preferences. Instead, communities ought to have a role in defining
the values and norms for decision-making within which technical or operational decision
about health care can be made.
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The operationalisation of communitarianism within a health economic evaluation paradigm is
still being developed and tested in empirically based studies (Jan 1998, Mooney et al 1999,
Jan et al 2000). Shackley and Ryan (1995) have suggested that community or consumer
involvement in decision-making should be separated into two distinct activities: the level of
deciding whether a specific service should exist, and, once it has been decided that such a
service should exist, what it should consist of. These debates are very pertinent to the
themes of this thesis that explores ways of valuing complex services once it has been
decided "by society" that such services should be supported.
One of the problems with moving away from what is straightforward to quantify and measure
is that the ideas of 'community' are themselves complex concepts. The definition of the term
'community' (who its members are, how they should express their views, how decisions
ought to be taken) has not been overtly specified in the literature because it can take many
forms. However, it could be argued that the basic concept of community is a contested
notion in political and economic thought. The idea that there is such a concept as a
community of common interest (rather than divisions of class, gender, race, social status and
other forms of identity) may be more clearly definable in some settings than in others.
Mooney has argued, quoting from Sen that it is "better to be vaguely right than precisely
wrong" (Mooney 2001, pp42). However it is not clear that the communitarian argument is
any more "vaguely righf' than other sources of value (such as individual preferences for the
outcomes of health care), since there is no clear gold standard against which to measure
these alternatives. Communitarianism appears more intuitively close to a democratic
approach to evaluating health care. But problems of defining the "community" and of defining
and agreeing the decision rules when different communities do not have the same values
does not avoid the problems that standard economic evaluation using the CEAlCUA
approach faces. It has been argued in this chapter that the CBA approach can, in theory
incorporate all the known and unknown arguments in an individual's utility function. This
could include preferences for "communitarian" or democratic processes and constitutions as
well as preferences for the health of others as well as oneself. The criticism of welfarism is
that there is a tendency to conceptualise individuals' preferences as preferences for an
individual's private benefit (in terms of health, money, or any other contributor to welfare).
However, this argument is not fully supported in the theoretical arguments of Mishan and
others set out earlier in this chapter.
Application to complex services - which methods could be used?
To decide which approach would be the most suitable for evaluating any health care
programme, it is clear that the simplest method that can meet the objective of the study
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should be adopted. This follows the rule set down by Occams' Razor that one should not
increase, beyond what is necessary, the number of entities required to explain anything. It
admonishes the researcher to choose from a set of otherwise equivalent models of a given
phenomenon the simplest one. Furthermore resources are wasted using more complex
research methods that will not provide better information for decision-making.
Also, it is necessary to be clear about theoretical foundations of the research and whether
strict adherence to theoretical principles will add to the validity of the findings. Since all
methods of evaluation make value assumptions and all use proxies for outcomes, all
methods are a trade-off between the data that it is possible to collect and validity of the
findings (in terms of adherence to welfare economic principles and ability to interpret the
results).
In some settings, this matters more than in others since the relationship between an
outcome measured in natural units (e.g. the hip replacement example described earlier) and
the value of the intervention were it to be purchased in a perfect market, are
commensurable. For health care settings that are more complex, there are reasons for
hypothesising that the relationship is also more complex: the measurement of observable
changes in quality of life and the value of those changes to the individual experiencing them
is not clear and may be highly individual to each person. Non-acute health and social care
interventions could fall into this category.
In health and social care settings where the benefits are not well defined, the subtle nature
of the benefits may not be discernable using quality of life instruments that only identify
larger changes in quality of life. It can be argued that the QALY approach was not deSigned
to measure overall welfare and does not discriminate well between different forms of
psychosocial health, which is the most obvious domain where complex services might make
a difference in quality of life. The fact that the EO-50 instrument considers anxiety and
depression in the same domain (Le. as synonyms of each other) illustrates this point since,
in palliative care for example, research has indicated that these psychological states are
distinct and should be addressed in different ways (Craven 2000, Hinshaw 2002, Ly et al
2002). However this has not been tested empirically and it might be useful to do so in a
palliative care context to test whether these arguments are valid.
For interventions that address wider dimensions of welfare, a form of cost-benefit analysis
might be an appropriate way of considering the value of a complex service, but this method
too has problems. The first is the issue of having to separate the measurement of
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willingness-ta-pay from ability-ta-pay. In the context of many health and social care
services, this is a major methodological problem. The concept of 'willingness-ta-pay' goes
against this philosophy of care in many settings where services are provided free of charge.
Another issue is the possibility that peqple who use these services may be either too frail or
too vulnerable to take part in a survey that requires complex decision-making and
judgement. This may be an important concern in research in these areas. Alternatively, there
is a chance that respondents might 'game the system' by offering responses that are
different from their genuine valuations in the belief that this will have an affect on the care (or
the cost of their care). The use of a direct monetary valuation technique could meet
significant "politicisation bias." There might be lack of will to support for this type of research
from the providers of care and prevent it from gathering any empirical data at all.
In the context of palliative day care these are all important concerns. Socio-demographic
data from the only comparative study of PDC in the UK (reported in the next chapter)
showed that the mean age was 74 years in this group (range 50-74), with only 4.5% of
attenders in paid work. More important, only 20% of carers had any paid employment (full or
part-time) and 63% of patients did not live in privately owned accommodation. There is a
danger, therefore, that patients would say they would choose not to attend palliative day
care at all if they asked what financial contribution they would be prepared to make. This
raises the issue of whether a service has 'value' if users are not willing or able to make any
sacrifice in order to attend palliative day care. The nature of the question may need to be
refined to identify some other form of sacrifice other than financial to assess the
consumption foregone that respondents would be prepared to sacrifice in order to attend
PDC.
However, there are innovative methods being developed that may provide a way forward in
this direction. Choice experiments, where patients trade between different attributes of care
(of which one may be price or a proxy for price but it does not have to be) may provide a
possible way of adopting a quasi CSA approach. This is an indirect technique of contingent
valuation. The approach has other important properties that might also be relevant to the
evaluation of the types of services considered here since it explores the value of specific
attributes of care rather than the service as a whole. In order to examine whether this would
be an appropriate method and whether a QALY type approach could be undertaken, a
review of the theory of choice experiments, methods and the issues they raise is the subject
of chapter 4.
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SUMMARY
This section has reviewed economic theory relevant to the arguments in the thesis. It
showed that economic evaluation of health care has been dominated by methods that have
moved away from the cost-benefit analysis approach, which is the closest to the practical
application of welfare economic theory. This has been due to the great difficulties in valuing
the outcomes of health care in monetary terms and also stems from a rejection of the idea of
using individuals' preferences for deciding the value of public services. This is perceived as
an inappropriate and inequitable criterion for making decisions about the distribution of
public resources.
The QALY approach makes assumptions about the nature of time as linear and additively
separable which is more problematic in some contexts that in others. In the context of
palliative care interventions, time may be inherently different at the end of life and valued
differently, from time earlier in life. It also incorporates a narrower definition of quality of life
than may be relevant and meaningful in particular care settings. The separation of health
benefit and the valuation of that health benefit would seem to be an important barrier to
using the health gain method for interventions that occur later in life. This argument that
objectively measured health gain can be different from the subjectively felt value of health
gain may also hold for people with long-term illness who do not expect to reach full health.
Therefore, there are persuasive arguments for a preference-based approach to evaluating
complex services.
The next chapter aims to put these questions more firmly in the context of current and past
evaluative studies undertaken work in palliative care, since this is the example on which this
thesis is focused. This bases the discussion clearly in the real world of evaluation, and the
actual problems faced in undertaking this type of work in complex areas of health care. The
review assesses what is known about palliative day care from the economic evaluation
literature and other evaluation sources, and to highlight the gaps in the literature. The
previous palliative day care study is presented as well as evidence from other areas of
health and social care. The previous palliative day care study and evidence from other areas
of complex health and social care has informed the decision about how to make progress in
the empirical work presented in this thesis.
Other types of evidence are also explored in order to conceptualise the nature of the
outcomes of palliative day care, and to consider what type of evaluation would be
appropriate to make progress in the evaluation of palliative day care. This work informs the
empirical work presented later in the thesis.
75
Chapter 3
Chapter 3
Review of the economic literature in
palliative care research
Introduction
The purpose of this review is to assess how far the issues raised in the previous chapter on
the theory of economic evaluation have filtered through to the economic evaluation of
palliative care. The argument made here is that economic evaluation of complex health and
social care services is less advanced than the evaluation of other health care intervention
because of the problems of defining and measuring outcomes. These problems are not
specific to palliative care but are relevant to other types of health and social care where
outcomes cannot be easily defined by one simple measure of outcome to produce a cost-
effectiveness ratio. Evidence from qualitative literature on palliative day care is also
presented since the empirical study presented later in the thesis draws on this work.
The second half of this chapter addresses the problem of measuring outcomes for
interventions that are complex and multidimensional and where outcomes are hard to
conceptualise and measure. Examples from other health and social care sectors where
similar issues of measuring outcomes might arise are discussed. Lessons are drawn from
the first economic evaluation of palliative day care, and insights from studies in other areas
of health and social care are presented.
SECTION 1. REVIEW OF THE ECONOMIC EVIDENCE IN PALLIATIVE CARE STUDIES
This review is presented to demonstrate that the empirical work presented in this thesis
represents a step forward in testing methods of economic evaluation in palliative day care
research. Since the body of evidence on the cost-effectiveness of palliative day care is very
limited, the review of the evaluative literature considers evidence from a wider range of
palliative care studies. It demonstrates that the economic evaluation studies in palliative care
have not in the main been well done and do not answer important questions for economic
evaluation in this area. An analysis of the methodologies used in these studies demonstrates
an absence of economic theory underlying these studies.
This section critically reviews 14 studies of palliative care services that have included
economic analysis. The inclusion criterion was studies that considered resource use or cost
as well as the outcomes of palliative care. The key themes explored and critiqued in this
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literature review were: how outcomes have been conceptualised and measured; how
outcomes have been considered alongside costs; the robustness of the findings; and the
interpretation of the findings by the authors.
Data sources and review criteria
The review of economic studies was embedded within a systematic review undertaken for
the Welsh Office. The search was undertaken by trained systematic and the economic
. papers identified from that review were passed to HRD for data extraction and review. The
economic review formed one chapter of a report to the Welsh Office completed in 2001. The
review was updated by HRD for the thesis using the HEED and NHS EED databases up to
August 2002, but no new papers were identified.
The systematic review was undertaken using the databases MEDLlNE, CINAHL, CancerLit,
Psychlnfo, EMBASE, PallCare Index, EPOC register, System for Information of Grey
Literature (SIGEL), Applied Social Science Index (ASSIA) and Sciences Citation Index (SSI).
Studies were identified from the data-base inception to end of 1999 and updated using
Medline, CINAHL and Psychlnfo to end 2000. The following key words were used: palliative
or hospice, terminal care, terminally ill, palllat", hospice*, dying*, end of life; and effective or
evaluate, random, methods, economics, statistics, trends, organization, utilization; and
service or team. This was augmented by hand searching Palliative Medicine, Progress in
Palliative Care, the Journal of Palliative Care and the Journal of Pain and Symptom
Management to end 2000, examining references from papers retrieved and a search of the
grey literature.
For inclusion, studies must have compared palliative care or hospice teams with
conventional care (present or historical). An intervention was defined as two or more health
care workers, where at least one had specialist training or worked principally in palliative or
hospice care. Study populations were patients with a progressive life threatening illness and
their caregivers (defined as family, friends or significant others). Usual care was routine
community and general hospital/oncology services. Outcomes were classified as: pain and
symptom control, quality of life and death; patient and family satisfaction / morbidity pre- and
post-bereavement. Non-English language articles were translated. Anecdotal and case
reports or studies without measured outcomes were excluded.
Overview of the studies
Appendix A shows a summary of the evidence from the papers in the systematic review. The
search criteria did not include specific treatments or specific groups of patients, but was
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defined as any service carried out by a multidisciplinary palliative care team with at least one
individual having specialist palliative care training, or who spends all their working time in palliative
care, working in a hospital, home/community setting or in a combination of these. Articles were
excluded if they reported individual case histories, or if they described any interventions not
usually considered to be part of palliative care, that is, surgery, chemotherapy, radiotherapy, or
anaesthetic procedure. Articles were also excluded if they reported a review of palliative care
without empirical data; a needs assessment exercise with no intervention described or evaluated;
a description of a palliative care intervention but no evaluation; a qualitative study with no
comparative element; developing countries interventions (where the context of care is markedly
different from the UK), or an intervention deemed not to be palliative care, for example disability,
rehabilitation or chronic pain.
In all, 43 studies were found that contained potentially relevant economic data. Studies that
contained primary economic analysis represented 14 out of the 43 studies. All the papers
that contained some comparative evidence of the costs and resource consequences of
palliative care and measurement of outcome were considered for inclusion. Of these studies
in the review, nine of them evaluated a home care intervention (Vinciguerra et al 1986,
Cummings and Hughes 1990, Tramarin et al 1992, Hughes 1992, Bloom 1980, Zimmer et al
1984, McCusker et al 1987, Ventafridda et al 1989, McCorkle et al 1989). This included
services provided by multidisciplinary teams, hospital-based home care, physician-led home
care, nurse-led home care, and "home hospice". The others were inpatient hospice service,
either alongside home care (Kane et al 1984, Greer 1986, Dunt et al 1989) or as a stand-
alone service (Axelsson and Christensen 1998). The only other type of service evaluated
was a nurse coordination service (Raftery et al 1996). None of the studies considered
palliative day care services.
The research methodologies can be categorised as follows: those which presented
economic analysis alongside a randomised controlled trial (five studies); those which
presented health care utilisation data after having failed to establish significant differences in
clinical outcomes from an RCT (two studies); economic data gathered alongside an
observational study (five studies); and analysis of health care utilisation and monetary value
of health care only (two studies).
The conceptualisation and measurement of outcomes
In 12 of the 14 studies that considered outcomes alongside costs, outcomes were measured
using health-related quality of life (HRQoL) instruments to measure health gain. They did not
include measures that reflected preferences for health interventions or health states. The
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types of instruments that were used focused on specific aspects of ill health associated with
patients in a palliative phase of illness (anxiety, depression, social dependency); on the
health of older people (who make up the majority of the palliative care population); or
general health profile (the Sickness Impact Profile, used in Zimmer 1984). All the studies
except three (McCusker 1987, Bloom 1980, Axelsson 1998) used at least three different
outcome instruments. The three papers that did not incorporate quality of life considered no
outcome measures at all and evaluated programme costs only.
All the studies were undertaken before a specific palliative care outcome instrument had
been developed and tested. The palliative care outcome scale (POS) was validated and
published in the late 1990s (Hearn and Higginson 1999). All the studies reviewed here were
undertaken before this time. The problem the researchers faced was to incorporate a range
of clinical and health-related quality of life outcomes into the evaluation in a way that would
be sensitive enough to detect important differences.
The scope of the studies has been narrowly defined. The majority of these studies are small,
single institution studies. The resource use data is focused on the providers of care and how
much might be saved by changes in service re-organisation. No comparative measure of
outcome is reported. For example, Vinciguerra and colleagues (1986) undertook a resource
use analysis of their pilot oncology home care programme in Italy, describing the types of
resources that were used for this programme (e.g. clinical equipment, staff involved) and
presented a comparative financial analysis and per diem cost savings of this programme.
The per diem savings reported were very large (34%). These savings were reported from the
programme and did not consider the impact of the costs of care on patients' use of other
resources or on the costs to the family of home care. The only outcome considered in this
study was financial cost to the provider that meant it was not a full evaluation.
The focus on provider costs was also adopted in two other studies (Axelsson 1998 and
Bloom 1980). One of these (Bloom 1980) did include some qualitative evidence of outcomes
from carers that suggested that patients had a better quality care at home, but this was not
developed further in this paper. All the single institution studies suggested that palliative care
was less costly than conventional care even though cost data were not rigorously collected
and the numbers of subjects small, that is, fewer than 200 subjects (Axelsson 1998, Raftery
1996, Vinciguerra 1986, Tramarin 1992, Ventafridda 1989, Dunt 1989, Bloom 1980). These
studies are similar to phase one clinical trials. They are all small trials or observation studies
that aim to understand whether there is any clinical benefit at all resulting from a new
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intervention. They do not consider whether the size and scale of this benefit is economically
worthwhile.
Only one study (Tramarin 1986) attempted to construct a single quality-of-life instrument.
This was a study of a home care intervention for people with AIDS. It was a very small
prospective study of 10 subjects, randomly selected from 17 eligible patients. The authors
used a Quality of Well-being Scale (QWB) that expressed outcomes in terms of complete
well years adjusted for diminished quality of life. The QWB scale incorporates physical
functioning and symptoms and an overall quality of well-being score graded from 0 (death) to
1 (asymptomatic optimal functioning). The authors modified this score by recalculating the
time frame from ''well-years'' to "well-weeks" and produced an overall ratio of cost per well
week. No other information was given about this score, its validity in this population cohort,
or how a "cost per well week" ought to be interpreted. No details were given either about
how the overall weighted score was derived, and the patient scores were not published. The
authors describe this as a cost-utility analysis, but it is clear from their evidence, that this
was not a utility-based score but a method of adjusting (in an obtuse way) for reduced health
along a few domains that were not clearly described. This is an example of a small-scale
study that attempted to consider a combined measure of length of life and quality of life but
the methodology was not well demonstrated or clearly based on cost-utility analysis theory
(either the health gain or preference-based approach).
All four randomised controlled trials focused on a single palliative care unit (Zimmer 1985,
Kane 1984, Hughes 1992, Cummings 1990). These studies had more rigorous study
methodologies but costs and outcomes were not considered together in a comprehensive
economic evaluation. The focus of the economic analysis was still provider costs with
outcomes analysed separately. The studies found no difference in health-related quality of
life between palliative care and non-palliative care patients except that there was increased
satisfaction with place of care among palliative care patients, an outcome found in all the
studies. This is a relevant finding as it implies that satisfaction with care, which is
fundamentally about patients' self-expressed preference for where and how they are cared
for, may be a very important outcome of palliative care.
Analysis of the discussion at the end of these papers is revealing: the attention is on clinical
outcomes and costs, and the issue of increased satisfaction is not addressed, certainly not in
relation to amalgamating patient preferences into an economic evaluation. One reading of
this could be that increased satisfaction (or realisation of preferences) is not a 'hard 'enough
outcome in effectiveness research. Whether or how to incorporate this phenomenon into an
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economic evaluation, and how preferences and values might be incorporated into economic
evaluation, has not been addressed in any of the studies published in this area.
The economic focus on cost
The over-riding concern with the costs of care is shown by the aims of these studies. Cost-
effectiveness is conceptualised as demonstrating lower costs of care for palliative care
services. Authors of the papers have highlighted the need to demonstrate cost savings from
palliative care as the main purpose of their work. This reflects concurrent concerns in the
USA especially about whether medical insurance should cover palliative care services (Kane
1984, Cummings 1990, Greer 1986, Hughes 1992). It also reflects concerns about perceived
inadequacies of local provision of care for people who were dying with the focus on a new
service (Zimmer 1984, McCusker 1987, Dunt 1989, Raftery 1996, Tramarin 1992), the need
to provide data to purchasers on the cost of a newservice (Axelsson 1998, McCorkle 1989);
and the need to demonstrate that palliative care does not equate to higher costs (Vinciguerra
1986, Bloom 1980, Ventafridda 1989).
'Costing a new service for the first time is a worthwhile activity. However these studies do not
address questions of whether an intervention is economically important, that is whether
additional costs or savings of providing palliative care are associated with additional or
reduced quality of care. This evidence therefore represents a narrow approach to economic
evaluation. None of the studies conceptualise economic benefit as a way of expressing
outcome. Only two studies demonstrated superiority of the intervention, one in HRQoL
scores (Ventafridda 1989) and one in pain score (Dunt 1989). Three studies demonstrated
that palliative care led to higher patient satisfaction with care (Vinciguerra 1986, Hughes
1992, Zimmer 1984).·The first two were randomised controlled trials of home care versus
hospital care. The latter study considered additional physician-led support versus usual
home care.
The consideration of outcomes alongside costs
The previous section showed that all the studies in this review of palliative care that have
included outcomes alongside costs have used evaluation instruments that reflect a range of
quality of life dimensions. This method of evaluation has been called a form of 'modified
cost-effectiveness analyses' (Goddard 1989). Goddard suggests that this approach to
measuring quality of life in the palliative care setting reflects the problem of measuring
health-related quality of life for individuals in the final stages of life. The limitation of this for
economic evaluation is that without a single unit of outcome there can be no incremental
cost-effectiveness ratio (Drummond et al 1997). This presents a problem in assessing the
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overall effectiveness of different alternatives and identifying a decision rule for assessing the
superiority of one intervention over the other. Either one of the interventions in the
comparison must be more effective across all domains of quality of life (and across all
HRQoL instruments), or across only one domain where all other domains are the same. If
the findings show that one intervention dominates another across some dimensions of
outcome but is dominated in others, then no decision rule can be applied since it is not clear
whether one intervention is better than another overall.
Chapter 2 outlined the particular welfare economic rules on which economic evaluation is
based: the decision rule based on Pareto optimality is that the benefits to the gainers of any
change in policy have to be greater than the losses to the losers. If the gainers can
potentially compensate the losers and still be better off, then a change in policy is a Pareto
improvement. This is the decision rule on which economic evaluation is constructed.
Considering how decision rules have been made in these studies is enlightening. One
approach that has been taken in one group of these studies (Ventafridda 1986, Cummings
and Hughes 1990, Raftery 1996, McCusker 1987, Axelsson 1998) has been to argue that
they have established clinical equipoise between palliative care and conventional treatment
and then reported reduced costs afterwards. These can be categorised therefore as cost
minimisation studies. The palliative care intervention is dominant and therefore difficult
questions about the marginal costs and benefits do not arise. A Pareto improvement has
taken place since there are only gainers and no losers. However since these studies
established no evidence of difference rather than evidence of no difference, the argument
that there is true clinical equipoise is not strictly true. The research instruments and sample
size used to establish differences in outcomes may not have been powerful enough to have
measured real differences, or the result may have been obtained by chance.
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Box 3.1: Study designs of economic studies included in the review, with overall
findings. 'Equivalen' (E), 'More satisfaction' (S), 'less pain', 'None' refers to the
overall finding for the outcomes of the study
Costing study in framework of
an observational study
RCT
Kane (1984) E
Hughes (1992) S
Zimmer (1984) * S
McCorkle (1989) E
Observational Studies
Vinciguerra (1986) S
Ventafridda (1989) .S
Greer (1986) E
Tramarin (1992) E
Dunt ( 1989) Less Pain
Resource use only reported
from an RCT
Cummings (1990) E
Raftery (1996) E
Bloom (1980) None
McCusker et al (1987) None
Axelsson (1998) None
All studies
Population average: 391 subjects
Range: 42 - 1874 subjects
Median: 167 subjects
Only one multicentre trial included in this review
"two papers from the same study by Zimmer et a/ et a/
The validity of the findings
·Criteria are now well established for publication of economic studies (Weinstein et al 1996,
Drummond et al 1997). However these had not been widely disseminated when these
studies were published since many were undertaken in the 1980s. Furthermore only one
study (as far as could be determined from authors' title and address for correspondence)
was undertaken by a health economist. To some extent this may have had had some
influence over the types of studies that were undertaken and how the economic evaluation
was designed.
One of the main forms of potential bias in small, non-randomised studies is clearly selection
bias. The concern about the observational studies is that patients who are enrolled in a
palliative care programme have different preferences from patients who have conventional
care (Tierney 1994, McWhinney 1994). These preferences could be for less aggressive
treatments, to avoid inpatient care and to be independent for as long as possible before
death (Greer 1986). There is some evidence for this in the literature. Patients in palliative
care settings tend to have been ill for longer, have better social support network, are more
likely to be white, and to be younger than patients who do not enrol in palliative care
programmes (Emmanuel 1996). The randomised controlled trials included in this review
support that when these factors are controlled for by randomisation, differences between
intervention groups disappear.
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In all of the papers, possible sources of bias are discussed. Problems that are reported are
not related to the economic data but are limitations of the overall study design. These were
non-representatives of the study sites (Cummings 1990, Raftery 1996), non-
representativeness of patient groups (Cummings 1990, Kane 1984, Bloom 1980, McCusker
1987, Axelsson 1998), group contamination (Kane 1984), differences in case-mix between
control and intervention groups (Cummings 1990, Raftery 1996), and small sample sizes
(Kane 1984, Bloom 1980). Problems are reported in these economic studies that are not
exclusive to economic evaluation but are limitations of the overall study design. The problem
of the lack of data on costs to the family was discussed by the authors of four studies
(Ventafridda 1986, Tramarin 1992, Bloom 1980,Axelsson 1998).
Given that studies are generally undertaken by enthusiasts keen to demonstrate cost
savings, it is important that five studies either failed to demonstrate anticipated savings or
cautioned readers in interpreting their results. Cost studies have usually been undertaken in
order to demonstrate that a new programme is either cost-neutral or cost saving. It may be
argued that those authors undertaking a cost study alongside an efficacy trial already
anticipate that a new programme will reduce costs of care. This could be described as a
form of researcher bias. Null findings suggest that the cost savings are more tenuous than
the authors have concluded.
While some papers reported very large differences in resource use between control and
intervention groups, these tended to be the weaker papers in terms of study design
(observational studies rather than randomised controlled trials) and sample size. Only two
studies suggested that the reader should interpret the results with caution. However, the
majority of authors have gone to some length to try and explain the differences in resource
use between intervention and control groups, and to assess the possible sources of bias
introduced into the study.
Discussion of quantitative studies
This review of empirical economic research found that none of the 'economic' studies
published in this field had incorporated values and preferences for different forms of
palliative care. Their focus has been narrower and has evaluated the impact of palliative
care on the overall costs of care. The problem with a cost- focussed approach in the wider
context is that it does not provide any evidence for whether the additional costs or savings of
a change in policy represent a good use of resources. It is interesting that research into a
service where the user is at the very centre of the decision-making process (in deciding
whether to accept home care, agree to be admitted to hospice, accept conventional care
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only) has not considered the problem of including patients' preferences in economic
evaluation up until now. This may be because researchers have not had the knowledge,
understanding or expertise to apply more robust economic measures of outcome in this
area.
One of the problems of this narrow approach was identified even before the majority of these
empirical studies were undertaken:
"The real problem is to determine when and in what ways a consideration of costs is
reasonable in administrative decision-making [...J What the administrator may view as a
pattern of wasteful expenses for statistically minuscule benefits the clinician whose practices
are being examined may consider a pattern of justified expenses for a series of individual
treatments, each undertaken in the best interests of the particular patent" (Bayer 1983)
These days, the 'clinician' might be substituted for the patient but it is argued that the idea
(and the problem) is the same.
Practical and ethical problems in quantitative evaluation of palliative care
Previous trials of palliative care services have described both practical and ethical problems
and a high refusal or uptake among potential patients (Rinck et al 1997, Grande et al 2000a,
2000b). In a systematic review of 11 randomised-controlled trials of palliative care, . two
studies problems were so severe that no results were reported (Rinck et al 1997). In 10
studies there were problems with patient recruitment. There were also problems reported
problems of population homogeneity, patient attrition, defining and maintaining contrast
between interventions, and selection of outcome.
Zimmer and colleagues (who undertook one of only two RCTs of palliative care) have
argued that their study has demonstrated that an RCT is feasible for a multi-dimensional
intervention (Zimmer et al 1985). But that these services have to be added to or change to
what is seen as normal care. Goddard (1993) has also argued that the RCT is the preferred
design for evaluating alternatives in health care as it can eliminate various forms of bias.
However, there are various ethical problems with randomising patients who are dying. This
is made easier if patients are randomised to two forms of care, rather than service/ no
service.
Goddard put forward the case that a randomised trial in the context of palliative care
services would ensure that differential outcomes were due to different models of care rather
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than differences in patients but recognised that RCTs would be difficult to organise (Goddard
1989). The difficulties relate to the nature of the illness and the needs of the patients to be
cared for now rather than at some time in the future. Randomisation to no service would be
perceived as unethical. For example Higginson (1999) found that GPs were reluctant to
agree for patients to be randomised to the 'no support' arm in a trial of palliative home care.
It is easier if two different models of palliative care are evaluated.
Back in the 1980s, Ward (1984) undertook a study of nurse-led palliative home care, and
reported that the reliance on nurses who may be "protective" towards patients in a palliative
phase of illness slowed down arrangements for undertaking a detailed cost and outcome
study for a sub-sample of patients. In this period, a number of patients died or were admitted
as inpatients before any data could be collected. The small number of patients eventually
recruited meant that no comparison of outcome could be made with conventional care. Ward
also reports problems of completeness of diary data by relatives of patients who were dying
which meant that detailed comparisons of costs were not assessed. Jarvis and colleagues in
their later study of a speciallst palliative care programme incorporating home care, inpatient
care and support services, also found that a large number of patients had to be excluded
from the study due to the acute nature of their illness (Jarvis et al 1996). Also, the authors
report that the proportion of patients dying before data from two time periods could be
collected (60%) meant that the sub-sample who survived were not representative of the
populations.
Jarvis and colleagues (1996) have argued that an important source of bias in palliative care
studies was that some patients (often the most ill) do not participate, and this may be a large
proportion of people who could benefit from a palliative care programme. In their study, they
found that only 34/84 subjects had data for two time paints for comparison. The reason was
a marked physical deterioration in the respondents. This raises the question of the internal
validity of these studies. Undertaking the valuation at an earlier stage in the disease
trajectory could improve the completeness and reporting of results but this would not capture
changes in health-related quality of life of the acutely ill patients.
This is not only a phenomenon in palliative care research, but has also been found in a more
general review of home based support for older people (Elkan et al 2001). This review found
an absence of evidence of improved health and functioning states that was explained by the
authors of the review as due to the patients with the poorest health dying and therefore
dropping out of the analysis. This meant that outcomes could only be measured on the
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subset of patients who survived longer. The research tools were not sensitive enough to
detect modest improvements in health or functional ability.
SECTION2. ECONOMIC EVIDENCE IN PALLIATIVE DAY CARE RESEARCH
Since palliative day care is a recent development in palliative care, research evidence of its
effectiveness and cost-effectiveness is still in its very early stages. Studies that have been
published have been small descriptive studies of individual services and surveys. There has
also been a recent collection ,ofessays on palliative day care that brings together experience
and practice of delivering palliative day care services (Hearn and Myers 2001). Although this
is not peer-reviewed evidence and does not directly compare palliative day care with other
forms of care, this descriptive analysis is invaluable for understanding the process of
palliative day care, and the context in which evaluative studies are undertaken.
A review of the evidence for palliative day care was undertaken in the late 1990s (Spencer
and Daniels 1998). The review traces the development of day hospice in the UK using
predominantly descriptive evidence and analysis of recent UK policy. The review presented
various aspects of palliative day care (such as service provision, access and meeting
consumers needs) and provided a broad picture of the kinds of provision that is available in
the UK and for whom. However, at the time of publication there was almost no evaluative
literature. The review describes some of the attempts to try and quantify or describe the
process of palliative day care and the extent to which meets its objectives. None of the
papers cited considered cost-effectiveness directly but were attempting to conceptualise how
palliative day care might be evaluated given the heterogeneity of the intervention.
Limitations in terms of identifying appropriate outcome measures were considered to be an
important reason why evaluation would be difficult to achieve. The purpose of the first review
of studies by Spencer and Daniels was to set out a framework for considering how palliative
day care might be evaluated. It did not consider in any depth how patient outcomes might be
affected by the range or intensity of day care services, or the levers by which palliative day
care might increase or decrease the cost-effectiveness of care, nor how patient preferences
could be taken into consideration in any evaluative framework.
Palliative day care studies - qualitative evidence relevant to the economic evaluation
Published evidence of the effectiveness of PDC is very sparse. A few descriptive studies
have been undertaken to either describe a single service in the UK (Hopkinson and Hallet
2001, Faulkner, Higginson et al 1993), or in the USA (Thompson 1990); to describe the
ethos and principles of day care (Carr and Carr 1992, Kennett 2000); to set policy and
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service standards for palliative day care in the USA (Olson 1989) and to report stakeholder
views on implementing a new palliative care service (Lohfield 2000). These studies have
been published, in the main, without reference to one another. Nevertheless, they reflect a
large degree of similarity in defining the need for PDe and in describing the structure of the
service as it is currently configured or could be organised in the future.
Only one descriptive study, by the author of this thesis, was undertaken specifically to inform
an economic evaluation. This was a pilot study undertaken in five PDe centres in Greater
London to assess the structure, process and outcomes of palliative care. This was a
participative observation study where the researcher spent a week in each centre. Additional
observation data, financial data and interviews with stakeholders informed this study
(Douglas et al 2000). Some of the characteristics that key differences in provision and
philosophy between PDe centres are presented below:
The qualitative evidence has informed the design of the economic evaluation of PDC as it
provides insights into the general problems of evaluation in this context. A number of themes
have been drawn out from these descriptive studies. These relate to the heterogeneity of
intervention, the heterogeneity of patient needs, the complexity of describing PDe as a
single intervention, how to relate inputs to outcomes, and finally whether user and provider
perspectives show a different viewpoint in terms of what is important about PDC. These
themes are explored in this chapter.
Table 3.1 Characteristics of the five POC centres In the North Thames study
Centre A B C 0 E
Attendance per 24 45 49 36 70
week
Philosophy More More More social MedicaV social More social
medical medical
% NHS funded 98% 27% 41% 22% 24%
Managed by NHS Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary
sector sector sector sector
Location Inner city Inner city Suburban Suburban Suburban
Inpatient unit attached attached Not attached attached attached
Day for younger No Yes Yes Yes Yes
people
Discharae policy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. therapists 11 (10) 11 (3) 10 (6) 11 (3) 8 (6)
(paid)
Transport Taxi service Volunteers Volunteers Volunteers Volunteers
provided
Medical staff Appointment Appointment Appointment On-call, On-call,
emergency emergency
only only
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Heterogeneity of intervention
The qualitative studies demonstrate that the breadth of possible activities is diverse.
Thompson (1992) describes a very wide range of services offered on one American day
hospice. These are described as water-based activities for symptom control (whirlpools,
swimming pools, and baths), through to personal care (bathing, hairdressing, and beauty),
hot meals, spiritual activities, arts and creative activities, and help with activities of daily
living (walking, dressing, cooking, and cleaning). Faulkner et al (1993) found that across 12
PDe centres in one UK region, specialist services were provided by doctors, nurses,
aromatherapists, hairdressers, beauticians, physiotherapists, art therapists, social workers,
occupational therapists, the chaplaincy, reflexology and massage therapists.
The only example of published guidelines for PDe has been written in the 1980s in the USA
(Olson 1989). The authors of the guidance set down standards that palliative day care
providers have to meet in order to claim reimbursement. They were to make provision of the
following services: medical care, nursing care, social work, transportation, nutrition, and
alternative educational and supportive therapies such as music therapy, art therapy, stress
management, family counselling, grief counselling, guided imagery training, recreation
therapy, speech therapy, occupational therapy, physical therapy, nutritional counselling, and
relaxation training.. This is a long list of activities, the efficacy of which has not been fully
established using rigorous trial methods. In the UK, there has been no policy of common
standards established. This has meant that PDe has been provided in different types of
accommodation and with different levels of staffing and other resources. (Faulkner et al
1993)
Each of the qualitative studies has argued that a well-designed PDe service should be able
to offer patients a range of services, incorporating flexibility into the programme. The
emphasis in both North America and the UK has been on allowing patients to decide
autonomously what their needs are and on trying different activities.
Faulkner (1993) also reported that different UK centres emphasised different aspects of
PDe. One centre did not provide any medical, nursing or physical input. One centre did not
provide any creative activities, each believing that it was not the role of PDe to provide these
services that could be accessed elsewhere or were not part of the therapeutic role of PDe.
Douglas et al (2000) found that there was a difference in philosophy or emphasis in day care
provision across centres, with some emphasising the clinical surveillance role more than the
creative opportunities provided by PDe. In the UK, there is no statutory guidance on what
should be provided, Or on the effectiveness of individual therapies. Each centre is guided by
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local circumstances and the ideologies of the providers of the services whether these are the
services that the patients need or want has yet to be established.
Heterogeneity of patient needs
Two studies have focused on the ability of PDe to meet different patients' needs with
different kinds of services. Thompson et al showed that one PDe centre provided different
kinds of care on different days of the week to accommodate sub-groups of patients
(Thompson 1990). For example there was a day for attenders who do not feel too ill and still
need the care offered by the day centre. For this group, an artist was present and the centre
was more oriented around creative activities. Other days were quieter with less input for
those patients who are either more ill or more elderly. A separate day is also provided for
younger patients. This pattern was also observed in the UK studies.
Douglas and colleagues found that what was offered in PDe varied from one centre to the
next. For example, the emphasis could be on creative activities, psychosocial support,
individual or group activities, rehabilitation, medical treatment or nursing care (Douglas et al
2000). The emphasis was on patients having some control over what happens to them, and
on deciding week by week, what activities would be beneficial. Older patients appeared to
want fewer active therapeutic services; younger patients (under 65 years) said they wanted
more control over what they received and they were willing to change their package of care
more often. Younger people who attended appeared not to stay as long in the day as older
people, and said they were more likely to attend the centre for a particular treatment or
consultation, rather than to use the social facilities of the centre.
In all centres, patients were referred for a range of reasons: for a specific palliative care
need such as continued symptom management or nursing care, psychological support or for
dealing with complex family situations; for short-term breaks for carers and for social and
creative opportunities for patients and their families. In some centres, patients undergoing
radiotherapy or chemotherapy were referred for additional support. Patients usually attended
once a week, although this depended on the patients' needs and use of other services.
This meant that no patient would necessarily receive the same package of palliative day
care services. The intensity, timing and range of services and therefore the possible impact
of these services on quality of life will differ between patients, or patient groups. The ability to
benefit from palliative day care and the extent to which patients were actively involved in
other forms of care and social activities also differed between patient groups, and between
people at different stages of their illness.
90
Chapter 3
Complexity of describing in the intervention
The authors of qualitative and descriptive studies of PDC have attempted to describe the
service in a straightforward way that is amenable to a wide readership. PDC has been
described as "both a health experience and in many ways even more importantly - a
psychosocial experience or personal experience' (Corr and Corr 1992,- pp156). Other
authors have described it by its service Components in order that providers of the service
have clear guidance on how the service should be structured (Olson 1989). Another author
summed day care up as "a day that begins with self care, is then generally spent in work,
arid ends in relaxation (Tigges, in Corr and Corr, 1993: pp 171). This sounds straightforward,
but does not explain the purpose of the service and why patients are offered a range of
activities.
All the authors of descriptive studies have argued that PDC is more than the sum of its parts.
"The purpose is more important than the activity. Helping individuals retain a sense of
integrity and dignity in the face of progressive losses is the primary goal of hospice and
hospice day care' (Thompson 1990, pp 30). This position is supported by another study that
suggested that "elementary craft activities guided by an occupational therapist or simple
class exercises led by a physical therapist have an importance that may not be apparent
from superficial observatiorl' (Corr and Corr 1993, pp 157).
Thompson goes on to describe PDC as, "a centre [that] provides a therapeutic milieu where
patients can receive the necessary support, training and equipment to resume activities and
adapt to changes in previous life roles, bringing meaning and value to patients' remaining
days (Thompson 1990, pp 30). While this is a more elaborate description, the means by
which PDC "brings meaning and value' to patients is not well described, and the lack of
description of day care from the patients' point of view underscores this.
Authors have described a "warm and supportive atmosphere" (Faulkner et al 1993). Douglas
(2000) also reported that the extent to which palliative day care differed across centres and-
from other kinds of health services was a matter of degree. For example, it is a more diverse
service than most other statutorily funded health services. While people presented with
obvious, visible care needs, they also may attend day care because staff feel they live in
situations of acute social isolation and where no other form of care is offered. There are high
staff-to-patient ratios in PDC centres and the workforce is often dependent on voluntary as
well as paid therapists and support staff. The effect of this on the provision of services is to
both make it more flexible and adaptable to individual patients' needs but also to make it less
stable and more reliant on the willingness of local people to support the service. These are
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important observations since most forms of evaluation assume that there is such thing as an
average intervention and average effect.
User perspectives in the description of PDe and measurement of outcomes
The studies described so far have all been undertaken by providers of PDe (Corr and Corr
1992, Thompson 1990) or by independent observers of the service (Faulkner, Higginson et
al 1993, Douglas, Higginson et al 2000). The impact of this service on the users themselves,
as perceived by them, has not been a focus of qualitative research until very recently.
A phenomenological study to assess patients' perceptions of PDC found that patients could
be divided into one group who could tolerate living with cancer without much change to their
daily living, and another that felt that this life event required some considerable adaptation
(Hopkinson 2001). The author reported that these different kinds of needs for palliative care
(one more intensive, one less so) could be supported in PDC since care focused on
individuals' needs and was flexible enough to manage both. What this study did not explore
was what specific aspects of PDC enhanced or detracted from patients ability to cope with
living with cancer. Nor did it explore the feelings of people who felt less satisfied with the
care they received (although it was reported that not all interviewees felt as positive as the
majority, in a cohort of just 12 patients). The over-riding perception of patients was that it is a
"humanistic" service, which is a term that is open to different interpretations and not a
straightforward outcome for evaluation.
One study that did consider the effectiveness of a specific aspect of PDC was undertaken in
one hospice in South London (Kennett 2000). This study explored the experiences of
patients taking part in the creative arts. The author was involved in the provision of this
service. Again, no negative aspect of participation in this activity was reported, and themes
are all expressed in an extremely positive light such as self-esteem, autonomy, hope, and
social integration. This study illustrates an important problem in evaluating PDC: the need for
providers to demonstrate effectiveness in the face of financial constraints, and the lack of
external evaluation by outside researchers. The one qualitative study (undertaken as part of
the North Thames study described in the next section) interviewed PDC attenders over a
three-month period (Goodwin et al 2002b). Interviews were undertaken outside the day care
setting, usually in patients' own homes, and the researcher did not work in day care. The
study reported negative as well as positive statements by patients. The most important
aspect of PDC was found to be "meeting other people" and ''the company", regardless of the
type of centre attended or the range of services offered. Patients who attended the centres
with an emphasis on medical input were more likely to say that specific medical care were
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important to them. This suggests that patents preferences are not complete when they arrive
but are constructed by their environment. Furthermore, there was some dissonance between
the providers' view of poe and what the patients said they wanted, as evidenced by this
quote from a patient:
"I only attend for the counselling. I've tried relaxation and I can't do that.... I'm not really
interested in art and craft... I have to come all day just for the counselling" (Goodwin et al
2002b, pp 278)
Issues in the economic evaluation of complex interventions
This thesis has set out to investigate the general problem of evaluating the outcomes of
interventions that can support decision-making within an economic evaluation framework.
The specific problem is how to evaluate outcomes where interventions are complex. A
definition of complexity that will be used in this thesis is proposed here. This complexity has
been conceptualised here as interventions that cannot be pre-determined. They will depend
on the specific needs of the individual whose needs will change over time. These individuals'
needs will be different from the needs of others in the same phase of illness, due to their life
circumstances and previous experiences. Services are interactive; they depend not only on
the context of provision, but also on the person receiving the care. They cannot be assumed
to provide the same value or benefit to individuals who are perceived (objectively) to be in
the same health state. This means that the relationship between inputs and outcomes is
inherently variable. Furthermore, the benefits of poe are complex as they relate to
individuals' ability to meet their goals and expectations and to remain positive in the last
months of their life.
The nature of these goals and how poe meets individuals' needs may not be seen in the
same way by providers and the users of these services and their carers. Across different
services, the emphasis or philosophy of care differs in subtle ways, revealing different
institutional beliefs about the purpose of poe services, and these are not universally agreed
by providers. Other interventions, such as community mental health care also have this
'characteristic of intrinsic complexity, and are "purposively flexible' to match the needs of
individuals with the services offered (Byford and Sefton 2002).
The argument made in this thesis is that the nature of complexity is not confined to palliative
care. The lack of consensus described by Evers and colleagues also describes the problem
faced by researchers in palliative care. Sectors where the needs of users of the service are
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diverse and the intervention are not easy to define account for a wide range of services
provided within NHS and social service care.
The "complexity" described in the nature of PDC may also be found in other health and
social care sectors. Examples of other sectors where similar issues arise are include many
forms of nursing, mental health care, long-term care, care of the elderly, and in the
organisation of services that cross between health and social care, where interventions are
not discrete and are designed to meet a multiple of needs.
Box 3. 2 A sample of the interventions that could be described as 'complex':
• Organisational interventions to meet long-term mental health needs
• Cross-sector interventions to meet the welfare needs of people who are marginalised by society,
such as homeless people, new economic migrants and asylum seekers
• Interventions that have multiple aims, such as strategies to reduce the effects of poverty or to
improve educational achievement and attainment
• Interventions that are provided to the families of people with life-limiting illness (for example
counselling and support by clinical nurse specialists)
• Interventions where efficacy has not been established through clinical trials, such as counselling,
and complementary therapies, and where the evidence is contested by different groups.
A database search to identify other areas of "complexity" is not straightforward since the
language to describe this complexity will differ across studies. A search of the HEED
database under "complex" found only one study which was a review of the evidence of the
cost-effectiveness of intervention to address the needs of people living with diabetes
(Gulliford 1997). The review drew similar conclusions that the challenge of defining and
measuring the effectiveness of the intervention was a major challenge for economic
evaluation, and that the methods of organising care may be the important factor in
determining the overall cost-effectiveness of care. Further searches under "organisation" in
the same database found 23 studies. The studies defined as having some of the same
characteristics as PDC were those of interventions that provided broadly social as well as
health related care provided in non-standardised way to people with a range of different
needs depending. on their life circumstances. Interventions for people with long-term
schizophrenia would fall into this category. Economic evaluation evidence in this field has
also adopted cost-consequence methodologies (Smylie et al 1991, McCrone et al 1994,
Chan et al 2000), focussing on the costs of care and reporting the clinical effectiveness of
interventions.
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This cost-consequence approach was also followed in economic evaluations of other
interventions that focussed on the organisation of care, such as stroke units (Grieve 2000)
and asthma. management (Sullivan, Weiss et al 2002, Evans, LeBailly et al 1999). The
identification of ways of synthesising costs and preference-based measures of benefit into
cost-effectiveness ratios has not been a major focus of this body of work. One study has
reported the development of an instrument to measure outcomes in terms of utilities for
interventions to manage depression (Bennett, Torrence et al 2000), but no published studies
were found to date that had employed this instrument in economic evaluation.
In their review of economic evaluation of mental health, Evers and colleagues highlighted the
problem of identifying an appropriate unit of effectiveness as a major problem in mental
health care studies. This is impounded by what they characterise as a lack of consensus
about the aetiology and appropriate treatment for many psychiatric illnesses (Evers et al
1997).
Norton (2000) has described the characteristics of long-term care as differing from health
interventions care that focus on treatment and cure-oriented care. He describes four distinct
characteristics of long-term care: care is focussed on people with 'chronic' illness with no
expectation of full recovery; services are located outside mainstream provision and funding
(funded through the private sector or voluntary organisations); informal (unpaid) care plays
an important role, and finally (in the USA) private insurance does not cover the costs of care.
Norton's analysis does not consider the problem of measuring the cost-effectiveness of
these services per se, but the analysis does provide insights into why these kinds of services
are different and the nature of the complexity facing evaluators.
Evaluating palliative day care as a complex intervention
The argument developed so far in this chapter has suggested that interventions such as
PDe that aim to meet the needs of patients with complex problems are inherently difficult to
evaluate. This is because of the problems of identifying appropriate units of effectiveness
and the lack of focus on preference-based measures of outcome in published studies of
these types of interventions. In these sectors, it is also difficult to identify and isolate
particular services that contribute uniquely to goals associated with finding meaning and
hope and meaning different things to different client groups (Spencer and Daniels 1998).
Therefore it can be argued that the question of whether poe and other complex services are
"effective" needs to address the more precise questions "what aspect of these services are
effective and for whom?" If a PDe study found that patients benefited (however defined)
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from poe, it might not provide useful insights into the aspects of poe that had been
beneficial to different kinds of patients. For example, one component of poe is the team of
clinically trained staff attending to patients on a one-to-one basis; another component is the
'safe and friendly atmosphere' that is promoted. If the second characteristic of poe were
more important to patients (and to their overall well-being) than the first, then this would
suggest that centres could focus on this (less resource intensive) aspects of care and
potentially reach more patients than could be accommodated in a one-to-one service. So the
question of how poe is to be provided, and what aspects of the service are important to
patients, is also important for practical and policy-making purposes.
The qualitative evidence is sparse, descriptive and, until recently, was undertaken in order to
inform others on the purpose of poe and how to set up a service. The more rigorous and
independent evaluation of poe inputs and outcomes has only come later. There is an
enthusiasm for poe in the qualitative literature that is enlightening as it demonstrates the
level of support that the service has had from the people who provide it, and how this
enthusiasm, rather than independent evaluation, may have ensured the continuation of the
service.
The North Thames palliative day care study
This study was the first of its kind to undertake a comparative approach to evaluating
palliative day care. The study was undertaken in light of the qualitative evidence presented
above that indicated that the service would not fit into a neatly prescribed evaluation
framework since the intervention could not be described in a way that would lead to
straightforward measurement of inputs or outcomes. The economic evaluation was
undertaken at the same time as a clinical effectiveness/health-related quality of life
evaluation. The results of this study have strongly influenced the empirical and
methodological work outlined in the following chapters of this thesis.
Between 1997 and 1999 a multicentre study was undertaken in five palliative day care
centres in North and South London. These centres represented different philosophies in
palliative day care, emphasising more medical care or more social care, as reported in
Oouglas 2000, which was a pilot study for the North Thames palliative day care study. The
aims of this study were to identify whether one approach to palliative day care was more
effective than the other, and whether patients who attended palliative day care had different
outcomes over time to patients who did not (who were recruited through palliative home care
nursing teams).
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Palliative care attenders were recruited at their second visit to day care and interviewed at
baseline, 4-6 weeks and 14-16 weeks after first attendance. Data on all inpatient, outpatient,
community, and social care activities was also collected at this interview. Two disease-
specific HRQoL instruments were adopted and resource use information was collected
relating to the last four weeks of care before each interview. Open-ended questions to elicit
a response from patients in their own words were also asked at each interview.
A single measure that would represent the outcome of PDC had not yet been developed or
validated at the time of the study (and has not to date). For this first evaluative study in PDC,
a more diffuse approach had to be adopted. Patients and families' views of, and satisfaction
with, the services received were recorded in open comments. Health-related quality of life
was measured using established scales validated in palliative care populations. These were a
10-item Palliative Outcome Scale (Hearn and Higginson 1999) and a 16-item McGill Quality of
Life Questionnaire (Cohen et al 1995). Both cover overall quality of life, physical symptoms,
patient anxiety, fears and well-being. These data were analysed separately from the resource
use data.
The main findings of the effectiveness study was that the HRQoL measures could not detect
any significant differences in the quality of life between the day care and comparison
patients, either in terms of change over time or differences between the groups. No
differences were detected between the different models of palliative day care in any items on
the Palliative Outcome Scale or the McGill quality of life instruments. The results were
similar when patients were divided into different survival cohorts.
The qualitative interviews, however, told a different story. In all centres, most patients
reported that they appreciated day care. When asked, ''what is day care like" they reported
two main positive components, 'getting out' and 'meeting others'. These accounted for over
60% of the reasons for liking day care. At baseline interview over half (54%) of the people
felt that they had already changed as a result of day care, and 30% had learnt a new skill. Of
these 19% had learnt an art & craft skill, with 5% learning a new exercise and 7% stated that
a change in them was another type of skill. At second and third interviews the total number
of respondents who reported learning a new skill was 43% and 38% respectively. Most
respondents felt that there was no downside to day care (76% of respondents in the first
interview and 78% by the last interview) (Goodwin et al 2002b).
The main conclusion was that patients who attended day care expressed satisfaction and
said they strongly valued the service when they were interviewed, but that these preferences
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did not translate into detectable differences in HRQoL scores. This presents difficulties for
economic evaluation. First, the consideration of costs alongside a range of outcomes is an
indecisive form of economic evolution as argued earlier in this chapter. If one outcome
measure shows benefits and another shows potential harm of an intervention, then the
results cannot be transparently interpreted. Second, since the qualitative evidence reported
that palliative day care was beneficial but the quantitative evidence did not, this suggests
that the quantitative outcome measures may not be sensitive enough to pick up relevant
dimensions of the benefits of day care. There is no unequivocal evidence of the benefit or
lack of benefits of the service. In this context, a full economic evaluation cannot be
undertaken.
There were also important methodological problems with this study. A randomised controlled
trial could not be undertaken as it was seen to be ethically unacceptable to withhold
palliative day care from people who could benefit. A waiting list approach (to offer palliative
care at a later date) was not seen to be acceptable in a patient group with life-limiting illness
if such a list did not already exist in practice. A problem with the comparative study design
was the identification of a comparison group. Originally, it was intended to recruit patients
through specialist home care nursing services. These patients were intended to be the group
of patients who wanted to attend palliative day care but, for particular reasons, were not able
to attend a palliative day care centre. The reasons people might not be able to attend were
the long distance from their home to the nearest centre, the physical difficulty in leaving the
house (living up flights of stairs), as well as those people on a waiting list for a particular
palliative day care.
However, as it turned out, there were no patients identified by home nursing teams who
would have liked to attend but who were unable to for physical reason (ambulances were
able to bring incapacitated patients down stairs), and there were no waiting lists in the
centres that took part in the study. This meant that the patients who were recruited into the
comparison group were those patients that home care nurses thought would be likely to
benefit from PDe but who did not want to attend. There are good reasons for suggesting that
this group of patients was different from the group of patients that chose to attend. These
differences were not picked up in the demographic data, but there may have been other
characteristics of these groups of patients that made them different.
Also, it was decided for ethical reasons that patients could not be interviewed before they
attended palliative day care as this might have affected whether they decided to continue.
Patients were interviewed within the first few weeks of attending. In that time, the baseline
98
Chapter 3
interview suggested that patients had already improved their outlook. The subsequent
interviews may not have picked up additional improvements above those already measured
at first interview.
The equivocal results in the outcome study were a major stumbling block in the economic
evaluation, leading to a deeper examination of why the quantitative and qualitative results
came to different conclusions. This had in part to do with the problems of study design and
partly the nature of the intervention and the way patients felt about the changes in quality of
life they experienced by attending palliative day care. A critical assessment of the evidence
from qualitative studies of palliative day care supported the notion that palliative day care
had an impact that was not captured in either disease specific quality of life measures that
have focus, in the main, on pain and symptoms or on acute stages of illness.
SECTION 3. EVIDENCE OF THE COST-EFFECTIVENESS OF DAY CARE FOR FRAIL
ELDERLY PEOPLE
Since the population who use palliative day care services are usually (though not
exclusively) older people, the literature on other day care settings for older people has some
relevance. The kinds of challenges faced by researchers in this field and the practical and
methodological problems they faced are briefly discussed here as they are relevant to the
evaluation of palliative day care. One study has been undertaken on a frail, elderly
population using conjoint analysis techniques, but this was not an economic study and was
not underscored by a random utility approach (Racher and Kaufert 2000). Another study was
also undertaken (again not an economic study) in a day hospital setting (Townend 2000).
The economic research evidence is limited in this field.
In a review in the 1980s of the evidence of the cost-effectiveness of day care settings for
frail, older people, Gerard concluded that day centres were more cost-effective than day
hospitals, given that they provided similar benefits at reduced costs (Gerard 1988). However
the data on the specific outcomes of day care was limited in this review, and as such, the
relative cost-effectiveness between settings could not be established. In 1999, a systematic
.review of day hospitals was published, reviewing 12 trials of almost 3000 subjects (Forster,
Young et al 1999). The review reported no significant differences in alternative services for
elderly patients, in terms of odds of death (preventing death) of patients attending day
hospital compared with alternative forms of care (what was described as comprehensive
care or home care). Patients in both groups had a similar chance of experiencing
deteriorating function (on a range of scores). Eleven trials provided information on costs!
. resource use. Average inpatient use was reported for all trials. Eight trials compared
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treatment costs, but these were not comprehensive (Le. excluded home nursing costs) for
six studies. The evidence suggests that day hospital is either slightly more expensive or
similar to alternative forms of care.
The actual findings of the review are of limited use in the palliative day care context as the
patient intervention was different. Patients received multidisciplinary assessment and
rehabilitation - presumably with a view to some recovery of health status, rather than in the
last few weeks or months of life. The main evidence that can be gained from the day hospital
review is that it faces similar evaluation challenges. This is because of the nature of the
intervention (multidisciplinary, multifaceted, and providing medical and social care, as an
intermediary between inpatient and home care) and because of the patients who attend.
The authors note that the control groups receive some other sort of active treatment
(comprehensive care). This is similar for palliative day care patients who receive specialist
home nursing as well as attending palliative day care once a week. Both interventions (day
hospital and palliative day care) are relatively weak interventions in that differences in quality
of .life between intervention and controls might be had to detect among the effect 'noise'
created by other (potentially more intense) health and social care services.
Second, the day hospital review found that no studies reported a summary statistic to
represent a patients' overall health status. Different measures of health status were used
and analysed in different ways without arriving at a single overriding message to conclude
the review. This is an important aspect of the study: like palliative care studies, the focus has
been on the clinical aspects of care, rather than preferences of patients and carers or the
burden! release of resources due to the presence of a day care service. This means that
making the judgement about whether these services are worthwhile has been seen as less
important than measuring the disease-specific (and study-specific) outcomes needed to
make clinical decisions about patienfs improvement/deterioration. Similar to the review of
quantitative studies on palliative care earlier in this chapter, these studies are asking
questions about efficacy and provide little insight into either the effectiveness or cost-
effectiveness of the service they focus on, despite the possibility of analysing cost data.in the
majority of these studies.
The most recent study of adult day care from the USA was a randomised controlled trial of
108 elderly patients to receive day care and 104 patients who acted as controls by remaining
on a waiting list for three months (Baumgarten 2002). This study gathered data on
. respondents' subjective assessment of day care (which was positive among both clients and
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their carers), but found that standard research instruments revealed no superiority of day
care attendance, and no difference in the cost of care. The authors conclude (in the same
vein as other studies reported here) that it is difficult to demonstrate objectively or
quantitatively the benefits of day care that have been strongly perceived subjectively by the
participants. They make a strong conclusion, given the evidence, that- high levels of
participation should be incorporated into future programme goals, without the empirical data
with which to support this recommendation.
OPUS: a measure of social care outcome for older people
The development of a method of identifying the outcomes of care for older people has
recently been disseminated (in 2002) as part of the Department of Health's Outcomes of
Social Care for Adults Initiative, and developed by the Personal and Social Service
Research Unit (Netten et al 2002). The aim of this project was to design an outcome
measurement instrument that reflected the relative value that older people put on welfare
resulting from social care services, and to incorporate domains that are of concern to the
providers of these services as well (ibid.). The approach to identifying preferences was
through choice experiments. The research team undertook extensive pre-piloting and
developed a choice experiment to establish the relative importance of the attributes included
in the outcome instrument. A sub-set of respondents were interviewed using the same
methods but with additional information relating to monetary benefits included in the
experiment. From this process, an outcome instrument was developed that included five
domains: personal care, nutrition, safety, social participation and involvement and control
over daily life. The instrument asked about current levels of unmet need, whether informal
carers were involved in meeting their needs, and what level of need they would have in the
absence of all intervention. The experiment found that willingness-to-accept estimates were
relatively high (around £1300) which they interpreted as surplus benefit over cost for social
care. This is an interesting finding in the context of the palliative day care study. Chapter 4
discusses the issue of including willingness-to-pay/willingness-to-accept attribute in a choice
experiment, and whether the interpretation of surplus monetary benefit is justified. It
considers this evidence in the light of the decision not to include this as an attribute in the
poe choice experiment study.
Relevance of the research evidence to economic evaluation in palliative day care
The review of the economic studies in palliative care has demonstrated that the
assessments of the outcomes of palliative care have been narrowly defined with clinical
endpoints, rather than economic endpoints. Economic endpoints have only focused on
.process (e.g. hospitalisation) and not outcome. These studies may answer important
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questions specific to the local environment about the likely consequence of a new palliative
carel hospice service on the management of budgets, but they are not very useful in the
wider setting, as costs are not considered alongside the health impact of an intervention.
Even if these studies had been better designed, none has come close to producing
outcomes that could be translated into a more universal measure such as QALVs. It appears
therefore that this has not been on the agenda for palliative care research until now.
The second drawback of the cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) approach in palliative day
care is that it cannot incorporate the views of the users of the service. These studies do not
provide any evidence for whether changes in a disease specific measure is important,
whether shorter lengths of stay in hospital is to be preferred to longer lengths of stay (by
patients or their carers). One of the key features of palliative care is that the patient is seen
to be at the centre of the decision-making process. CEA studies do not incorporate this into
the research design. Lessons from qualitative research evidence suggest that this approach
will not suffice in palliative day care research.
The qualitative evidence has provided some tentative reasons why people choose to attend
palliative day care and these are reported to be not primarily for clinical care, or for reasons
that are definable as "health related". This presents an interesting dilemma. If palliative day
care is not producing any identifiable health gains, then should it be provided at all? Taking a
societal perspective and leaving aside the question of who should fund the service, the
question is whether services should be offered that produce no identifiable 'health gain.' This
is not a technical question but relates to the value that people (society) places on health
services. If society has a preference for providing care and support to people who are facing
death, then the question is not if this should be provided, but how it ought to be provided.
The services provided in palliative day care are not aimed at addressing patients' objective
health needs only, but are designed to meet a range of subjectively health and social care
problems as defined by individuals. Wider quality of life assessment needs to be adopted
that can produce a single index of quality of life, incorporating some notion of preferences for
the psycho-social well-being as well as health related quality of life of individuals who attend
the service. This would suggest that a cost-utility approach or contingent valuation approach
ought to be considered. Also, evidence from day hospitals for the elderly suggests that
evaluation will be complex where services are not aimed at addressing patients' objective
health needs only, but are designed to meet a range of subjective health and social care
problems as defined by individuals.
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SUMMARY
The first section of this chapter reviewed the economic studies on the delivery and
organisation of palliative care (as opposed to specific clinical interventions). It considered the
nature of the economic evidence that has been published and the strengths and
weaknesses of this evidence. It demonstrated that the evaluative studies in palliative care
research that have considered economic issues have not incorporated wider consideration
of outcomes other than clinical effectiveness, measured using a range a HRQoL
instruments. For this reason, they do not capture important dimensions of outcome in
palliative care. They do not reflect individuals' values and preferences for particular types of
care when they are in advanced stages of illness and possibly facing the end of their lives.
The review considered these papers in light of one of the main arguments of this thesis: that
the incorporation of values and preferences in the measurement of outcomes is central to
economic evaluation in the context of palliative care, and for decision-making. Economic
research in other areas of health and social care faces similar challenges. Examples of other
studies that have considered these issues were also discussed.
The final section summarised the arguments and demonstrates the gap in the palliative day
care literature and a need for economic studies that can incorporate complex concepts of
inputs and outcome, values and preferences. The review has helped to identify why
palliative day care was different from many other health interventions and why
straightforward economic evaluation would be difficult to undertake in this context. The next
chapter discusses the approaches to empirical investigation of palliative day care in light of
the literature, and in light of the theoretical arguments set out in chapter 2. It provides the
rationale for the methods that were adopted and reviews the strengths and weaknesses of
different evaluation methodologies for measuring outcomes inthls context.
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Chapter 4
Empirical investigation of the outcomes of complex services: theoretical and
methodological issues
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to consider how to conceptualise the outcomes of care in
complex services and from this to consider the advantages and disadvantages of
approaches to economic evaluation in the specific context of complex services. It considers
different approaches to undertaking evaluation using well-known simple approaches, and
more complex methods. The issues are applied to palliative day care (POC) in light of the
evidence presented in the previous chapter.
One of the key themes of this thesis is the distinction between the health gain and health
preference approach to evaluating outcomes of health and social care. Both approaches are
explored here. Chapter 2 reviewed the theoretical foundations of these methods and
concluded that the closest method to the application of welfare economics was contingent
valuation, a preference-based approach. However, deriving a monetary valuation for the
benefits of health care presents important methodological and practical difficulties. Chapter 3
reviewed the literature to date that has attempted to evaluate palliative care and palliative
day care (POC) in particular. The review found that the only comparative study undertaken in
POC did not show any significant differences in outcome between those attending POC and
those who did not using palliative care (disease-specific) health gain instruments, although
this study was methodologically flawed. It also demonstrated that none of the published
evaluation studies adopted a utility-base or a contingent valuation approach to measuring
the outcomes of POCo
SECTION 1. SUMMARY OF HOW THE EVALUATION OF COMPLEX SERVICES IS
DIFFERENT FROM OTHER HEALTH SERVICES
The evidence presented in chapter 3 suggests that complexity in health and social care is
related to the heterogeneous characteristic of these services since people attend for different
reasons. They may face different life circumstances and consequently may need a different
range and intensity of specialist care and general support. Qualitative evidence suggests
that the heterogeneity of the intervention and heterogeneity of users' needs means that it
has more in common with social day care for older people, and mental health day care than
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with acute health care interventions that address the physical health of individuals (Wimo
and Wallin 1990, Victor and Higginson 1994, Marshall and Crowther 2001). The themes
highlighted in box 4.1 below summarise the reasons why the evaluation of complex services
such as PDC is different from the evaluation of mainstream health services. This reasoning
has led to the consideration of different ways of undertaking economic evaluation methods.
These provide different kinds of evidence of the effectiveness. This reflects the contrast
between these services and others that are well-defined, one-dimensional interventions that
are amenable to clinical trial type evaluation (Douglas and Normand 2001).
Box 4.1 Challenges to applying health care evaluation techniques to complex services based
on the research evidence presented in chapter 3.
Health services are relatively straightforward to evaluate if they have the following characteristics:
• They are highly structured, specific interventions, delivered in mostly the same way for all
patients. (Complex services cover social, psychological, spiritual and existential aspects of quality
of life as well as physical health);
• They focus on improving physical health, with specific care pathways or algorithms to follow.
(Complex services do not aim to provide the same pattern of care for all patients. The focus is on
the patient as an individual);
• The outcomes are clearly defined in terms of improvements in physical health and length of life,
and there are uncontested, accepted definitions of positive and adverse outcomes. (Positive and
adverse outcomes are not well defined and may even be contested between the different
professional groups. Complex services can be relatively less intensive interventions: for example
patierits may only access a service once a week alongside other clinical or social services);
• The focus is on the patient only and usually on a specific aspect of their health (Complex services
focus on wider social or pastoral needs and the well-being of the whole family).
• There may be specific difficulties in economic evaluation for interventions that occur at the end of
life. These relate to the short amount of time a person has left to live and the (usually) worsening
health state they experience, relative to an expectation of a full healthy life. Since any
improvements are relatively small and over weeks or months rather than years, a quality adjusted
life year saved may not be a sensitive or meaningful unit of outcome (this is explored further in the
text in this chapter).
SECTION 2. OVERVIEW OF THE CONCEPTUALISATION OF OUTCOMES FOR
COMPLEX SERVICES
Problems with the measurement of outcomes in the North Thames study
The North Thames study was undertaken prior to the study on which this PhD is based. The
study is described more fully in chapter 3. What is important to highlight in this chapter is that
it demonstrated that using a disease-specific quality of life approach did not produce useful
or informative results. The open-ended interviews undertaken alongside the quality of life
measurements suggested that some patients who attended PDe felt that their attendance
had a positive impact on their quality of life. Furthermore, the pilot study for the economic
evaluation component of the North Thames study also indicated that patients who attended
poe might have preferences for specific aspects of PDC. These preferences might differ
from the reason given by the health care providers for why they attended. These findings
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were speculative. The study was not designed to provide any insights into how strong
patients' preferences were for particular aspects of the services, or whether different
configurations of the service (which existed across the five centres in the study) might have
an impact on how much they wanted to attend.
One argument for why the quantitative findings of the North Thames study did not show any
change in quality of life for patients attending POC is that there is no tangible change in
quality of life that relates to attending POC. Another is that the domains of quality of life that
were assessed were not the relevant ones for POC patients. It could be argued that since
the palliative care quality of life instruments were developed in an inpatient context and
concentrated on pain and symptom control, they reflected a more acute experience of
disease than that experienced by patients while attending POC. For patients in the North
Thames study, pain and symptoms were usually well controlled in order for them to be able
to attend a POC centre. The qualitative analysis described the domains of quality of life that
appeared to be important to patients who attended POC. These were social ("getting out and
meeting other people") psychological ("being around people in the same situation", "being
able to talk about problems", "someone there when you need them"), and about the impact
of specific therapies and interventions that lead to more relaxation and more physical and
emotional well-being, ("feeling like a person again") (Goodwin et al 2002). These are not
aspects of quality of life that can be easily described in words nor described in terms of
specific, discrete domains of quality of life.
Following this argument, it might be the case that a quality of life instrument that captures
more global dimensions of well-being would be a more appropriate instrument for capturing
the important outcomes of a service such as POC that aims to meet a wide set of health and
welfare goals. A global quality of life instrument should in theory be sensitive to any changes
in quality of life, not only those related to a specific disease or health state.
However, there is another argument arising from the evidence from the North Thames study
that would suggest that a quality of life instrument is not the appropriate way of establishing
the value of POC services. If one of the objectives of POC is to meet the needs of patients
who attend, and since these needs may be very different depending on the individual and
their circumstances, then a quality of life approach to evaluation may not be useful. This
argues for a more radical departure from straightforward quality of life outcomes in economic
evaluation. It requires a different class of evaluation methodologies that can incorporate
more deliberately the preferences of individuals for particular aspects of POC.
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POC is not one service and people use it in different ways for different needs. A health gain
approach that assumes that POC is one intervention may not be sensitive enough to detect
this complexity. The results, equivocal or unequivocal, may not provide the type of
information that is needed in order to establish what it is about the service that patients (or
groups of patients) require in order to meet their different needs. There is very-little evidence
to support decisions about which aspects of POC seem to be more important to patients (or
groups of patients, or individuals in specific circumstances) and how strong patients'
preferences are for specific components of the service.
Chapter 2 reviewed the arguments for a preference-based approach to establishing whether
a policy should be supported. Cost-benefit analysis is the 'gold standard' approach to
economic evaluation but has not been adopted widely in health care evaluation since the
problems of measuring revealed preference are onerous and other methods of measuring
welfare have been adequate as proxy measures of revealed preference (even where this
has not usually been explicit). For interventions such as POC,where quality of life outcomes
are not well described and the relationship between POC inputs and outcomes is not clear, it
may be appropriate to re-examine whether a preference-based approach to measuring
welfare is a more appropriate form of evaluation.
The following two sections of this chapter consider these broad arguments in more detail
and review the theory behind global quality of life and preference-based approaches to
measuring welfare.
SECTION 3. FROM DISEASE-SPECIFIC TO GENERIC MEASURES OF HEALTH-
RELATED QUALITY OF LIFE
Adopting the EQ-SO instrument in the poe study
EO-50 .is a simple generic 5-item quality of life instrument designed to measure health
outcome (EuroQoL Group 1990). The instrument produces a weighted score for each patient
that, when combined with any additional life years gained, produces a composite measure of
quality-adjusted life years that can be used as the measure of outcome in cost-utility analysis
(Kind et al 1998). Five domains of health related quality of life are self-assessed by
respondents: self care, usual activities, pain and discomfort, anxiety and depression.
Respondents are asked to rate themselves in all five domains as either having 'no
problems', 'some problems' or acute problems, described as "confined to bed", or "in
extreme pain and discomfort," for example. In this way, 243 possible health states have
been identified. A visual analogue scale (VAS) from 1 to 100 is presented and respondents
are asked to rate themselves in terms of how good they feel (up to 100) or bad they feel {to
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0) today. This score is not incorporated into the weighting score but provides additional
information on patients' well-being. This has been interpreted by one of the original
contributors to the EO-50 project as an individual's level of 'morale' on any given day since it
is a reflection of the overall well-being of a person at any given moment in time (Williams
2000). This interpretation is plausible because the value assigned by an individual to a VAS
score is determined more by their mental or moral confidence, feelings of hope and optimism
than a more objective assessment of their well-being. However, this hypothesis has not been
explored empirically.
A major research activity in the EO-50 project has been to identify the value that society
places on each of these 243 identifiable health states. Studies to estimate population-level
valuations (how much worse a health state is than full healthy life) has been undertaken in
the UK (Kind et al 1998), and replicated in Europe (Badia et al 1999, Bjork and Norinder
1999) and worldwide (Nord et al 1993, Burstrom et al 2001, Devlin et al 2002, Tsuchiya
2002) and show similarity of scale values. Once population values of health states have
been identified, a composite score is calculated for each health state. This score is the
weighted adjustment that can be made to a full life year in order for quality of life to be
incorporated into measurement of outcome.
Validating the methods for deriving OALY estimates is on-going and has produced some
incongruous results. These suggest that the measurement of outcomes may be dependent
on the approach adopted (Hollingworth et al 1995, Dolan et al 1996, Jenkinson et al 1997,
Krabbe 1997, Glick et al 1999, Badia 1999). However OALY estimates using instruments
such as the EO-50 have been put forward as the gold standard approach to economic
evaluation by The National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE 2001).
Advantages of EQ-SO over disease-specific quality of life instruments
The EO-50 has specific advantages over disease-specific measures of quality of life in the
context of complex services such as PDC. First, the global measure of quality of life may
measure benefits more effectively than measures that were designed for acute interventions.
A global measure may be a more appropriate reflection of the overall importance of a service
(or health and well-being in general) in patients' lives. Second, measuring health-related
quality of life in more generic terms allows comparison across different kinds of
interventions. Also, explicit values are assigned to health states in order that outcomes
reflect subjective valuation rather than only objective measures of well-being.
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Use of the EQ-50 questionnaire on people who have long-term illness or disabilities
and older patients
There has been some empirical evidence published that suggests that the experience of ill
health has an important effect on health state valuation. The research found that patients
with long-term illness valued health states significantly differently from heafthy individuals
(Badia 1998). Healthy individuals assigned some health states a negative score (implying
states worse than death) while patients with long-term illness assigned positive scores to all
health states.
Other empirical research among health care providers found that EO-50 scores from the
general population did not adequately describe the valuation of health of people with
disabilities (Taylor et al 2001). The scores derived from health professionals who worked
with patients with long-term illness were significantly higher than those of the general
population. This research did not obtain valuations from the patients themselves for
comparison. Variables such as years of experience and type of profession had a significant
impact on scores, as did the type of disability described. The ability to perform usual
activities had the most impact on valuations.
The effect of the experience of illness and age on health state valuations has also been
explored. Empirical evidence has shown that those in poorer health generally give higher
scores for health states (Dolan 1996). However, the scores for patients over 60 years have
been found to be considerably lower than those based on values of people aged 18-59
(Dolan 2000). In this case, we could expect that younger patients would give higher scores
for health states than older patients. No valuation project has provided estimates of EO-50
valuation scores for patients with a life-limiting illness and who are no longer receiving active
treatment. These valuations may differ from the general population since people at the end
of their lives may value even small changes in quality of life that allows them to live their last
months in relative peace and without pain. This is discussed again further on.
There has been work undertaken to establish the validity of the technique in elderly
populations. Age has also been found to have a significant impact on the ability to complete
the Ea-50 questionnaire (Brazier et al 1996, Coast 1998).
Would EQ-50 be sensitive to changes in quality of life in a poe setting?
The advantage of the EO-50 outcome measure ion economic evaluation is that it can be
used to calculate quality adjusted life years. This would overcome some of the problems of
previous studies that only considered clinical and disease-specific quality of life endpoints.
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There are a priori reasons for suggesting that the EO-50 instrument and the generation of
OALVs may not be an appropriate instrument for measuring the outcomes of palliative care.
These reasons relate to the issue of time and the issue of sensitivity of the instrument to
perceiving changes in quality of life along the domains that are important to patients in this
phase of illness. There are several issues to consider. The first is whether the instrument is
sensitive enough to distinguish different states of health. If the instrument were insensitive,
then it would not show changes in quality of life even when respondents report that a POC
intervention has made an important difference to their quality of life. Second, the valuation of
health states should reflect the values of patients using POCoAs discussed earlier, there has
been extensive work undertaken to identify population level valuations for all 243 health
states but this work has not been undertaken for specific groups such as those at the end of
life.
The value of an additional QALV is the same regardless of when it is lived. For palliative
care interventions, there may be reasons why people value health state differently at the end
of life. For example it might be more important to be able to take part in special activities with
loved ones at the end of life than in other periods of one's life. People may be less (or more)
frightened of pain or some discomfort at the end of life than at other times. An improvement
in the quality of time at the end of life may be more valuable (even if it is only a few days)
than the same absolute improvement earlier in life. This is because people may not expect
to have any improvements in quality of life at this stage. Also they may highly value any
additional quality of life in order to be able to undertake particular tasks or activities that are
important to them at the end of their lives. This may also be extremely valuable to their
family and loved ones. These individual preferences cannot be captured by a OAL V
approach without also undertaking an exercise to re-evaluate the QALV weightings for this
group of patients. These ideas have not yet been fully explored in the OALV literature. This
may bean avenue for future empirical investigation.
The valuation of health states may also vary between patients who use poe services. In an
editorial on palliative care it was suggested that patients experience their objectively similar
levels of illness in subjectively different ways:
"Some patients with minimal dysfunction are extremely dissatisfied while others seem quite
able to tolerate severe impairment and may even feel fortunate to obtain therapy. Patients'
perceptions of their illness are extremely variable and factors other than their disability come
into their perception." (Cella 1995)
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Another important issue is that QALVs are generated by measuring additional years of life
weighted by the quality of life in a particular health state. However good (or bad) a health
state, the endpoint for the outcome is a time-based measure. Since the majority of patients
who require palliative care are not expected to live long, the fact that the outcome measure
is dominated in units of time is problematic. If an intervention that improves life expectancy
by only a fraction (say from 6 months toa year) were to be compared with a palliative
intervention that improves quality of life, the palliative intervention would have to have an
impact on quality of life equivalent of 0.5 to be equivalent (say from a health state valued as
o.zto one valued as 0.7). An assessment of how likely this might be in a poe setting can
illustrate this point. Table 4.1 shows the calculation for estimating quality of life weighting for
each EQ-50 health profile. Full health is given the value of 1.0. Any state of health less than
full health is estimated by subtracting from 1.0. The constant term, for any state less than
perfect health is 0.081. If level 3 occurs in any domain, an additional parameter of 0.269 is
subtracted. The values to be subtracted for level 2 and 3 for each domain are given in the
table below.
Table 4.1 Values for estimating weighting for each state of health. Values for the UK general
population (source: Kind, P., P. Dolan, C. Gudex, and A. Williams (1998) Variation in
population health status: results from a United Kingdom questionnaire survey. BMJ316, 736-
41)
EQ-50 dimension Level 2 Level 3
Full health 1.0 1.0
Mobility -0.069 -0.314
Self care -0.104 -0.214
Usual activity -0.036 -0.094
Paint discomfort -0.123 -0.386
Anxiety/ depression -0.071 -0.236
Constant for any level two Any level 3, subtract an
or higher, subtract 0.081 additional 0.269
A hypothetical poe patient at first attendance would be expected to be able to get out of bed
(with help from a carer), be able to travel, be able to eat with others and socialise to some
limited extent. Very few patients would be in either acute paint discomfort, unable to perform
any usual activities,or be completely unable to wash and dress. They may have acute
anxiety or depression (level 3) and have some problems with all other domains (level 2).
This could be represented as a score of 2 2 2 2 3, calculated as a weighting of 0.082.
Marginal improvements in this score, say in anxiety and depression (moving from level 3 to
level 2) and in pain discomfort (level 2 to 1) and usual activity (level 2 to 1) could be
represented as the profile 2 2 1 1 2, which has a weighting 0.675. This would represent a
difference of about 0.6 QALVs if a patient was in this improved state for a year. If the patient
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lives for only 6 months in this health state, then the intervention would have produced
around 0.3 additional QALVs. This level of improvement might be expected in POC, given
the aims and objectives of the service. This is equivalent of an intervention that increases life
expectancy (or reduces premature death) by about three and a half months.
The impact of this simple analysis demonstrates that interventions that increase length of life
by only few months will dominate life improving interventions such as POC. This argument
does not consider the relative outcomes of interventions for this group (which may always be
small) nor the likely number of individuals who might benefit from POC (and represent a
small benefit but for a large number of people). However, this example suggests that any
benefits that do not increase length as well as quality of life will not fare well in analyses that
compare outcomes across patient groups and health care settings.
Table 4.1 above shows that moving from level 3 to level 2 in the domain of 'pain and
discomfort' represents a marginal change of 0.263. For 'usual activity', the difference is
0.058. This implies that improvements in pain and discomfort are more highly valued by the
general UK population than improvements in performing usual activities. This makes intuitive
sense. However, POC is more likely to have an impact, given the nature of the intervention,
on improvements in usual activities and anxiety and depression (marginal change from level
3 to 2 of 0.165) than in pain control. It would also require a larger sample size to detect
significant differences in quality of life between groups than would be necessary if the
expected change was in pain or mobility. This is potentially problematic given the challenges
of recruitment and retention of subjects in palliative care research.
Second, people who attend POC are not expected to regain full health and may not live for a
full year. They would be expected to continue to have some problems and deteriorate until
death. Since time in any health state might be measured in weeks or months, the detection
of a significant change in QALVs would also require a large sample size to detect small
differences. These differences in time lived in a particular health state may not register as
significant in the research findings but, as described earlier, may be very important to the
individuals experiencing an increase in number of months or weeks (or even days) of life or
small improvement in quality of life in this period of their lives.
As there are only three levels of distress for each domain in EO-50, the likelihood is that
patients in a palliative phase of illness may improve but continue to have 'some problems' in
all the domains. This means that respondents would continue to tick the box 'some
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problems' even though they may have marginally more or fewer problems. This distinction
will not be picked up using this three-level approach.
Research undertaken prior to the development of EuroOoL (a precursor to EO-50) in the
1980s had suggested that OAL Y approach to assess the outcomes of lonq-terrn care for
older people in the UK would be insensitive to changes in health status of older people in
long term care (Donaldson et al 1988). It was argued that the dimensions that were
appropriate for this patient group (disability and distress) would need to be included in a
OAI:.Y instrument.
The extent to which these arguments are also relevant for palliative care patients has not yet
been explored. The palliative care literature has focussed on domains of quality of life such
as pain and symptom control and psychosocial aspects of living with a life-limiting illness
(Massaro 2000). It has also broadened the debate about what constitutes health and quality
of life by trying to conceptualise ephemeral aspects of quality of life as "existential health"
(Doyle 1992, Bolmsjo 2002, Albinsson 2002) or "spiritual health" (Breitbart 2002, Nelson
2002). This has to do with finding hope and meaning in life at the end of life by those
experiencing the illness as well as the people around them.
EO-50 is a standardised instrument for use as a measure of health outcome designed to be
applicable to a wide range of health conditions and treatments. Domains such as pain!
symptom control and anxiety/depression that are relevant to palliative care are covered by
the EO-50 instrument, but it is clear that other domains such as existential or spiritual health
are not. These domains are not clearly understood or even accepted as relevant domains of
health-related quality of life (Warr 1996, Kaasa 2002). The EO-50 instrument should not be
criticised to something it did not set out to achieve, but the limitations of its use in palliative
day care population are that it might not capture the domains of health-related quality of life
(or quality of life more generally) that are important to a those who attend a centre or are
responsible for the care that is provided. However, the use of this instrument in a palliative
care population has not been explored to date, except in one very recently published study
of radiotherapy palliation (Van den Hout et al 2003). However, this intervention has more in
common with mainstream health care than palliative day care.
An opportunity arose to use the EO-50 questionnaire in a second study of poe undertaken
after the completion of the North Thames study in 2000. The methods used, and results from
this study are presented in the next chapter.
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SECTION 4. THE CHOICE EXPERIMENT APPROACH TO EVALUATING PALLIATIVE
DAY CARE
Modelling consumer preference has been a major activity in consumer research since the
1960s (Green and Srinivasan 1978, 1987). This section provides an overview of the
theoretical foundations of stated preference choice experiments (eE)and presents
arguments for why this approach may provide evidence of the value of poe in a way that is
useful to decision-makers. It involves a more in-depth methodological analysis than the
discussion of the EO-50 since it is a less established, more recent development in health
economics and there is some controversy around its use in economic evaluation.
Furthermore, choice experiments (eE) had not been tried out in frail elderly populations,
patients in a palliative phase of illness or cancer patients when the design of this study was
first underway (although there have been more recent studies published in this area which
will be referred to later). For this reason it was necessary to consider its theoretical strengths
and weaknesses and the appropriateness of its application to poe research before
attempting to use this methodology in a study of the views of potentially vulnerable people.
Deflnltlon of a choice experiment
A choice experiment is a stated preference technique for establishing the importance of
individual attributes in the overall utility of a good or service (Cave et al 1993, Ryan 1996).
Stated preference methods are "a family of techniques which use individual respondents'
statements about their preferences in a set of .... options to estimate utility functions." (Kroes
and Sheldon 1988).
Ryan and Hughes (1997) have argued that choice experiments are another method of
estimating an individual's utility in a way that is similar to standard gamble and time trade-off
techniques. Unlike these techniques, choice experiments estimate the utility of particular
attributes of an intervention and establish the relative importance of different attributes by
estimating the marginal rate of substitution between them. Another argument for the choice
experiment approach in evaluation is that it resembles "real life" choices and is therefore
superior to other contingent valuation methods. The assumptions underlying choice
experiments will be explored further on.
The approach assumes that a service (or product) can be defined in terms of a few important
characteristics of that service (Ryan, Bate et al 2001). Also, it is assumes that when an
individual makes the decision, it is based on trade-offs among these characteristics. An
individual decides which characteristics (or atributes) are important to them and which are
less important and makes a choice that will maximise his or her utility from that service.
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All forms of the appoach are concerned with the valuation of attributes of a good or a service
and transforming respondents' subjective preferences for attributes of a service into
numerical valuation of the attributes. These numerical valuations have different properties
and can be interpreted in different ways depending on the approach and underlying theory.
For example, marketing researchers have been concerned with disaggregated values of
attributes and in designing commodities with optimum value attributes, that is, the highest
overall value to customers (Green and Wind 1975). By contrast, economists have been
mostly interested in the aggregate implications of multiattribute utility structures in terms of
how they help to describe the aggregate demand function for a particular good or how the
results might be used in cost-benefit analysis (Cave et al 1993). Public sector economists
have interpreted this approach as being a way to understand and measure the utility of a
good or service where a market value may not exist (Adamovicz 2002). In other words, it
may be used as a proxy for measuring monetary value directly (Le. by individuals' revealed
behaviour in the marketplace).
Therefore this approach may be best suited to problems where the decision is based on
attributes rather than the whole good or service. It can also be used where the research or
policy problem is to value one or more attributes or where a specific combination of
attributes does not currently exist in the market or new attributes are being considered
(Green et al 1988, Haaijer and Wedel 2000). The method makes a number of strong
assumptions about the functional form that can transform the attributes into additively
separable utilities for individual attributes (also known as part-worths in the marketing
literature) and sums the utility of individual attributes to arrive at the overall utility of a
product.
How a choice experiment works
There are different ways to design a choice experiment. In all approaches, respondents are
asked to make trade-offs between scenarios that are presented to them that have different
characteristics. A scenario is a simplified version of a product, a service, or outcome that can
be described by its attributes. Respondents may be asked to choose between two or more
pairs of scenarios. For each, say, pairwise choice, individuals select the option that, in their
mind, would bring them the highest level of welfare. For example, a dessert might be
described by its flavour, its colour, its size and its price. These attributes may be quantitative,
such as time, or price. They may also be descriptive of a specific attribute, such as colour.
In a pairwise choice experiment, two scenarios representing the same product or service but
describing different levels of attributes (higher price, different colours etc) are shown to the
respondent. The respondent is then asked to choose which, overall, taking all attribute levels
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into account, they would prefer. Some attributes are seen as positive (flavour, colour) some
as negative (higher cost). Respondents must trade between positive and negative attributes
in each description and decide which one, taking in all the attributes, they would choose or
maximises their overall utility.
This task is repeated with different pairs of scenarios (or holding one scenario constant in
each round), and asking the respondent to decide which they would choose each time. Each
response (say, in a pairwise choice) for each respondent is entered into a regression model.
The- results estimate the relative importance of each attribute to the decision to choose a
scenario. If the attribute is not important, the parameter in the model for that attribute will not
be significant (for example, a p-value below the 0.01 significance level). If it is important to
them, it will be shown to be significant at this level.
The relative size of the coefficients for each of the attributes is interpreted as the increased
propensity to choose a scenario if the attribute is present (or at a higher level). It indicates
how important, relative to the other attributes, the presence of a specific attribute is to a
respondenfs decision to choose a scenario. The signs on the coefficients in the probit
models can be interpreted qualitatively to indicate the direction of the association between
the explanatory variables and the chance of choosing a scenario. If the coefficient is positive,
then the presence of the attribute is positively related to the respondent's decision to choose
a scenario. In other words, respondents have a positive preference for the attribute. Clearly,
the signs and their interpretation in a probit/logit model will depend on the how the attribute
is described in words in the choice experiment, that is, whether the attribute is described as
a positive or negative contribution to overall welfare.
The marginal rate of substitution between attributes can be calculated to establish the
relative importance of each attribute relative to other attributes (or how much a person would
be willing to sacrifice of one attribute to have more of another). If one of the attributes is a
financial charge or a price, then the marginal rate of substitution can be expressed in
monetary terms. If other information on respondents is gathered, then it might be possible to
identify whether different groups of people have different preferences.
As individuals are accustomed to making choices on a range of stimuli simultaneously in
normal. market transactions, the experiment is designed to mirror real choices that people
make in their daily lives. In general, the attributes should be those that are most relevant to
actual or potential consumers (Cattin and Wittink 1982). It can establish the relative
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importance of different attributes based on the notion of opportunity cost, sacrifice, or benefit
foregone in making decisions to maximise overall utility within resource constraints.
It is interesting to note that, in the marketing literature, the paired comparison approach is
seen as the least efficient design in terms of the information obtained per unit of
respondents' time (Green and Srinivasan 1987). The recommendation is that rank order
approach will fare better in terms of predictive validity than direct paired comparison, the
approach taken in most choice experiments. Nevertheless in the economics literature, the
paired comparison or trade-off approach based on random utility theory (described further
on) has emerged as the dominant approach to eliciting values for multi-attribute products
because of its particular properties of constrained choice and adherence to the axioms of
utility theory.
Interest in choice experiments CE for the evaluation of health services
One of the principal advantages of the CE method is that is allows experimentation on data
which may not exist in the real world. This means it has important advantages over other
methods that use data from observation, either of outcomes, or revealed demand (Cave et al
1993). Where these data are difficult to collect, it allows information to be gathered where
otherwise none might be available for decision-making purposes. Related to this, it also
allows for the valuation of products or services that do not yet exist and for the valuation of
particular (secondary) aspects of a product or service that might be "swamped" by other
primary attributes (ibid. 1993). These properties make CE techniques potentially attractive
for evaluating complex health services.
The conceptual framework appeals to health economists working on public policy issues'
because it is grounded in Lancaster's microeconomic theory that recognises that the utility of
a good or a service can be decomposed into separable characteristics. One particular
property of a choice experiment that it can provide a large amount of information from a
relatively small amount of data from respondents (Cattin and Wittink 1982). In this sense it is
a highly efficient research tool. Another property of choice experiments is that they do not
rely on comparative data, either over time, or between patient groups. This makes it an
attractive method for research in contexts where there is a particular problem of patients
being too frail to continue in a study, or dying before they can be followed up (McWhinney
1994, Jarvis et al 1996, Grande et al 2000a).
The interest in choice experiments in health economics literature appears to have been
driven by specific areas of economic research. The first is as a way of valuing aspects of
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care "beyond health outcomes" as a means of deriving willingness-ta-pay valuations without
using lengthy and cognitively challenging stated preference techniques (Ryan and Farrar
1995). The second is the potential use of technique is as a way of evaluating interventions
and services that have multiple attributes or properties (Ryan, Scott et al 2001)
Recent reviews of the discrete choice literature in health economics have demonstrated the
variation in study question and study design. A review of 31 choice experiment studies
concluded that the rnethodoloqyhad been interpreted in different ways for different contexts
but-that methodological transparency and adherence to theory had been improved over time.
What was lacking in many of these papers (and consequently from the review) was a
detailed reasoning behind the different approaches to undertaking choice experiments and
therefore why there was such heterogeneity in study design (Ryan and Gerard 2001).
Furthermore, the impact of variation in design has not yet been fully explored (Ryan, Scott et
al. 2001; Ryan, Bates et al 2001).
The economic theory underlying choice experiments
It has been argued that the choice experiment approach originated in the literature of
mathematical psychology in the early 1920s. It was then was adopted by marketing
researchers, then by geographers, sociologists and planning analysts (Huber 1987). These
first approaches were not based on any explicit theory of value, nor were they an attempt to
measure utility or welfare in the way that it is understood in microeconomic theory. The use
of the terms utility and part-worths in the marketing literature did not have explicit economic
meanings but were terms coined to express the measure of value of specific attributes of a
marketed good (Green and Wind 1975).
In their seminal paper, Luce and Tukey pioneered the trade-off approach whereby
respondents react to multiple stimuli simultaneously (Luce and Tukey 1964). They were
concerned with the joint effect of two or more independent variables on the ordering of a
dependent variable (Green and Rao 1971). It was also recognised that such an approach
could have some uses in cost-benefit analysis in assessing the trade-offs between different
policies (Green and Rao ibid.).
Economists have considered adherence to utility theory to be of great significance, precisely
because of the desire to be able to interpret utility in choice experiments the same way as it
might be interpreted in cost-benefit analysis (Small and Rosen 1981). Chapter 2 considered
the fundamental axioms of expected utility theory. The violation or adherence to the axioms
of this theory in choice experiments has been an area of concern. A programme of research
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in health economics is currently being undertaken to explore the underlying axioms of choice
experiments and the consequences of violating these axioms under different conditions. The
importance of this work is that it sheds light on the extent to which choice experiments reveal
underlying (or latent) utility. If the axioms fail (and the assumption about human behaviour
does not reflect the real world of decision-making) then it is more likely that the approach is
akin to a more pragmatic decision-making approach. The outcome of this work will
determine the extent to which the findings of a choice experiment in PDC are valid in
reflecting the monetary value of specific attributes of PDC. Another equally important
contribution is to provide evidence of the relative value of attributes of PDC for decision-
makers.
Lancaster's theory of value
Classic demand theory is based on assumptions about human psychology. Value is
determined by how individuals satisfy their wants and is concerned with the factors that
shape preferences for commodities (Rabin 1998). Until Lancaster's theory of demand was
developed, little progress had been made in understanding how the properties of the goods
themselves affect demand or in predicting how changes in the goods would affect
individuals' preferences for them. Lancaster's contribution was to consider the properties of
the goods themselves and identify the objective characteristics of goods that are relevant to
choice (Lancaster 1966;1971). His fundamental proposition was that all goods have
characteristics that are objective and finite and satisfy human wants. He also proposed that
goods or services are demanded because they contain certain characteristics that contribute
to utility. Therefore individuals' demand for commodities is a derived demand for the
characteristics they contain. Lancaster made this point succinctly:
"[T]he good per se does not give rise to utility to a consumer; it possesses characteristics,
and these characteristics give rise to utility." (Lancaster 1966)
Second, people possess preferences for different bundles of characteristics. This is the
subjective, personal aspect of demand. Since Lancaster recognised that people possess
different preferences for different collections or bundles of goods, these preferences are
indirect or "derived" since the goods are only required to produce these characteristics. The
"characteristics" models of demand separates the aspects of demand that are universal
(depending on objective characteristics of goods) and those that are specific to the
preferences of the individual.
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Lancaster was making the point that demand is made up of two elements, people and
things. He argued that microeconomic demand theory had not made use of information
about ''things'' (or commodities or products). It did not trace effects of changes in the physical
properties of goods, so it took no account of information that is readily available. While not all
goods have the same properties to all people, some properties are clearly universal. Also,
goods have many properties, but only some of them are relevant to choice. Those that are
relevant to choice Lancaster has referred to as "characteristics", that is objective properties
of things relevant to choices by people.
This "characteristics" theory of value recognises that the utility of a good or service can be
decomposed into separate utilities or attributes and allows examination of preferences for
different goods and services by their constitutent parts so that:
gk can be described by its specific attributes X" X2 ••••• Xq
where g is a specific good with K attributes, i is all individuals 1, .... 1 and j represents the
levels of attributes 1,.... J
Multi-attribute utility theory on which choice experimentation stems from Lancaster's
characteristics theory of value by postulating that the utility of a good stems not only from
characteristics but from preferences for specific levels of these characteristics (Herrman
2000, Green and Kreiger 1991). In experimental research, the levels of attributes that
represent a specific good are assigned a numerical value such that the sum of all attributes
at specific levels represents the total utility to an individual undertaking the experimental
task. The role of the researcher is to find the function that aggregates the attribute utilities to
an overall utility (U) for the good 9 with k attributes and the good 9 with m attributes, so that
holds only if good gK is preferred to gm (Fishburn 1988, Green and Kreiger 1993).
This approach still makes the important assumption that people have well-defined and stable
preferences for bundles of characteristics to meet their needs/wants. (Lancaster 1966,
1971) ..
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Lancaster's influence on attribute based choice experiments
Choice experiment theory has its roots in Lancastrian demand theory that relates demand to
the characteristics of goods rather than to the characteristics or circumstances of the people
who demand the goods. In Lancastrian theory, all attributes or bundles of characteristics can
be combined in an infinite number of ways in order to determine the point at which utility can
be optimised along a perfect continuum of attributes. Choice experiments attempt to mirror
this choice continuum by expressing the relative value of attributes in terms of marginal rates
of substitution, which assumes infinite substitutability.
In the real world, there are constraints to individuals maximising their utility since not all
combinations of characteristics of products are available. The ability of individuals to make
choices and trade-offs to maximise their utility in every consumption decision in every
moment is constrained by time, cognitive overload and their willingness to undertake such a
laborious task for all decisions in everyday life. There are also potentially millions of
interaction effects (Le. individuals' preferences for one bundle of goods being influenced by
the availability and preferences for other bundles of goods) that would be impossible to take
into consideration for all choices.
Choice experiments therefore operate as if the combinations of attributes and attribute levels
are the only inputs into an individual's utility function for a particular product at a given time
and the usual ceteris paribus rules apply. Respondents are assumed to be constantly
seeking to maximise their own utility, but are only oftered a limited number of attributes,
attribute levels and trade-ofts in order to do so. The results of the choice experiment are
therefore limited in reflecting reality (and utility maximisation) and the importance of this
limitation is determined by how closely the experiment reflects the real trade-ofts and
choices presented to individuals in the real world.
Random utility theory
"Generally speaking, there can be no valid measurement without underlying theory of the
behaviour of the numbers which result from measurement" (Louviere et al 2000, pp25).
Choice modelling is based on random utility theory (RUT). The development of random utility
theory (McFadden 1973, Hanemann 1994) and statistical design theory has been
fundamental in the development of the methods of choice experiments. Together they
provide a way of modelling the choice experiment decision process (Ryan and Gerard 2001)
and estimating the importance of characteristics of a product in a utility function. Random
utility theory provides a unified theoretical framework to develop models to account for real
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market choices (McFadden 1973, Louviere et al 2000). Using this theory, behaviour can be
modelled in order to formulate probabilistic discrete choice models that can be estimated
directly from choice experiments (Louviere ibid.). The RUT framework has placed choice
experiments into the mainstream of mircroeconomic theory.
Random utility theory recognises the consumer's true utility for a particular good or service is
unobservable and can only be estimated by modelling behavioural responses. These models
have both deterministic and stochastic components (Manski 1977). Mathematical analysis
that-linked choice experiments and microeconomic theory through the application of random
utility was undertaken in the 1980s (Beggs, Cardell et al 1981, Train 1986). This analysis
relates choice experiments with the larger family of probabilistic modelling in econometrics.
In random utility theory, while the individual respondent knows the nature of his or her
preferences, the researcher does not. One of the main contributions of McFadden's work
was the recognition that choice behaviour is stochastic when seen from the vantage point of
the analyst/observer (Louviere 1994). Data from groups of individuals leads to more
randomness and variation. It recognised the impossibility of accounting for all differences in
individuals. Fluctuations in behaviour within individuals (who may not always appear to
choose what they like best) can be modelled using a random component in the utility
function, such that;
where Ui is the unobservable but true utility for individual i, Vi the observable component of
utility and ei is the random, unobservable component. V is the proportion of the variance in a
choice that can be explained and e is the proportion that cannot.
The random term e, or error term, is itself made up of two components:
where Vi is the constant term specific to the alternative and ei is the random error term that is
independently and identically Gumbel distributed over all alternatives (for example, in the
logit model) or not independent or identically distributed for normal random variables (for
example, probit models). The decision-making process within a choice experiment can be
interpreted as an individual making a comparison of, say, two unobservable (to the
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researcher) utility functions. The respondent is assumed to choose the option that leads to
the maximisation of their utility at a given time. Since all that is observed is the final choice
the respondent makes, all the factors that contribute to that choice cannot be known, or
modelled. An error term that represents the unknown factors is included in the model to take
account of the fact that the direct utility function cannot be determined.
This approach has led to a general framework for understanding and modelling many types
of human behaviour. Utilities are assumed to have a random component, which mirrors the
fact-that the researcher is unable to understand or model perfectly all influences on choice.
The analyst can, however, specify the probability that an individual will choose a particular
option from a set of competing options (Louviere et aI2000).
This method of estimating utility makes the economic approach in choice experiments
qualitatively different from the assumed functional form in the marketing literature where no
error term is included (Van der Pol and Ryan 1995). It allows all the unobservable
unknowable factors that affect utility and choice to be incorporated in the model. It
represents the fact that underlying or latent utility can never be observed or known, but only
estimated from observations of human behaviour under constraints.
In a choice experiment, faced with a choice of two scenarios, it is assumed that a
respondent chooses the scenario that leads to the highest level of utility, so that
where Uiq(A)represents the unobservable, true indirect utility function of individual q for the
good/servicelintervention i with attributes A, and viq(A) represents the measurable
component of the utility function estimated empirically, with Elqrepresenting the unobservable
factors.
Axioms underlying choice experiments
Outside the economics literature, where a lot of applications of conjoint measurement and
choice experiments have been undertaken, it was recognised that there were important
general limitations to these approaches. These were specified in the first review of conjoint
analysis techniques published in the 1970s (Green and Wind 1975). It was accepted that
some goods and services might contain utilities that are not adequately captured by these
techniques, especially where too little is known about either the product or the interactions
between the utility of attributes within a product. Twenty years later, choice experiments
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have been described as a "double edged sword' (Louviere 1994) in that "the predictive
power may come at the expense of real understanding. They may fit response data well but
be incorrect and misleading' (Louviere, ibid.).
The methods of choice modelling make a number of strong assumptions -about human
behaviour. Interest in the health economics 'literature is now focused on the assumptions or
axioms in economic theory, rather than the theory of numbers, that underlie choice
experiments and the extent to which choice experiments disclose underlying or latent utility
(San Miguel and Ryan 2002a, San Miguel and Ryan 2002b, Ryan and San Miguel 2002,
Cairns et al 2002, Amaya et al 2002). It is important to address some of these issues and
whether they relate to choice experiments in particular or contingent valuation methods (and
the neoclassical theory of demand) more generally. Understanding these core assumptions
and how they are adhered to or violated will help in interpreting the results of the empirical
work presented in the thesis. Some of this work is still being developed and, consequently,
has not yet been published.
Importance of considering economic axioms in choice experiments
Microeconomic demand theory is based on assumptions about behaviour and how it can be
described in quantitative terms. Some of these assumptions apply to neoclassical theory of
demand generally, some are specific to stated preference methods of eliciting values of
. benefits and some to the choice experiment approach. Research has been undertaken to
assess the validity of these assumptions, and the extent to which these assumptions must
hold in choice experiments in order to interpret the results as the values or utilities of
attributes. This research is also trying to establish the significance of violations to these
assumptions in terms of how the results might be interpreted. The violation of some
assumptions may be more importance than others.
Health economists working on choice experiments have contributed to this field by
undertaking a number of empirical investigations into the properties of economic axioms
alongside collection of data on choice values. The evidence will be reviewed here in order to
investigate how likely it is that the PDC empirical study can establish utility values for
attributes of PDC, and the assumptions about the data that these findings must rest on.
Some assumptions may be violated in some contexts but not in others. For example, a
choice experiment where respondents may have experience of the attributes of a product or
service (and know the consequences of their consumption, and their individual demand
threshold for that product) may lead to more consistent choices than choice experiment
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.where respondents are unfamiliar with the product. The importance of these axioms in the
context of research into complex services will be investigated.
Axioms of neoclassical demand theory: Rationality and choice
It has been argued that the stated preference choice experiment approach to conjoint
analysis (as compared with ranking and rating approaches) is superior because individuals
are used to making choice decisions in their daily lives, whereas ranking or rating exercises
are not as common in real life (Ryan 1999). Therefore it is seen as self-evident that
respondents will find choice exercises easier to understand and respond to, and presumably
therefore will give more valid answers. The limited empirical evidence available has reported
high test-retest reliability in choice experiments, suggesting that respondents are consistent
over different time points in their preferences, although this evidence is from one study only
(Bryan et al 2000). Tests of reliability cannot demonstrate whether choice experiments are
valid, that is, measuring what are designed to measure. In this case validity relates to the
ability of the experiment to reveal respondents' true relative preferences for different
attributes.
The validity of choice experiments as consistent with the economic theory depends on
whether the observed preference meets the economic axioms of rationality. The concept of
rationality is a theoretical underpinning of neoclassical demand theory. Neoclassical demand
theory assumes that consumers are utility maximisers and will choose to consume goods
and services that promote this goal, subject to income constraints. Individuals' preferences
are also complete (without indecision) and stable in the short term. Individuals are
introspective and utility maximisers. Within this framework, they make decisions that
maximise utility and their preferences are revealed through their consumption.
Trading between attributes
Another one of the fundamental axioms of utility theory is that people have complete and
stable preferences. This that means that they have well formed preferences regarding the
attributes of a product or service. It also assumes that people are willing and able to trade
the attributes in any valuation task to maximise their welfare. This also assumes that there is
always a level of one attribute that can compensate for deterioration on the level of another
attribute. This has been termed the axiom of continuity. There is an implicit assumption that
people. make decisions, and engage in compensatory decision-making in a way that
represents their true preferences (and therefore reflects their underlying utility).
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Preferences for products, or attributes that make up a product are assumed to be
continuous. This means that for every individual, there exists a price or marginal rate of
substitution whereby each product is tradable with any other which can be represented on
continuous indifference maps. Individuals must be prepared to trade between attributes to
maximise their welfare. No single attribute can be dominant over all others (for which
individuals are not prepared to trade at any level of compensation with other attributes).
Such a pattern of preferences, where an individual would not trade no matter how much
utility in other attributes was sacrificed for that attribute level, would be interpreted as
irrational since preference for that attribute would be infinite.
Other tests of rationality also have to be met for choice experiments. Some are easier to test
for than others (Gerard 2002). The straightforward tests of rationality are reported in box 4.2
below:
Box 4.2 Concepts of rationality and how they might be tested in choice experiments
Completeness of preferences
Test: Individuals should be able to state their preferences for a product. The consequences of
consumption are known to the respondent, or can be formed (for a new product) if adequate
descriptive information is given.
Independence of preferences
Test: The preference ordering within one attribute should not depend on the level of another attribute.
Continuity and stability of preferences in this short run
Test: Re-run the same set of pairwise choices with the same respondents at a different time point in
the near future, ceteris paribus.
Transitivity of preferences
Simple test: If scenario A is preferred to B and scenario B is preferred to C, then individuals must
prefer scenario A to C.
If these assumptions are satisfied then there exists an additive solution such that the utility of
a product is equal to the sum of utility of all the attributes,
U(A,B ... n) = U(A) + U(B) ., ... U(n)
where U is the sum of all utility from a product and A, B .... n are attributes of the product.
There is evidence from the psychology and economic evaluation literature that these
assumptions may not be valid. Evidence has been produced that shows clear reversal of
preferences in studies of how individuals choose between two gambles, depending on how
the gamble is presented (Lichtenstein and Slavic 1971). Other evidence has suggested that
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preferences may not be stable or complete. For example Shiell and colleagues found that
the majority of participants (in an admittedly small study of college staff and students)
demonstrated unstable preferences on repeat presentation of a standard gamble task. This
suggested that individuals were reflecting on their responses over time and changing them
(Shiell et al 2000).
Evidence from the environmental economics literature has demonstrated that people's
estimates of value to not reflect the magnitude of the commodity. One study showed that the
maximum willingness to pay for environmental preservation of a lake in one area of Canada
was similar to people's valuation of environmental protection of all lakes in Canada,
describing this as a "purchase of moral satisfaction" (Kahneman and Knetsch 1992).
Transportation and environmental economics has been at the forefront of the theoretical
development of more complex models for accurately predicting choices. If, for example,
individuals exhibit non-compensatory decision-making, then this will severely restrict the
extent to which in practice overall preferences between options (scenarios) can be
established by CE methods (Swait 2001). Swait has argued for an extension of the
neoclassical theory of consumer behaviour to incorporate 'cut-offs' which can significantly
improve the choice prediction in stated preference choice tasks. His argument is based on
insights that the normative economic model of the fully rational, fully informed, utility
maximising decision-maker is restrictive and does not explain fully the complexity of human
decision-making.
Swait's argument builds on the work of others in psychology, marketing and economics that
individuals are in reality information processors with only limited capabilities and resources
to make decisions. People are "cognitive misers" (Swait ibid. pp 905) and adapt the amount
of effort they invest in making a good decision to their context and resources. Swait
proposes that individuals adopt 'cut-offs' as a means to reduce the burden of the decision by
eliminating alternatives in a choice set that do not meet specific requirements for which the
individual will not trade. These cut-ofts are psychological boundaries of particular attributes
within which the respondents will restrict themselves. An example of such a boundary might
be that a respondent will never choose an option with a price higher that £X. Non-
compensatory decision-making means that a respondent is not willing to allow compensation
between different criteria in a decision. Swait has shown that if models that incorporate such
attribute cut-offs produce a better theoretical model and a sizeable improvement of the
predictability of the CE model.
127
Chapter 4
For discrete cut-offs the choice model can incorporate dummy variables that reflect whether
the requirement is violated in a given alternative in a choice set. This dummy variable is
included for all attributes that are outside a given cut-off. For this to be operationalised, the
individual must provide his or her own cut-offs to the researchers. These can be decided ex
ante with the danger that these preconceived cut-offs are not well formulated but will
influence the respondents decisions in the experiment as people wish to be consistent in
their preferences, or ex poste in which case there is a danger that the answers given in the
experiment will influence the cut-offs rather than reflect the individuals true cut-offs or
preferences in the real world. There have been difficulties in implementing choice models
based on two-stage choice processes (for screening the attributes for cut-offs and second,
making the final choice) as it can increase the number of choice sets exponentially (Swait
and Ben Akiva 1987, in Swait 2001) but the approach proposed by Swait that includes
dummy variables for cut-offs can capture both stages in the model parameters and so
reduce the number of choice sets required to estimate the model.
Research in environmental economics has experimented with designs that can reflect the
intensity of preference (Johnson et al 2000, Swallow et al 2000, reported in Adamovicz
2002). This allows examination of a subset of respondents who are confident about their
responses. Adamovicz suggests that in the contingent valuation literature, this approach has
improved consistency with actual choices. But there has been too little empirical examination
of the effect of the additional burden of these approaches on respondents' ability to complete
the choice tasks.
Some of the emerging issues in the choice modelling literature are whether the context of
the experiment has an effect on the estimated parameters of the regression models
(Adamovicz, 2002). Adamovicz argues that empirical evidence has shown that the
regression model estimated from a choice experiment can change significantly with relatively
small changes in context. Theoretical analysis of the importance of specific contextual issues
(such as social interdependence of decisions, the complexity of decision, or the
heterogeneity of preferences) is an emerging field in choice experiment research. It is likely
that the consequences of this work will have an effect on how the results of simple choice
experiments can be interpreted. Adamovicz argues that,
"The critical issue is the extent to which the assumptions of the choice modelling approach
can be satisfied and whether there is sufficient data to support the estimators..... it is
becoming clear that the amount of data with many replications per individual may be
necessary for the use of more advanced models. II (Adamovicz ibid.).
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The more complex the nature of the inquiry into consumer choice, the more complex the
choice experiment model may have to become, not only in the number of choices that are
presented to respondents but in the analysis of those responses. However, Louviere (2001)
has argued that any method of choosing choice sets would, given enough data, lead to good
quality model estimates. Research effort has been concentrated in understanding and
developing methods for estimating the regression models to fit the data: "far less is known
about the model parameters estimates, particularly their statistical efficiency' (Louviere, ibid.
pp19).
The debate outlined in the next section discusses the extent to which, given the restrictions
of research design, choice experiments can claim to measure utility. It suggests that the
violation of even the most lenient of the criteria for rationality (stability of preferences in the
short run, within the same choice) means that it isdifficult to interpret the findings of
empirical research as measuring utilities.
Empirical investigation of the axioms in the health economics choice experiment
literature
Empirical investigation is still limited but it is addressing the validity of choice experiments
beyond the very simple tests of rationality. The axioms have been examined with real data
from choice experiments. At the same time, theoretical understanding has advanced to
explore ways in which some more minor axioms might be violated but the overall rationality
of an individual's responses remains intact.
San Miguel has undertaken work to suggest that individuals do not follow the decision
process assumed by utility theory (San Miguel 2000b). The results are not sufficiently
conclusive to enable rejection of utility theory but they raise questions about the need to
explore its applicability in representing individuals' behaviour. Amaya and colleagues are
examining whether individuals adopt compensatory heuristics in their responses to choice
experiments. Heuristics are cognitive strategies or shortcuts that operate to simplify people's
data processing when responding to a task (Kahneman et al 1982). There is a suggestion
that individuals adopt simple decision-making heuristics in choice experiments that may be
in direct conflict with the axiom of continuity of preferences (Amaya et al 2002).
Simplifying decision heuristics may exist such as 'Take the Best', where respondents
consider one attribute at a time in the comparison of a choice set. If the first attribute can
distinguish between the two options the two for the individual, then the decision is made on
that first attribute (Gigerenzer et al 1999). Regression models using the 'Take the Best' rule
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have been shown to be as accurate at predicting decision as using all the information
presented to respondents (Gigerenzer et al ibid.). The authors consider these heuristics to
be more psychologically plausible and a reason why the strict axioms may fail, but
respondents are still providing rational responses.
Work by Ryan and colleagues is examining whether it is possible to demonstrate rationality
without an understanding of the cognitive processes that a respondent uses to make a
choice (Ryan, Hughes et al 2002). They have employed qualitative research techniques to
examine the reasons given by respondents about why they make the choices they do in
choice experiment contexts. They found that 30% of the choices that might be considered
"irrational" could be explained by respondents not understanding the choice task (Le. by
making price-based not value-based choices). This suggests that respondents may in fact
be making what to them are rational decisions although they violate the axioms of rationality.
For example, a respondent may consider the cost of an intervention to them rather than the
value of that intervention them in terms of willingness-to-pay. There is also evidence from
this work that people will employ simplifying decision-making heuristics in choice
experiments contexts and consider only the minimum about of information necessary to
make the decisions where not all attributes are considered.
There have been two studies undertaken to explore Sen's expansion and contraction
properties in choice experiments. These are test of rationality to explore whether
respondents are making a range of decisions that are consistent when the questions are
presented in different ways. The expansion property, for example, tests whether the choices
made by respondents are consistent (rational) when choice sets are expanded or
contracted. If a respondent makes a preference ordering between a pair of scenarios, this
preference ordering should not change by the addition of a third scenario added to the
choice set.
The first study, by San Miguel and colleagues showed that these tests were hard to satisfy
compared with simple dominance and transitivity tests (San Miguel and Ryan 2002).
Recently Gerard and colleagues have begun to investigate whether more irrational
responses were detected when stricter tests of irrationality were applied (Gerard 2002). In
the preliminary findings of this unpublished work there has been some support for the
hypothesis that more stringent tests of rationality led to higher proportions failing the test.
The consequence of this work is to challenge the notion that respondents do not act as if
they are rational individuals when more stringent tests of rationality are applied. It is not
enough to apply more simple tests and conclude from this that individuals are acting
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rationally when faced with choice sets. It adds to the empirical evidence that utility estimates
derived from empirical research may not always meet the strict normative axioms set out in
theory.
The investigation of axioms is finding different results. One the one hand individual
respondents' choices can be better identified as rational once complex decision-making
heuristics are better understood by researchers. On the other, more respondents fail the
stricter tests of rationality (Sen's test) when these stricter tests are applied.
There is some debate about whether testing for dominance is a relevant test in the context of
a choice experiment. Dominant preferences are preferences for attributes that individuals
are not willing to trade for any level of some other attributes. Since a foundational axiom of
discrete choice analysis is that individuals trade to maximise their utility, the individual who
expresses no willingness to trade regardless of the value of the alternative is perceived to
have irrational preferences.
One' approach to empirical analysis has been to class dominant preferences as irrational
since respondents show no willingness to trade one attribute for any quantity of another in
compensation. Therefore these respondents were excluded from the analysis (Ryan and
Hughes 1997; Ryan et al 1998, Ratcliffe and Buxton 1999; Jan et al 2000). However, this
position has been challenged. From a 'public policy' perspective it has been argued that
since policy-making has its foundations in the democratic process, and some people do
have irrational responses in choice situations, this should not exclude them from analysis
(Bryan et al 1998). If these irrational responses are random then they should not have an
important effect on the results. The qualitative evidence described earlier also showed that it
is not possible for researchers to make ex poste decisions about which patients are
exhibiting dominant preferences (Ryan and Hughes 2002). There may be good reasons why
people have what seems to be on the surface an irrational view even if these are not evident
to the researcher who only ever has partial knowledge.
What is left of utility?
'7he operation failed, but the patient thrived" (Huber 1979)
This quote by Huber represents the phenomenon that despite widespread violation of the
axioms the .predictivevalue of choice experiments is quite strong. Utilities derived in this way
may be useful despite these violations.
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The value of the CE approach is that, unlike more straightforward ranking or rating exercises
developed in the stated preference framework, it requires individuals to make decisions that
require judgments to be made when choice is constrained. It is an improvement over direct
elicitation techniques because it keeps respondents from seeing every attribute as important.
Respondents are required to make decisions about what they would sacrifice in order to
obtain a particular level of an attribute, and this provides some quantitative, comparative
measure of its contribution to welfare, in the context where this cannot be measured directly.
The· extent to which choice experiments are measuring utility is determined by the
adherance to the axioms of rationality. The empirical evidence presented in this chapter and
in chapter 2, suggests that individuals do not always act as if guided by rational decision-
making. The question is the extent to which this matters in the interpretation of the results. It
has also been suggested earlier in chapter 2 that utility estimation should be interpreted as a
metaphor for decision-making (Nease 1996), and that adherance to the axioms is not
necessary for the findings to be insightful.
There is evidence that decisions in the real marketplace are made on remarkably few
dimensions (Olshavsky and Granbois 1979). The value of choice experiments is that they
force people to make trade-efts that are similar to those of the market. It is analogous to a
market choice and it requires judgements to be made when attributes conflict. It is an
improvement on direct elicitation in that it keeps respondents from seeing everything as
important. Even if choice experiments do not reflect utility directly, this process of
systematically assessing how individuals value attributes of a product or service is still
potentially useful information for policy-makers.
SECTION 5. THE METHODOLOGY OF CHOICE EXPERIMENTS
The key stages of a choice experiment are introduced in this section, as described in the
health economic literature published in the last decade. These studies build on
methodological work developed in the environmental economics literature and transport
economics. The health economics literature has contributed to the methodological
development of the approach, especially in underlying economic axioms of choice
experiments and the extent to which they hold true under empirical investigation described
earlier. This has been an important contribution to the literature as it has an impact on the
interpretation of the results of the empirical work undertaken in POCo
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How a choice experiment is constructed
There are specific stages to designing a choice experiment and these have been well
described in the literature and a recent review of the use of these methods in health
economic evaluation (Ryan, Scott et al 2001). The main approach has not changed but there
have been subtly different approaches described in the empirical studies. This reflects both
the fact that this is an emerging field in health economic methodology, and that there are
different ways of addressing the problem. An approach that has been widely followed in the
health economist literature and which has acted as a type of blueprint for this kind of
research is followed here (Ryan, Scott et aI2001).
There have been other approaches to choice set design suggested. One of these involves
randomly selecting pairs of scenarios for respondents to consider. This has the advantage
that each possible pair has the same probability of being compared by an individual
(Adamovicz 2002). The disadvantage is that a large sample of respondents is required to
take part in the study in order for there to be an adequate number of observations for each
pair of scenarios. This is rare for choice experiments, and this approach has not been
adopted in studies in health economics to date.
Establishing the attributes in the choice experiment
From Lancastrian theory it is postulated that the characteristics of a good or service must be
those that have an effect on a person's desire for that good or service (Lancaster 1971). If
there is evidence from qualitative research that describes the important attributes of a
particular service, this can be used to design the study. Equally, literature reviews or
previous studies may provide data on the attributes and how to assign the appropriate levels
of the attributes to the scenarios. There has been some discussion in the choice modelling
literature on how these choices of levels then impact on the results. The consensus is that it
is necessary to describe how and why the particular attributes and levels were chosen in
order for others to be able to judge their appropriateness (Ryan 2000). Pilot testing will help
to determine whether the choice of attributes is described in such a way as to be understood
by the respondents.
Assigning levels to the characteristics
Differences in levels need to be sufficiently wide in order to represent important differences
in utility to an individual. As described earlier, the level of an attribute may be quantifiable
and continuous (for example distance from clinic, where one mile is half as long as two
miles), or descriptive (where qualitative differences in levels cannot be arithmetically
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measured). Descriptive attributes are more difficult to infer as one person's interpretation
may be different from another's. For example, for the "level of discomfort after the operation"
the levels might be labelled: mild, moderate and severe, which may be understood by
individuals differently. The importance for people to be able to discriminate between two
choices is that they are both "plausible and actionable" (Ryan 2000).
Attribute levels can also be continuous (such as time or distance) or intervally scaled (such
as the number of days per week that a clinic is open). Binary variables (for example if an
attribute is either present or absent) are can be represented by dummy variables in the
regression analysis. This will be explored in more detail further on.
To minimise potential information overload, Thomas (1979, quoted in Huber 2000) suggests
no more than five attributes should be included in a survey. Malhotra argues that
respondents are capable of processing ten attributes without excessive strain (Malhotra
1982). Green and Srinivasan (1978) recommend that no more than six attributes should be
used.
Number of choice sets
The final product of the choice experiment is the estimation of a probabilistic regression
model. Each of the coefficients or parameters of the model represents an attribute and
shows the influence of that attribute on an individual's likelihood to choose the scenario.
There have to be a sufficient number of choices presented to respondents so that these
coefficients can be estimable to an acceptable degree of significance. One of the important
properties of choice experiments is that it should be possible to estimate the coefficients
without having to present all possible combinations of levels of attributes to all respondents.
These can be calculated from a pairwise choice of only a fraction of the possible scenarios,
using, for example, an orthognal design.
An experimental study that incorporated all combinations of attributes, even for a fairly
simple study, could be very large indeed (five attributes with three levels would lead to 243
possible scenarios). Since a full factorial design is usually not required to estimate the model
coefficients, a method of reducing this cognitive burden on respondents is used. Empirical
investigation of the number of choice sets found decreasing reliability with increasing
numbers of properties (Acito 1979). The restriction is that the number of profiles must
exceed the number of factors to allow for error degrees of freedom (Jones 2001).
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A common approach to reduce the number of scenarios has been to use a fractional factorial
design. Fractional factorial designs might be adopted when presenting all alternatives would
be too time-consuming, cost too much, or might fatigue the respondents, thereby possibly
invalidating responses (Kanninen 2000). A fractional factorial design is a subset of all
possible combinations of attributes used in the experiment. One type of sub-set is an
orthognal array. It design allows estimation 'of the relative value of individual attributes but
assumes that interaction between attributes is negligible. Although decision-making by
individuals does incorporate interactions between different attributes of a choice, it may not
be necessary from a practical point of view to include these in a choice model. It is reported
that main effects typically account for around 70-90% of explained variance in choice
models, with two-way effects accounting for another 5-15%. More complex interactions in
decision-making probably account for around 5-10 only (Louviere, Hensher et aI2000). In an
orthognal array, there is no collinearity between attributes so that the probability of one level
of attribute appearing in a choice set is not associated with the appearance of another level
of another attribute.
The orthognal design produces profiles (or scenarios) of combinations of attributes that have
statistical properties which determine what utility specifications can be estimated from the
response data, and with what efficiency. Virtually all orthognal designs in health economic
applications have used main effects plans (assuming no interaction between attributes)
which is a potential limitation in terms of reflection of the complexity of interactions in real life
choice situations. Despite this limitation, main effects designs are common with choice
experiments because they do not require large sample sizes (Kanninen 2002).
The complexity in choice experiments may be similar or different to the complexity faced in
real market decisions (Adamovicz 2002). The advantage of the fractional factorial design
where not all combinations of levels of attributes are evaluated by the respondent is that the
model can predict the equations for those combinations of attribute levels that subjects did
not evaluate directly.
The analysis of choice data requires more complex analytical techniques than
straightforward ranking or rating methods. Recent developments of suitable analytical
procedures such as logit (logistical probability unit) and probit analysis and the use of
software packages to execute these techniques have meant that CE methods have become
more widely used (Cave et al 1993, Ryan, Scott et al 2001). Computer programmes can
select a set of scenarios that are orthognal and level balanced (each level of an attribute
appears proportionately the same number of times as any other). The 'best' design has been
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described as one with optimality (efficiency), level balance, utility balance, orthognality and
minimal overlap of levels of attributes. (Huber and Zwerina 1996). There is a trade-off
between design efficiency (the ability of the design to derive attribute coefficients that are
significant) and respondent efficiency (the ability of respondents to understand and complete
the task) (Segal 1982). Recent work has suggested that the number of attributes and the
number of levels can influence the results of the study (Ratcliffe 2002). However, Louviere
(2001) reported that recent reviews of the literature outside health economics have been
consistent in finding that task complexity and length primarily impact on the random
component of variance not the mean parameters.
"There is no empirical evidence that increasing numbers of attributes, numbers of choice
options or numbers of choice sets (scenarios) impact mean preferences parameters, but
there is evidence that increases in these factors impact random component variability.
However optimal levels of these variables remain unknown for particular applications'
(Louviere 2001 pp34)
The importance of the random component in choice models is returned to further on in this
chapter.
Also there is a "cost of thinking" (Shugan 1980). Respondents face different levels of
motivation and have different levels of ability to respond to the choice task. One of the
design questions to be explored is how to compare the complexity in decision-making in
choice experiments with the complexity of other contingent valuation experimental methods.
If it is similar, then other contingent valuation methods will face comparable problems. If
there are additional levels of complexity in choice experiments then data and meaning may
be lost by not understanding the nature or source of this complexity. However, it has been
reported in health economics studies that simple models of choice have been found to
explain 85% of the decisions made by individuals (Wordsworth, Ryan et al 2001, Ryan and
Gerard 2001). However it has been argued outside the health economics literature that
increasing the number of attributes would not significantly affect the estimates of the model
coefficients of the model but that this increases the impact on the random component
variability (Louviere 2001).
Assigning attribute levels to choice sets
Assigning attribute levels is an area where there has been least guidance in the health
economics literature to date, although outside the health economics literature the guidance
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has been more comprehensive at dealing with these more complex issues of study design
(Zwerina et al 1996, Louviere 2000).
The problem of maintaining the orthognality of the design once the scenarios were put into
pairs had not been addressed directly in the published health economics literature at the
time of the study design. The technique of randomly assigning scenarios to pairs had been
adopted in some studies (Ryan and Farrar 1995; Ratcliffe and Buxton 1999, Shackley, Slack
et al 2000) or random pairing with additional manipulation to ensure trade-off between
different dimensions of benefit (Farrar et al 2000). But subsequently there has been some
suggestion that random pairing of levels of attributes may violate the statistical properties of
the design (Ryan and Gerard 2001).
The other main approach has been to compare one scenario against the status quo (Ryan
2000, Farrar and Ryan 2000, Gosden et al 2000). This has the advantage of being
cognitively easier and reflects the real world where one scenario is seen as the usual or
current situation, practice or policy. A constant comparator can maintain statistical
properties, but for this study where there is no constant comparator representing current
practice or the status quo, this does not appear to be a logical option. Furthermore, by only
comparing all levels of attributes with one attribute, the chance of comparing two scenarios
other than with the baseline comparator, is lost. This important point (and how it was
addressed in this study) it returned to further on in the next chapter.
Sample size
The stated preference literature (in marketing) has tended to deal with the issues of sample
size rather informally, with early empirical work suggesting samples of around 30 per sub-
group were adequate (Cave et al 1993). The argument was that since these methods collect
multiple observations per respondent, only small sample sizes were required (Green and
Wind 1992). However, since the number of multiple observations provides more information
on the individual and not the population, larger sample sizes are now more common. The
figure of 75-100 respondents per market segment has been quoted (Bradley and Kroes
1990; Swanson et al 1993, unpublished working paper quoted in Cave et al 1993). The latter
study tested how many respondents were needed to "uncover" known utility functions. It
suggested that values could be predicted with the greatest accuracy as the sample
approached 100, beyond which the marginal benefit of each additional interview falls.
The method of data collection also has an effect on the number of respondents who can be
recruited to the study and complete the task. Postal questionnaires have been the dominant
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method of data collection for other studies in the health economics literature. These have
produced a higher number of respondents; between 100 and over 500 is the range (Ryan,
Bate et al 2001), although one recent health economic study used data from only 67
respondents (Ryan 1998).
Tests of axioms
Many choice experiment studies have included simple test of internal consistency by
including scenarios considered to be dominant in all attributes, as reported in a recent
systematic review of discrete choice based studies (Ryan and Gerard 2001). These
additional choices are not "data" as the responses are not part of the orthognal array and are
not included in the regression model. There needs to be a balance between the amount of
choice data from respondents that contributes to the analysis and the tests for rationality. If it
is possible to present a large number of choice sets to individuals, or to split the sample into
two separate questionnaires, as has been done in recent studies (Gerard 2002, Ratcliffe
1999), then the experimental choices and test of rationality should be included.
Data,analysis
Regression techniques are used to analyse responses to choice questions. These are data
reducing techniques that attempt to predict an outcome based on as simple a model of
independent variables as possible. It is a summary of the complex relationship between
factors and is interpreted as an approximation of the true relationship that involves unknown
variables. A good model is judged by whether it predicts a known outcome well (Le. is
unbiased) and predicts the outcome efficiently (balancing the number of explanatory
variables which should be as few as possible, with the accuracy of the prediction).
Choice experiments provide a sample of repeated choice sets for individuals (choice
between scenario A or B) for a given set of explanatory variables. The characteristics of the
scenarios are the explanatory variables whose levels or presence/absence may contribute to
determining a respondents' decision about which scenario to choose. Interpreting the data
from choice experiments in this way means it is possible to specify a regression function that
describes the relationship between the attributes and the decision to choose a particular
scenario. Because of the nature of the dependent variable, which is binary, simple linear
regression does not function well for these kinds of data (Jones 2001, Powers and Xie
2000).
Responses to choice experiments can be interpreted as categorical binary dependent
variables. Categorical variables are a limited rather than infinite number of possible values. If
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the categorical variables are the independent variables (the attributes in this case) they can
be assimilated into simple linear regression by using dummy variables to represent the
presence (X=1) or absence (X=O)of the attribute. But if the dependent variable (the choice
of scenario) is also categorical, then the analysis and interpretation of the data is more
complicated. Since the dependent variable is either scenario A or scenario B, this is the case
in choice experiments.
Classical linear regression models do not function well when the dependent variable is
binary. This is because the predicted values of a regression function can lie outside the
range 0 to 1. If the model is designed to predict a binary outcome, Le. whether an individual
might choose a scenario A over scenario B in, say, a pairwise choice, a value outside 0 (no)
and 1 (yes) is theoretically impossible. Therefore other non-linear functions that are bounded
to the range 0 and 1 are estimated. The common forms of models are the logit and probit
models.
The probit model for analysing choice experiment data
Probit and logit models are models that can estimate the value of dependent variables that
are bounded within the range 0 to 1. They both have an S-shaped distribution and are
similar in appearance. They differ in the assumptions made about the distribution of the error
terms. As described above, probit models are based on standard normal distributions of the
error term, assuming that the error term is the sum of independent unobserved quantities.
The logit model assumes the error terms are independently and identically Gumbel
distributed. Both are typically estimated by the method of maximum likelihood estimation
that specifies the joint probability of observed data and determines the coefficient values that
are most likely to fit the data.
The random effects probit model (Heckman and Willis 1976) has been a common option for
analysis for health economists who have undertaken choice experiments since it is an
approach that can take account of potential correlation between observations from one
individual, but assumes that this correlation is unknowable, hence the random component.
However, in some situations a simple probit model will be the most parsimonious model
where this correlation is not significant. In practice, it is useful to test both ordinary probit,
fixed effect and random effect problt models. The ordinary probit takes no account of any
panel data (repeat data from the same respondent). The fixed effects probit model stratifies
the data by respondent and assumes that each individual is different from others in a 'fixed'
way. The random effects probit model assumes that the intra-respondent effects differ in a
random way.
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Using the random effects model that has been widely reported in the health economics
literature, the function to be estimated in a choice experiment has the following form
U' = constant + ~Xl -n + e
where U' is the (unobservable or latent) change in utility from moving from one scenario to
another, and ~ represents all the coefficients of X attributes to be modelled.
The-B parameters are equal to the marginal utilities of given attributes, and the ratio of any
two parameters indicates the marginal rates of substitution between attributes, and e is the
error term. The error term e is made up of a combination of unobserved heterogeneity (v)
and stochastic error (e).The random effects probit takes account of any correlation between
v and ewhich represents correlation between observations within any individual.
The approach assumes that there is a "latent variable" or underlying and unrevealed
continuous variable Y that is represented by the binary variable 0 and 1. The coefficients of
the independent variables relate to the underlying or linear index, often interpreted as the
latent variable Y*. This term is not directly observable and not measured by natural units,
unlike the probability of choosing 0 or 1.
As mentioned earlier, the interpretation of the probit models is different from the linear
probability models in that it applies a non-linear link transformation, using an S-curve of the
normal distribution. The dependent variable Y can be interpreted as a propensity to take one
action (in this case, to choose scenario A in a choice experiment, revealed as Y=1). At a
certain point along the continuous scale, the decision will switch to take the opposite action,
(revealed as Y=O).
One way to conceptualise this is in terms of costs and benefits relating to a decision. The
ratio of costs and benefits in any decision is a continuous scale, but at a certain point, an
individual will decide benefits are greater than costs (revealed as Y=1, the decision that A is
a better choice than B). At a turning point, the costs of A will outweigh the benefits and the
respondent will choose B (revealed as Y=O). This is the latent variable approach to analysing
categorical data. Therefore underlying each individual's choice is a continuous variable for
the costs and benefits of each decision. All that can be observed is the decision to
choose/not to choose in pairwise choice. This observable choice is a realisation of a
ontinuous propensity that is unobservable, as formalised by random utility theory.
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The estimated coefficients produced by the logit and probit model's coefficients cannot be
compared directly as for the linear probability model. The two main findings in probit and
logit models are the effect of the explanatory variables that is given by the sign of the
coefficient. If it is negative, this means that the presence of this variable is less likely to make
an individual choose a particular scenario in pairwise choice (in this case scenario A). This
effect is shown by the size of the coefficient.The marginal rate of substitution, if appropriate,
can be calculated from these coefficients.
Theresults of the random effects probit model can be estimated with and without a constant
term. The constant term has been interpreted as the overall propensity for respondents to
choose one of the scenarios even when the level of attributes is the same. If the constant
term is significant, then respondents may be considering attributes other than those in the
scenarios in their choice. A constant might not be specified in experiments where
respondents are asked to assume that all other characteristics are the same except for
those in the scenario, for example between two hospital outpatient clinics). The STATA
(version 7.0) output from a random effects probit model automatically produces a regression
equation with the constant term. The structure of the equation is:
U = constant + ~1 (attribute 1) + ~2 (attribute 2) + ~3 (attribute 3) ..... ~n (attribute n)
Interpreting the results of a choice experiment using the probit model
The key findings of a choice experiment are the estimated coefficients for the attribute
included in the design. These attributes show how important, in relative terms, each attribute
is in an individual's (and aggregated) demand function. A priori reasoning provides
hypotheses for the direction of the coefficients (whether they will positively or negatively
affect the choice of a scenario). The p-value associated with the coefficient, and the
confidence intervals provide information on whether a particular attribute is important in
respondents' utility or demand for that scenario. The coefficients relate to one of the choices
(scenario A or B) and a positive sign on the coefficient indicates whether increasing the level
of an attribute makes it more likely that the scenario will be chosen.
The probit and logit models can also provide an estimate of marginal rates of substitution
between attributes. Logit and probit models produce coefficients of a different magnitude but
always in the same ratio, so the marginal rate of substitution is the same using either method
(Powers and Xie 2002). If a price or charge is included as an attribute, the marginal rate of
substitution between the price and another attribute may reflect the willingness-ta-pay (to
trade with money) for that attribute. If all attributes can be compared with one continuous
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attribute, such as money (or travel time), this provides a marker for the relative and absolute
importance of all attributes to an individual. This is subject to particular methodological
constraints that are as discussed further on.
However, even without price as an attribute, it is still possible to estimate the relative
importance of an attribute to the decision. to choose either scenario A or scenario B.
Therefore, while the probit model is complex, the results it can provide are relatively
straightforward to interpret by non-experts. It has been argued that this is a potentially
powerful tool for decision-making, and easily interpreted if analysed correctly (Jones 2001).
However, the distribution of the error term, the use of a constant term, and the associated
functional form of the estimated probitllogit model will lead to different estimates of the model
coefficients.
There is no standard method of goodness of fit of probit models as there is for ordinary
regression analysis. Since the coefficients are estimated using a maximum likelihood
procedure that is not designed to maximise anyone criterion of goodness of fit, there is no
automatic method of assessing this (Powers and Xie 2000). The usual R-squared statistic for
ordinary least squares regression (the proportion of the variance in the dependent variable
which is explained by the variance in the independent variables) has no equivalent measure
in probit models. The pseudo R-squared does not have the same relationship to probit
models that the ordinary R-squared has to linear regression models. It is possible to
artificially construct scenarios in which the pseudo-R-squared is very close to 1 even though
the model is not a good fit. Conversely models with pseudo R-squared values that are very
low can be very successful in terms of correctly predicting the observations in a sample
(Greene 2003).
However, pseudo-R-squared statistics have been published for probit models. The most
common is the McFadden's R-squared statistic (sometimes called the likelihood ratio index).
This gives the proportional difference in log likelihood ratios of a model without parameters
and a model with parameters, so that
McFadden R2= ( Log La - Log Le) / Log La
where Log La is the log likelihood generated by the probit model with no parameters (Le. with
the constant term only) and Logeis the log likelihood generated for the current model. The
statistic is presented as a percentage or proportion and indicates how well the model ''fits''
the data or predicts the dependent variable (in this case, whether scenario A or B is chosen)
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(Altman 1991). The STATA computer package provides an estimate of the log likelihoods
for probit models, so this statistic can be easily calculated from the data.
The McFadden R2is a scaled measure that varies between 0 and (somewhat close to) 1. It
is expected that the Pseudo R2will be much less than what would be expected for a linear
model. The Pseudo-R2 in probit and logit models is best used to compare different
specifications of the same model, rather than to compare models with different data sets.
This approach to modelling is more open to error due to misspecification of the model and
misinterpretation of the data than other simpler regression methods. There is no standard
accepted range for the test of goodness of fit. This issue is referred to again in chapter 7 in
considering the goodness of fit of the model. Since there is no widely accepted R2statistic
for binomial data, the convention is that these measures should be used "cautiously" (Altman
1999).
The approach adopted for this analysis will be to use this statistic to assess which of the
models presented is the better fit to the data relative to one another rather than to interpret
the statistic as a measure of the overall goodness of fit of the model.
Validity
The purpose of hold-outs is to determine the model's ability to correctly predict the 0/1
observations in the sample in a set of pairwise choice as this may be a more reliable and
useful test of the model that the pseudo-R-square statistic. The hold-out approach is a way
of testing the internal validity or robustness of the model. The hold-out choice sets have the
same structure (ten choices, five attributes each) as those included in the main study derived
from an orthognal array of choice sets. Respondents are presented with additional choice
sets but the responses to these choice sets are not used to estimate the regression model.
The test is whether the model will correctly predict the actual choices that are made by
respondents. Once the model has been specified using data from the main experiment, the
choices made by respondents to the hold-out can be compared with the choices predicted
by the model, using for example a chi-square test. If the model is well specified, then the
actual proportion of patients who chose a scenario would be similar to the proportion
predicted by the model. The chi-square test indicates the proportion of agreement between
observed and expected values.
Tests of external validity (the test of whether respondents' true preferences are found using
a choice experiment approach) are more difficult in this context. Louviere (2001) has pointed
out that the efficiency of any choice experiment depends on knowing the true parameters,
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but if these were known ex ante, then it would not be necessary to run the choice experiment
regression model. For experiments where a willingness-to-pay estimate is derived, external
validity could compare the values derived from the choice experiment with real market
values where "theyexisted. However, Louviere (2001) suggests that the estimates of value
derived from choice models have often been over-simplistic due to a lack of l,mderstanding
of the true nature of the error term in the models. Louviere suggests that the random error
term incorporated into most choice models may be derived from different sources of error.
He argues that reasoning and empirical research imply that the random component is
mul~idimensional, containing subcomponents representing intra- and inter- individual
variation, task variation and potentially many other sources specific to a research context.
Louviere has argued that the variation in values reported by different studies may be due
more to the differences in the error term, than the differences in the actual values. This
violates the condition that the variation in error terms between two utility functions must be
less than the variation in parameters of the explanatory variables. For monetary values, this
point is illustrated by the reported differences in willingness to pay (WTP) and willingness to
accept compensation (WTA) values. Louviere has suggested that the random components
may be different between WTP and WTA since WTA values have been found to be
consistently larger than WTP values,. This may have more to do with the fact that the
variance is wider for WTA than for WTP since subjects are less familiar with the concept of
deciding a level of financial compensation for forsaking something they value, than the
maximum price they would pay it.
Therefore much remains unknown or unresolved, particularly regarding optimally efficient
designs for particular purposes and the degree of complexity that is desirable and/or
necessary to understand adequately, explain and predict behaviour.
When should choice experiment methods be considered in evaluation?
To consider more than one trade off
Many of the issues that arise in trying to use CE to obtain monetary valuations of outcomes
also hold for a wider class of contingent valuation techniques. Clearly, the importance of the
arguments about whether and how to include monetary valuation will depend on the health
care setting and the evaluation question. Also it is determined by whether and how it can be
included in a way that makes sense to the target group of respondents who are asked to
make the choices in the choice experiment setting.
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It has been argued that choice experiments represents "a subtler way to establish WTP, and
hence the monetary value of benefits' (Ryan 1996). One recent study compared the choice
experiment approach with that of a study examining patient preferences for the same
treatment using a standard gamble technique (Morgan, Shackley et al 2000). They found
that while the standard gamble (SG) findings supported those of the choice experiment
(strong preferences for local treatment), there were differences in the level of risks that
patients were willing to take to ensure local treatment. The standard gamble study found that
patients were willing to accept higher risks of dying than in the choice experiment study.
There were notable differences in definitions presented to patients in the two study designs
making this comparison less valid. However the authors suggest that the SG approach
presented the trade-off in more explicit terms than the CE approach as the SG approach
trades off only two attributes at a time. By contrast, in the CE approach these attributes are
just two among several other attributes for the respondent to consider. Therefore, the choice
of experimental design must depend on the nature of the question and how realistic the
trade-off is that respondents are required to make.
To mirror real management problems in the health service
For some health services research questions, the consideration of multiples of attributes at
the same time is seen as an improvement over methods that consider only one dominant
outcome. The argument is that choice experiments can ask respondents to consider a wider
range of consequences than other trade off methods (Ryan 2000). For areas of health policy
that need to consider the process of care or a range of dimensions of outcome, this could be
a valuable property of CE methods. The services where CE has been applied recently have
focused on patients' preferences for aspects of care other than a single health outcome.
Examples of this were a study of miscarriage management (Ryan and Hughes 1997) and a
study on patients' preferences for out-of-hours care (Morgan, Shackley et al 2000). These
methods have also been used to investigate the importance of waiting time compared with
other aspects of care (van der Pol and Cairns 1998, Ryan, Mcintosh 2000), to explore job
satisfaction in general practice (Scott 2001, Gosden, Bowler et al 2000), and preferences for
different types of investigative procedures (Bryan et al 1998).
Studies that do not include a price or "charge" for health care have been published recently
(Ryan, Mcintosh 1998, Morgan, Shackley et al 2000, Shackley, Slack et al 2001, Longworth,
Ratcliffe et al 2001, Moayyedi, Wardman et al 2002). These studies have focused on
patients' preferences for the organisation of health care where the relative value of specific
attributes is not known and is considered to be important for management decisions, for
example the value of introducing a patient health card in primary care (Ryan et al 1998).
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Where resources are used across a range of different activities and little is known of the
relative value of these different aspects of service to users (or the general public) these
methods may be especially useful. One study used two choice experiment designs, one with
a price attribute, one without (Bryan et al 1998). The argument given was that there might
be some objection by respondents to considering a charge, and asking respondents to
consider a price for health care would makethe experiment unrealistic. When included, the
price attribute was not found to be statistically significant sLlggesting that patients did not
consider the price in their decision-making.
Choice experiments and willingness-to-pay
One of the potentially most interesting uses of CE is the possibility that monetary valuation of
the value of individual attributes might be derived from the technique (Ryan, Bate et al
2001). If one of the attributes used in the experiments is price or a charge (some notion of
financial sacrifice), then this allows willingness-ta-pay to be indirectly derived from the
marginal rate of substitution between an attribute and price. This approach has been
adopted as the preferred approach to estimating WTP values by economists working in other
public sectors, rather than to ask them to state their WTP directly (ibid.)
However, this method of estimating WTP values does not avoid other problems contingent
valuation methods in that individuals are often not accustomed to valuing outcomes or
services in terms of money and that ability to pay biases stated WTP. One study that
stratified respondents receiving treatment for infertility into income groups found that
respondents in the higher income group had a lower marginal valuation of price, reflecting
diminishing marginal utility of income (Ryan 1999).
There has been some controversy over whether differences in WTP are affected by choice
of payment vehicle. Cost-benefit theory would suggest that payment mode is a preference
and therefore should be considered if all elements of a policy are to be valued by
respondents (Boardman et al 2001). Empirical studies that have investigated the use of a
price attribute and type of cost vehicle have recently been undertaken have not been
conclusive. In an Australian study, the cost attribute was described as a Medicare levy (Jan
et al 2000). The arguments given for using this method of payment were that respondents
would have little experience for paying for hospital services. The Medicare levy attribute was
not found to be statistically significant. One of the reasons for this suggested by the authors
was that since over half the respondents were not in paid work, many would not be paying
such a levy in real life. They assumed from this that respondents might have discounted this
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attribute altogether in their choice-making. In this case, the payment vehicle may have had
an impact on whether cost was considered by individuals.
A recent systematic review of current practice reported only 55% of the studies included a
monetary attribute from which a marginal WTP could be calculated (Ryan and ~erard 2001).
Issues were raised about the appropriateness of price as a proxy for monetary valuation,
especially in a collectively funded health system (as in the UK). There appears to be a trend
away from directly applying WTP attributes in discrete choice studies, but attempts to use
other indirect monetary valuation (Jan et al 2000) have shown that respondents were not
sensitive to these values in their decision-making.
Another more recent Danish study has found disutility associated with both payment as a
concept and the extent of payment through different payment vehicles and that these
disutilities are separable. (Skoldborg and Gyrd-Hansen 2002). Respondents were more
positively inclined when presented with the concept of introducing out-of-pocket payments
than towards the notion of a tax increase. However the marginal disutility associated with a
rise in out of pocket payments was greater than that for taxes.
Another problem is that choice experiments, rather than open-ended WTP methods, may not
derive individuals' maximum willingness to pay (Le. their threshold of indifference) and may
underestimate it (Ratcliffe 2000). This problem was also found in the Danish study
(Skoldborg and Gyrd-Hansen 2002). This study found that some respondents would still
choose a particular scenario even when associated with very high costs (which was only
included for a sub-group of the respondents). It concluded that if very high estimates of value
are used, respondents will still choose these scenarios and the WTP will be estimated far
higher than if only lower estimates were used.
This evidence suggests that patients do not seem to consider the price attribute in their
choices (Bryan, Buxton et al 1998, Jan, Mooney et al 2000). Using proxies for the charge for
care, such as travel cost to individuals (Ryan, Mcintosh et al 2000) appears to have been
more successful as these costs may actually have to be borne by patients using the service
and therefore make more sense in a decision-making exercise. Similarly, the income that
GPs would be prepared to sacrifice in order to improve their working conditions (Gosden,
Bowler 2000) makes sense to respondents who face these financial decisions in the real
world.
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Willingness -to-accept attributes in choice experiments
The OPUS study referred to in the previous chapter developed an outcome measure of
social care for older people, similar to the EO-SD but measured in different domains of
quality of life··(Netten et al 2002). The study adopted a choice experiment approach to
identify weighting for particular domains of care that were important to this tarqet group. The
appropriateness of including a monetary charge as an attribute was considered in the choice
experiment in order to establish a WTP for each level and domain. The authors argued that
this would have the added benefit of showing that the weighed measures in the outcome
instrument were cardinal. They assessed the feasibility of ascertaining appropriate levels for
the monetary charge but this did not work well. Open-ended valuation in the pilot stage was
"virtually impossible and people did not like the very wide differences between levels or very
high levels of possible payments being presented' (ibid. pp29).
Another barrier cited for this method was ability to pay, as this quote demonstrates:
"The initial interview with a woman who was on a very low income made it clear that she
could not afford anything other than her current living expenses. This raised the concern
that, if asked to make choices including levels of payment at anything other than very low
levels, the money issue would dominate, so whatever option was presented, the cheaper
option would always be chosen. "(Netten et al 2002 pp30)
This is an important finding and highly relevant to the decision of whether to include a charge
in the palliative day care study. Even though this study was published after the design of the
PDC study, it reflects the same concerns about adding monetary considerations to decision-
making by people who are mostly elderly. The approach finally adopted for the OPUS study
was to use a willingness-to-accept approach to establish the financial recompense or
benefits that would make an individual indifferent between living in a more disadvantaged
situation with the financial benefits, and the more advantageous care situation.
SECTION 6. THE RELEVANCE FOR THE EVALUATION OF COMPLEX SERVICES
The choice experiment method has a number of advantages for examining the value of
complex health and social care services. Choice modelling can be used to estimate the
structure of preferences for these services, that is, what is contributing most and least to the
decision to access care. This re-directs the question away from one that is very difficult to
answer; like "is a service cost-effective overall?" towards a more answerable question that is
valuable to decision-makers.
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An analysis of the demand for complex areas of health and social care using choice
experiments may reveal the characteristics of the service that are important to patients. In a
service where external measurements of health gain may not be as important as the
subjective assessment of quality of life (welfare/utility), this approach to measuring outcomes
can be a way forward. It can therefore make progress in understanding the nature and value
of the outcomes of a multidimensional servlce in ways that are not amenable to other
economic evaluation methodologies.
The _choice experiment methodology allows the question of effectiveness to be approached
from a different perspective. Rather than measuring the impact of a service on an
individual's health as a proxy for utility, choice experiments can evaluate the services directly
by establishing how much individuals would be willing to sacrifice in order to have these
services.
But there is also another potential use of this approach that is of specific interest in the
context of POC and is probably equally as important in other complex services as well.
There is debate in the POC field about the relative importance of the various activities it
offers. CE techniques can be used to elicit patients' preferences for particular component
activities of care that are difficult to obtain by other methods. They can by-pass the objective
measurement of health status and consider individuals' preferences for particular
characteristics of a service directly. Measurement of preference for inputs or outcomes
amounts to measuring the same change in welfare. For example, the attributes of the
service (or arguments in patients' demand function for POC) may be described either as the
objective characteristic of the service (information provided, presence of a doctor) or as the
subjective perception of benefits from a specific attribute of a service (better clinical
information or less time in pain).
For PDC research, this reasoning addresses a fundamental problem: that objective
measurement of outcome may not be the appropriate way to judge the value of the service
to society. If, using choice experiment methods, the value (or lack of value) of POC services
can be established, then this will be a useful contribution to knowledge and decision-making.
If the choice experiment included a monetary valuation of PDC as an attribute, the results
could be used in a cost-benefit analysis of POC.
Adopting a choice experiment to palliative day care
The pilot study for the North Thames study indicated that patients are willing and able to
make choices about the service that contribute to their welfare (Douglas et al 2000). POC
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patients were encouraged to make choices about the kind of care they accessed and had a
range of activities and therapies offered to them. Second, staff involved in that study
reported that patients demanded particular services (such as hairdressing) and that they
might be willing to pay for them if they were not provided free of charge. Third, although the
majority of patients were over 65 years and had advanced illness, they did n9t suffer from
cognitive impairment as this is often one of the criteria for access to POCoConsequently the
study showed that such patients were usually very willing and able to answer questions
directly and are used to being aSk.edtheir opinions.
Since POC is not easy to describe in a straightforward way, there is little clarity about what
the attributes are from a patients' perspective. This means there are problems with
translating POC into specific attributes of the service. Some of the characteristics such as
''friendly social environmenf' are, in reality, a bundle of different attributes, and can mean
different things to different people. Furthermore, finding out that patients want a ''friendly
social environmenf' does not translate into policy advice that is straightforward or easy to
action. Providers need information that is specific so that the important attributes of the
service that can be defined (and purchased) by them. This means that the focus of the study
becomes provider driven rather than user driven. There is a danger, then, that the value that
patients derive from attending POC may not equate with service provision type
characteristics and may include other factors. Attributes such as "staff attitude",
''friendliness'', "and environmenf' may have more importance than any of the characteristics
presented in the choice experiment. This could be seen as a limitation of this approach and
is raised again later in the thesis.
Incorporating a price or charge as an attribute
Earlier in this chapter, the arguments for and against a willingness-to-pay approach were set
out. The.problems were that the valuation may be influenced by respondents' ability to pay;
they may not be able to express their preference in monetary terms; there may be political
dissent from service providers and the public in valuing health services in this way and the
approach may not derive maximum willingness to pay (Le. the point of indifference in a
trade-off) if the price attribute is set to levels that do not reach this maximum.. The
willingness-to-accept approach adopted by the OPUS study would have to ask respondents
to consider financial recompense for worse quality of life before death.
In the context of POC, all these problems were thought to be important, so much so that it
was felt that the inclusion of a price attribute in the first study of its kind in POC could be so
controversial as to potentially jeopardise the whole project. poe centres do not charge for
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use of their services (except a nominal fee for lunch in some centres). Many of the services
(general and specialist) are provided by volunteers. All but a very few of the people who
attend these centres are not in paid work and are predominantly elderly (Higginson et al
2000, Goodwin et al 2002). The concern was that, in this setting, the inclusion of a charge
for attending POC could provoke so much protest by providers of care to the extent that they
would not support the study, especially if it was seen as a way of setting charges for POC
"by the back door". This could be seen to be against the ethos of the service.
second, although no data had been systematically collected on patients' income in the
previous studies, it might be the case (as in the OPUS study) that the consideration of a
charge for POC would be dominant in many patients' consideration of their choice, and that
data on their value of other aspects of the service would not be obtained. The decision taken
was that a price attribute would not be included in choice experiment since there was a
danger that the experiment could fail overall. Given the difficulty that had been experienced
in previous studies in obtaining any evidence of the value (or lack of value) of POC, the aim
was to obtain some data on the relative value to patients of specific aspects of POC rather
than risk obtaining none at all.
SECTION 7. AIM OF THE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH - HIERARCHY OF OBJECTIVES
Since it had not been investigated empirically, it was decided to test the hypothesis that EO-
50 was not sufficiently sensitive to detect any changes in health status between patients
who attended POC over a three-month period compared with patients who did not attend.
The EO-50 instrument is a relatively easy questionnaire to administer to patients, with only
five items and a visual analogue scale, so it was not thought to represent a considerable
burden to respondents. However, the long-term goal of the research was to be able to
compare POC with other services for patients in a palliative phase of illness (home care,
social care, primary care, and inpatient care) and to establish the marginal costs and
benefits of the service. However in order to reach this goal, or to make progress towards it,
other stages of research needed to be undertaken.
Choice experiments offer the opportunity to investigate the (putatively) important constituent
parts of POC and to quantify the relative importance of them to individuals' utility or overall
welfare. This seemed to be a sensible approach to evaluate an intervention that aims to
meet a range of needs. The application of this method in a POC population had not been
tried out before. In light of this, and in the context where no other method had shown any
useful quantifiable benefits of POC, it was appropriate to design an experiment that had the
highest chance of producing useful data and minimise the risks of obtaining no data at all.
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A hierarchy of objectives for the evaluation was drawn up. The first was to establish whether
a stated preference method could be used in the context of POC. It was not clear
beforehand that it would be possible to use this technique with POC patients. Therefore, it
was necessary to demonstrate that the techniques could arrive at some relative measure of
value for attributes of poe, and to address the ethical and practical problems of undertaking
research on frail and elderly people who use POC services.
Second, the attributes had to be chosen that would be useful to policy-makers. This meant
identifying aspects of palliative care where there was little evidence of value and that were
not the same in all centres. From this, we could establish what seemed to be more valuable
to users and whether particular characteristics of the respondents or the service had an
impact on their valuation of specific attributes of POC. For a service that is not uniform and
where the provision of care changes relatively rapidly, this could be an appropriate way of
assessing the most preferred package of services (or for individuals with particular
characteristics). The findings would be of value to providers where this information has not
been obtained through other methods of evaluation.
Only if the first two objectives could be met would it be useful to consider whether a
monetary valuation of POC attributes could be derived using this method. The focus of the
empirical work was on the first stage and second stage of investigation. The question of
whether it would be possible to reach the third stage in this study and quantify the value of
POC attributes in monetary terms was considered and rejected at this stage as it was
thought to be not feasible to identify an appropriate measure of sacrifice for this group of
patients in this context. This decision will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter and
in the conclusion. The fourth wider objective was to consider whether the empirical analysis
would provide any insights for the economic evaluation methods of health and social care
interventions with similar characteristics (multidimensionality, and complexity of outcomes).
The choice experiment study was therefore designed to measure the strength of preference
for different attributes of PDC as a measure of relative rather than absolute benefit of POC.
This approach measures the marginal value of each attributes relative to all other attributes.
This is still based on the theoretical underpinnings of CSA (Mishan 1988; Mcintosh et al.
1999) but is one step removed from valuing all attributes with reference to the 'measuring
rod of money'. It is a step along this path that has not been undertaken before in attempting
to quantify the value of POC services.
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SUMMARY
This chapter has reviewed the health gain and preference-based approaches to economic
evaluation, with a particular focus on the EQ-50 method of measurement and on choice
experiments. These methods were discussed in depth and some of the possible
methodological problems identified. The main problem with the EQ-50 instrument is that it
may not be sensitive enough to capture small but subjectively important changes in health
status. In the context of palliative care, the value of time at the end of life may be
qualitatively different from the value of time earlier on in life, which argues against health
gain being measured in additively separable and equal units of outcome.
The choice experiment approach has also been considered as a method of assessing the
relative value of particular dimensions of care. In the context of multidimensional services
this is a promising approach since the focus on the strength of preference for particular
aspects of care rather than on overall quality of life that is hard to capture using simpler
measurement instruments. Stated preference choice experiment methods can adhere more
closely to the theoretical underpinnings of CSA (welfare economics) than health-related
quality of life assessment.
Choice experiments are considered to be worth investigating in complex services as they
have other properties (such as simplicity of the task, and data collection at one time point
only) that are important for collecting data from groups that may be frail, confused or whose
health is deteriorating. The next chapter outlines the research methods adopted in the
empirical investigation of these issues presented later in the thesis.
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Chapter 5
Methods of empirical research into palliative day care
Introduction
This chapter describes the methods of the economic evaluation of palliative day care in a
comparative study undertaken in Chichester and the south of England. It describes the two
components of the economic evaluation that form the empirical research presented in this
thesis. This follow-on study was different from the first North Thames Palliative Day Care
study in a number of dimensions that will be described here.
The North Thames palliative day care study had included a detailed cost study to compare
the range of inputs (day care and other health and special care services) and cost of care
between patients who attended and those who did not. The same methodology was adopted
for the Chichester study.
The two distinct parts of the methods of empirical investigation are described separately, as
they were in the previous chapter. These two stages of research were undertaken
consecutively and the same patients did not participate in both stages of data collection. As
in the previous chapter, the choice experiment methods are described in more detail since
these are less well known and, at the time of planning the study, there were differences in
the reporting of methods of choice experiments in the health economics literature. The
section on choice experiments refers to the literature that was published before and during
the period of planning the study design, and discusses the ways in which this study follows
or diverges from the methods used in other health economic studies.
Background to the Chichester study
This study of palliative day care (referred to from here on as the Chichester Study) differed
from the previous North Thames Palliative Day Care Study in that the quality of life data was
gathered from a prospective before-and-after study of one palliative day centre in the south
of England where palliative day care provision did not previously exist. An opportunity arose
to recruit patients before a new palliative day care centre was built (attached to an inpatient
unit) and then recruit a palliative day care group after the centre opened. A third group was
also recruited at the same time to assess any changes in local provision of service (such as
home care nursing services) between the 'before' and 'after' PDC groups.
154
Chapter 5
This study evaluated the impact of a new POC service in a locality where one had not
existed before. This was a more robust study design than the North Thames study that had
recruited patients who attended five POC centres and the comparison group was patients
who did not wish to attend POC in the same localities. This approach was more open to
problems of sample bias than the before-and-after study as reported in the literature review
in chapter 3.
A preference-based health-related quality of life instrument was added to the set of disease-
speclflc quality of life questionnaires that had been used in the North Thames study. The
choice of questionnaire was determined from a review of existing outcome instruments
designed for economic evaluation which concluded that
"the EQ-5D and HUI [Health Utility Index] are currently the best preference-based health
status measures and should be considered for inclusion in al/ trials intended to be used in
economic evaluation. II (Brazier and Oeverill 1999, pp 4)
The HUI family of health status measures has been described as incorporating ''within the
skin" definitions of health status, which is a person's capacity rather than actual experience
of living in a health state (Furlong, Feeny et al 2001). EO-50 incorporates the consequences
of ill-health (ability to undertake usual activities, social functioning). For this reason, it was
considered that the EO-50 might be the more appropriate measure in principle the context of
palliative day care.
The health-related quality of life questionnaires were also included in the Chichester study to
assess whether the more robust study design would be able to detect differences in outcome
using these outcome instruments. This was undertaken in the Chichester POC centre only.
The choice modelling came after the quality of life study. It did not focus on one POC centre
only. Patients from four POC centres were recruited as not enough patients were attending
the Chichester POC centre to gather sufficient data. This also meant that the study could
investigate whether patients at different models of service had different preferences for
models of day care (Le. whether provision determines preference) and to do this, patients
were recruited from centres offering different ranges of services.
As the Chichester study was a collaborative project, it is necessary to set out the specific
contribution of the author of the thesis (HRO) to the empirical research. The design of the
cost study and the collection of all the cost data were undertaken by HRO. The published
version of the EO-50 questionnaire was used and the structure and design of the
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questionnaire was not changed from the published version. The choice experiment was
conceived and designed by HRD with additional statistical advice from a colleague in the
Health Services Research Unit, LSHTM.
Section 1. Overview of the Chichester study
Methods
A prospective before-and-after study was undertaken to compare the costs and outcomes of
three groups of patients and their carers. The before group was comprised of all patients
rece!ving a palliative care service (inpatient care or specialist home care) before the day
centre opened. They were receiving usual palliative care services (in-patient, out-patient and
home care) and would be suitable for day care, as decided in weekly hospice team
meetings. These patients lived at home and were selected as having specific needs for
psychological, social, nursing or physical care, or support for their carer that could be
provided in a day care setting, although one did not yet exist. The day care group consisted
of all new referrals to palliative day care once the service commenced. The comparison
group was defined as those patients who did not receive day care when it opened, either
because they were not referred or did not wish to receive it, but they continued to receive
usual palliative care services.
Setting
Chichester, West Sussex is a district within the South East Region. The district has a
resident population of 759,000 of whom 156,000 (20.1 %) are over 65 years of age. The
hospice has 15 inpatient beds, plus a home care service caring for patients and their families
in the community. Around four hundred patients were admitted to the hospice each year, and
in addition there were 550 doctor visits and approximately 4,000 home care nurse visits to
patients in their own home per year, during the study period. Half of the referrals were from
hospital doctors and half from general practitioners.
The day care servlcel intervention
During 1999, the hospice had been planning the development of a purpose built day centre.
This opened in February 2000, for one day per week, taking approximately 10 patients. This
expanded to three days per week, taking 12-15 patients each day from home care and the
hospice in-patient unit. The service included social activities, plus nursing & medical care,
physiotherapy, occupational therapy and volunteer support. Patients usually attended one
day per week, although some who needed more intensive support attended two or three
times per week.
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Data collection
Data were collected using trained interviewers. Interviews were undertaken at baseline
which was either entry to POC or for the before group at the point they agreed to take part in
the study; at 6-8 weeks, and at 12-15 weeks. The interviewed took place in the patients'
homes, by arrangement. At each interview, the EO-50 questionnaire was administered. Two
other disease- specific quality of life instruments were also used. The previous multicentre
study informed the choice of outcome measures that were selected to evaluate palliative day
care. The Palliative care Outcome Scale (Higginson and Hearn 2000) was used to allow
comparisons with the previous study. However, the McGill Quality of Life Questionnaire
(Cohen et al 1997) was not used in this study since it was longer (16 items versus 10 in
POS), there was more missing data and some patients found the items distressing (Goodwin
et al 2002b). Therefore a measure was selected that reflected the existential objective of day
care, engendering hope. The Herth Hope Index (Herth 2001) was piloted for the first time in
palliative day care in this study. The results of these palliative care quality of life measures
are not reported here since they were analysed by others and did not form part of the
economic evaluation.
Sample size
The sample size for the study was based on 5% level of significance (two-tailed t-test). A
sample size of 40 in both intervention and before or comparison groups would give a power
of over 85% for the disease-specific measures. The power needed to detect difference in
EQ-50 scores was not considered. The power calculation for economic analyses has been
shown to be different from that of clinical studies since the associated variance and
covariance is not usually the same when costs and effectiveness are synthesised in cost-
effectiveness ratios (Briggs et al 2002). This was a limitation of the study design (as
discussed further on in chapter 7).
To ensure a chance of significant findings in the clinical effectiveness study the aim was to
recruit 70 in each of the three groups - 210 patients in total. However, considering the
number of new referrals to day care (approximately 5-10 per month) it was not possible to
recruit 70 patients to the day care group. The sample size was recalculated at 170 patients.
Eligibility criteria
All patients were asked to be in the study except those in the following group: patients too ill
to be interviewed (decision to be made by the clinical team), with confusion/ dementia; with
behavioural problems which would exclude the patient from day care; those currently out of
the area (e.g. staying with relatives elsewhere; those reluctant to have further contact with
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the hospice; those under eighteen years of age; patients without malignant disease or other
form of chronic life threatening illness.
SECTION 2. Methods of estimating resource use and costs
Analysis of costs of care between the three palliative care groups (palliative day care group,
'before' group, 'contemporary comparison group') was undertaken to compare the overall
level of costs over the period of recruitment to the study, whether they changed over time
within groups, and whether there were significant differences between groups in mean and
standard deviation of costs.
Data was gathered on the full range of services used by the patient and family using a
resource use interview and additional data on use of hospice care extracted from clinical
records. From this information the total volume of cost generating events was calculated.
Data on inpatient and outpatient services, residential care,. use of primary and social care,
services to support families, were collected. Using a vector of unit costs estimated in the
North Thames study (for PDC and for hospice care, see below) and from published data for
all other health and social care services (Netten et al 2002), the total cost of care during four
weeks prior to interview was calculated for each patient. This allowed comparison of costs
over time in each of these resources use "windows" for each arms of the trial, before day
care, the palliative day care group, and the contemporary comparison group.
Prior to the North Thames study, there had been no detailed analysis of the resources
dedicated to PDC and costs. A 'bottom-up and top-down' method of costing was employed
in order to consider the range and volume of resources used in the centres, rather than rely
solely on financial data. Detailed cost data were collected from all five centres. in the North
Thames study and the same unit costs, uplifted to 2002 prices were used for the follow-on
Chichester study.
A second level of analysis was undertaken to assess whether particular patterns of resource
use were responsible for differences in costs between groups. Two individual health care
resources were assessed: inpatient use was analysed as a separate cost item (as it is
expensive and therefore an important cost driver for patients who use palliative care
services). Also, the use of GP services was analysed to assess whether palliative day care
acted as a substitute for patients' access to GP services. It was hypothesised that patients
who use palliative day care services might use less GP services if they were receiving
specialist support and symptom review at the palliative day care unit.
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SECTION 3. ASSESSMENT OF OUTCOME USING THE EQ-5D INSTRUMENT IN THE
CHICHESTER STUDY
The properties of the EO-50 instrument described in the previous chapter suggest that it
might not be sensitive enough (with only 5 domains and three levels for each domain) to
identify some of the aspects of quality of life that are important in palliative day care, such as
engendering hope, 'existential' health, and rehabilitation. As there has been no empirical
study undertaken in this health care setting to explore these issues, the EO-50 instrument
was adopted for the Chichester study.
The aim of the study was to establish whether there was any difference in quality of life
between patients who attended the POC centre in Chichester compared to historical
controls, recruited in the months before the centre opened. The null hypothesis was that EO-
50 would not detect significant differences in quality of life.
Analysis plan for the EQ-5D data
The first stage was to report the numbers of respondents who reported no problems, some
problems, or extreme problems in each health domain. This was set alongside the same
scores for the population of the UK to show how these palliative day care patients differed
from this profile of scores.
The quality of life weights were calculated for all palliative care groups at each stage of
interview. These overall scores were derived from the scores on individual domains. Values
for the 243 possible health states defined by the EuroOoL classification have been
calculated using a regression model developed by the EO-50 group (Kind et al 1998). The
result of this arithmetic model is that it allows the scores for the five domains to be translated
into a composite number, as described in chapter 3.
The composite quality of life scores (EO-50 score) derived from this arithmetic model were
examined to assess whether any significant change in score over time could be detected.
The median, quartiles, confidence intervals and extreme values are reported in box plots that
show the different patterns of data in each palliative care group at each time point. Within
each group, respondents who had data for interviews one, two and three were examined
separately from patients who only had data for interviews one or interviews one and two
only. It was hypothesised that these groups represented patients at different stages of
disease (as defined as time from death or acute decline. Changes over time were compared
between interview one and two; and between two and three.
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Paired t-tests are reported for each of the palliative care groups. The Hest examines the
differences in mean values of health status for each respondent at each interview and test
whether the average scores is different from zero.
The visual analogue scale (VAS) scores are reported for completeness but these are not
included in the derivation of the QALY weightings. This measure is often omitted from clinical
trials as it does not contribute to the overall outcome score. However, it represents a
descriptive snapshot of time for patients in the palliative phase of illness that has not been
reported in this way before for palliative day care, so it has been included in the results. It
may also help to interpret and contextualise the overall quality of life score if they do not
show a clearly interpretable pattern. As reported in chapter 4, VAS scores have been
interpreted as representing the 'morale' of respondents at a moment in time, that is, how
they are feeling overall about their quality of life, not specifically related to their health, but in
the wider context of their lives (Williams 2000). This may, hypothetically, be more closely
related to the objectives of PDC than the five domains of health-related quality of life that
contribute to the overall score.
The main comparison in this study is between the palliative day care group and the group of
patients who were recruited before the palliative day care centre was opened (the "before"
group). If there is a significant difference detected between palliative care groups, it could be
argued that this is related to the different times in which patients are recruited to the study.
The overall health economy may have altered (for example changes in community or
primary care services) resulting in type one error in the analysis (false positive associations
between intervention and outcome). To address this, the following analysis plan was
adopted: if a difference in EQ-5D scores were to be detected, then a second level of analysis
would be undertaken with the contemporary comparison group (patients recruited at the
same time as the day care group but not attending day care). This comparison would only be
undertaken if a difference between the before and after group were detected.
Validation of the EQ-50 scores against data disease-specific health-related quality of
life instruments
At the same time as collecting data for the EQ-5D instrument, respondents were asked to
complete questionnaires relating specifically to palliative care (the Palliative Care Outcome
Scale and the Herth Hope Index). The Herth Hope instrument provides statements to which
respondents must strongly agree/agree or strongly disagree/ disagree (four options). These
statements describe feelings about the world around, and attitudes to life and to the future.
None of the domains coincided with the domains in EQ-5D. On the other hand, the POS
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instrument has been designed as a clinical tool. It includes questions on physical symptoms,
psychological symptoms, spiritual considerations, practical concerns, emotional concerns
and psychosocial needs. Two questions in POS relate closely to questions in the EO-50
instrument. The anxiety/depression statement in EO-50 ('I am not/moderately/extremely
anxious or depressed') is close to a POS question ('over the past 3 days have you been
feeling anxious or worried about your illness or treatment?' - response choice: not at all,
slightly, moderately, severely, and overwhelmingly). Similarly, the EO-50 pain question ('I
have no/moderate/extreme pain or discomfort') is similar to a POS question (,Over the past
three days have you been affected by pain?' - same response choices as before).
The data on the responses to these questions answered by the same group of respondents
at the same interview were compared in SPSS (version 10) using the Pearson correlation
coefficient. This expresses the degree of linear relationship between two variables measured
from the same individual. Values can range between -1.00 to +1.00. A correlation coefficient
of +1.00 signifies a perfect positive relationship, while -1.00 shows a perfect negative
relationship. The smallest correlation is zero. Significance at the 1% and 5% levels were
explored.
Qualitative data
In-depth qualitative interviews were not conducted for this study, but patients were asked
three questions at the end of the interviews: what is day care like, what is the most important
thing about day care, and whether they felt they had changed since attending day care. The
responses were analysed by another researcher on the study team. The responses to the
question 'have you changed as a result of attending palliative day care?' are included in the
results section as they provide some insights into patients expressed preferences. The
contrast between this approach and the constrained choice approach of choice experiments
will be discussed in the final chapters.
Informed consent and ethics
Local ethics committee approval was obtained before data collection began. The application
for consent was undertaken by Professor Irene Higginson, principal investigator for the
project at Guy's Kings and St Thomas' Medical School. One of the particular ethical issues
was the need to consider the inclusion of all patients who might attend a palliative day care
centre. These include patients with motor neurone disease who were not able to provide
written consent. In these cases, written consent was given formally by a carer and signed
witnessed by a third party (see Appendix B for copies of the consent form). No patients
were excluded from the study on the basis of their disability. The informed consent letters
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were held in the Department of Palliative Care at Guy's Kings and St Thomas' Medical
School.
The aims and objectives of the study were discussed with patients and an information sheet
about the study was left with them so they could consider whether they wanted to take part.
The interviewers were nurses who worked part-time in the hospice. Since none of the
questions related directly to care outside PDC and since none of the nurses worked in the
PDC unit, there were perceived to be no potential conflicts of interest between patients'
quality of care and taking part in the study. On the contrary, the fact that the patients knew
that the interviewers worked for the hospice (although they did not care for them directly)
was thought to have contributed positively to patients' decisions to take part in the study.
The recruitment rate was higher than that achieved in the multicentre study.
SECTION 3. THE CHOICE EXPERIMENT
This section describes the methods and practical considerations associated with undertaking
the choice experiment in PDC. For each stage in study design, the method adopted in the
PDC study is presented, alongside evidence from other choice experiment studies in the
health economics literature to demonstrate that the methods are following an established
methodology for choice experiments, where this exists. In some areas (such as establishing
design balance), the PDC study took a different approach from other studies and this is
explained and justified.
Aims and hypotheses to be tested in the POC choice experiment
The aims of the study were to establish that a choice experiment study could be carried out
in a PDC setting, to estimate the relative importance of attributes (services and structure of
care) of PDC, and to evaluate whether demand for particular attributes of the service is
influenced by patient characteristics or particular models of care. This was evaluated using
specific hypotheses developed from previous research evidence.
Feasibility of a choice experiment
The feasibility of the choice experiment approach was assessed by establishing how many
patients who were able to take part were willing to do so, whether they said they understood
the instructions given and made a choice between scenarios presented to them, and
whether they completed the task. A further measure of feasibility was to establish whether
respondents traded between attributes and whether the model produced coefficients for the
attributes that were significant at the 10% level, and to estimate marginal rates of
substitution. It was also important to establish whether the study design with less than 100
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participants per sub-group would produce results that would be interpretable and useful for
decision-makers, since the previous poe study had shown that it was hard to recruit more
respondents in a reasonable length of time.
Hypotheses to be tested in choice experiment
The hypotheses were that specific attributes. would be more important to respondents than
others and that particular pre-defined groups of patients would have stronger preferences for
particular attributes of the service. The justification for these putative associations comes
from. previous descriptive research in POC (e.g. Faulkner et al. 1993, Douglas et al. 2000).
Specifically the hypotheses tested in the data were the following:
1. Open access (unstructured day, no appointments), staying all day and therapeutic
interventions is positively and significantly related to choice of scenario.
2. Access to a doctor will not be dominant over all other attributes of POC.
In the sub-group analysis:
3. Patients living alone will have stronger preference for staying all day as they are
more likely to suffer from acute social isolation
4. Elderly patients (over 75 years) will have stronger preferences than others do for
10am to 3pm and for staying all day rather than having an appointment.
5. Younger patients (under 65 years) will have stronger preferences for therapeutic
interventions (a more active form of intervention).
6. Preferences for different attributes of POC will depend on the type of centre the
respondent attends and the services that are available. (Respondents will value
attributes they have not experienced lower than those they have experienced).
Design of the palliative day care choice experiment
A comprehensive checklist for designing and undertaking choice experiments in health
economic evaluation had not been published at the time of designing the POC experiment.
This section presents the methods adopted in the POC choice experiment and discusses the
reasons behind the decisions to follow the example of other studies, or to take a different
approach. Since the methods have evolved rapidly over the last 10 years, there is some
heterogeneity of study design in the literature and judgement needs to be taken on the most
appropriate approach within the context of each health care setting. Where an approach has
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been used that is different from the usual (as set out in Ryan 2001 b), justification of this
decision is presented, along with discussion of the possible consequences of this approach
for interpreting the findings of the study.
Identifying the attributes and number of attribute levels
Attributes for the PDe study were selected on the evidence of in-depth observations and
interviews undertaken by HRD of palliative day care as described in chapter 3 (Douglas et al
2000). The preparation for the North Thames study had involved HRD visiting all five of the
PDe centres who took part in the study for a period of one week consecutively. Following on
from this experience, further interviews were held with key members of staff involved in
delivering and managing the service, as well· as informal discussions with patients while they
attended the day centre (HRD worked as a volunteer in each centre and talked to patients
during the course of this work). This observational and interview data provided the first idea
that a choice experiment might be an innovative approach to exploring the value of specific
aspects of the service.
The starting point for defining the attributes for the study was the differences in how palliative
day care centres were organised and the emphasis on contrasting aspects of care and what
was believed to be the important aspects of palliative day care. Attributes representing more
social, open access configuration of services were contrasted with attributes that defined
themselves as therapy-based services structured around appointments. Also included were
characteristics representing "personal care," such as hairdressing and bathing. This is
because there was no common agreement about whether these should be included in the
"package" of services and there were strong views amongst providers about whether these
forms of care were appropriate in specialist palliative day care settings. In the North Thames
study, some centres offered these services to all patients, while others did not offer them at
all. Table 5.1 shows the range of different services offered in the four centres that
participated in the choice experiment study.
None of the centres were exactly the same and all provided different activities, depending on
the philosophy of care that determined which aspects of care should be emphasised (table
5.1). Furthermore, the comments by the patients who gave their views indicated that patients
might have different views from the health care professionals as to what was important about
PDe. It was decided that, from a policy-makers' point of view, the focus should be on the
value ofthose services that were different between centres, such as the timing of and mode
of access to care, and particular activities emphasised in some centres and not others (such
as access to medical support).
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Some of the attributes defined in this early phase of the study were the opportunity to meet
other patients and socialise with others facing similar problems, to have a safe place to talk
about living with illness, to learn a new skill and try out creative activities, to go on trips
outside the centre and be active, and to provide a break for home carers. However these
particular attributes were seen as either too ill-defined, or meaning different things to
different people. This method of defining the attributes in a way that is relevant to both users
of the service and to the decision-makers is common in designing health economic discrete
choices (Ryan, Bate et al 2001b).
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!Social activities • • • •
Doctor appointments • •
Nurse-led clinic •
IArts activities • • • •
Music Therapy
Physiotherapy • • • •
Hairdressing •
K::ounselling! II • • •
Psychotherapy
Massage • • • •
Bath •
Hydrotherapy •
Reflexology • • • •
Yo patients who 100% 93% 93% 33%
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It was decided to concentrate on service attributes rather than these less well-defined
characteristics of palliative day care. This has meant that the study has focussed on service
provision rather. than the utility that patients may derive from aspects of the service. This
means that the study may not have captured important attributes in individuals' utility
function. This may be a limitation of the study and is discussed further in the final chapter.
Furthermore, the choice experiment reduced the attributes down to six specific
characteristics. This was a limited range of attributes that could describe PDe (which is
usually described as more than the sum of its discrete parts) and this is also a limitation of
the study. It may not reflect the aspects of the service that patients themselves have
described as being the most important aspect of day care, for example getting out and
meeting others in similar circumstances (Goodwin et al 2002b). Even if the most important
aspect of PDe is that it provides a safe environment to meet others, this does not provide
insights into the value of specific services. Also, all centres aim to provide care in an
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environment that promotes sociability, and is comfortable and relaxed. If this attribute were
included and a scenario was presented that deliberately left out ''friendly social atmosphere,"
this might reduce the believability, and hence the validity of the experiment. Further, there
would be a strong chance that respondents would express dominant preferences for this
attribute and no useful data would be collected on the value of other aspects of care.
The attributes are characteristics of the different approaches to palliative day care rather
than representing the complete picture of the service. Aspects of care such as "existential
health" or spiritual well being have not been addressed in this study. It was felt that the
complexity of trying to describe in simple terms a highly complex domain of quality of life was
beyond the limitations of this study. Efforts have been underway to explore aspects of
existential health in the quality of life literature but this is still embryonic and has been
developed for specific contexts that may not be appropriate for palliative day care settings.
This issue is explored further in chapter 7.
Social care is represented by hairdressing, and personal care is represented by bathing to
explore whether PDC attenders value social and personal care as much as the specialist
services that are offered. Centres with a more medical philosophy are represented by
routine access to a doctor and centres that only offer specific appointments.
Although the PDC experiment did not include a price or charge to patients as an attribute,
other variables that could act as proxies for a monetary valuation were considered. Travel
time was not an important consideration for PDC attenders since volunteers (or taxi
services) are employed to bring them to and from the centre. Furthermore, it was assumed
that for individuals who had almost no other health and social care input and do not
participate in other outside activities (as the findings of the North Thames study showed), the
opportunity cost of time could be relatively low. This is paradoxical since this group of
patients may have only months or weeks to live. But on a day-ta-day basis, time is in relative
abundance. Therefore a longer journey to a PDC centre could not be assumed to be a proxy
for monetary sacrifice and it might even be something that people might look forward to.
Waiting time for a place at a PDC centre was not a useful proxy for monetary sacrifice as
none of the centres had a waiting list. Quality of life variables were too complex to consider
in this study design. Descriptions would be open to difference of interpretation by
respondents and potentially represent different qualitative characteristics of care to
individuals. Also; some of the descriptive variables were thought to be too specific. For
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example, the utility (or disutility) of a POC centre that opened for an hour longer or shorter
might not be very relevant to their decision to attend.
Therefore attributes that were chosen were fairly simple and clearly demarcated. The
identification of more complex attributes that reflect patients' preferences and mirror their
decision-making presented in ways that make sense to them is an area of research that
needs be explored further, and this is considered in the discussion.
Number of attributes
.
Six attributes were finally selected in the POC study (table 5.2). This was a balance between
the range of attributes that could have been used in the study and the need to avoid
information overload. Each attribute represents a domain or dimension of palliative day care
that is 'discrete' (is not related to the presence of any other attribute), is recognisable to most
patients who attend day care, and is a variation of day care. This means there are also
attributes where there is no agreement (or evidence) on effectiveness or strength of patients'
preferences.
To continue to keep the number of scenarios in the choice experiment manageable, it was
decided to define the attributes in only two categories rather than a higher number of
variations (levels). For the activities (bathing, hairdressing, specialist therapies, and medical
support) the attribute was either 'present' or 'absent'. For the attributes that defined the way
that the centre worked (opening hours, and structure of the day) these were harder to
determine as attribute levels. In-depth discussions with providers of POC revealed that the
usual 10am to 3pm opening hours (for all centres) had been identified as the most
convenient for staff (allowing for ward rounds before and after opening hours) but that this
might not be the best for the patients or their carers. Originally, three opening times were
specified: 10am to 3pm, 1pm-6pm and 3pm to 8pm. Pilot questionnaires tried out on POC
patients showed that the 3pm to 8pm timing was not favoured by any patients and was
consequently dropped from the final design.
For six attributes, each with two categories, a full factorial approach would have given 26
combinations, a possible 62 scenarios to put into choice sets. This is still too many to
present to respondents in a questionnaire, despite the simplification of the levels. Three
studies have been published in the health economics literatures that have undertaken a full
factorial design (Ryan and Farrar 1994, van der Pol and Cairns 1998). Many studies adopted
the fractional factorial design. A fractional factorial design was therefore adopted. No
interactions between attributes were assumed in the first instance. It would be preferable to
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include interactive effects although the sample size would increase substantially to do so.
The assumption of no interaction effects is a strong assumption that was explored by adding
interaction terms (discussed further on).
Number of choice sets and the balance of the study
Eight pairwise choice sets were specified for this study design. Since six attributes were
used to estimate the model, this allowed for sufficient error degrees of freedom (as specified
in chapter 4). The minimum number of choice sets was determined using SPSS software
version 10, using the program Orthoplan.
One of the determinants of the number of pairwise choices is the decision of how to pair up
the scenarios. This study lies at the low end of the range of 8-18 choice sets that has been
adopted by other choice modelling studies in the review (Ryan and Gerard 2001). A non-
choice ('choose neither) option was not included in this study as the purpose of the
experiment was to determine the relative importance of each attribute, and not primarily to
consider whether the overall package of care offered in each scenario would be chosen in a
real life context. By not including a non-choice option, respondents were 'forced' to make
difficult choices between bundles of attributes that they may not have chosen in real life.
Since the number of pairwise choices was restricted, it was felt that to offer a non-choice
option would further dilute the amount of data collected in the experiment. The result of this
is a regression model that has reduced external validity (to reflect actual choices of poe
centre in real life), but increased in internal validity (measuring what it sets out to measure in
terms of the relative value of the individual attributes).
The issue of design balance and orthognality was addressed by adhering to
recommendations that choice experiment designs use a common ratio for the number of
levels of attributes (Ryan, Bate et al 2001). As there is no status quo in palliative day care in
the real world it was felt a design with a status quo scenario to compare all others was
conceptually flawed. When all scenarios are compared to one constant only, no empirical
data can be collected on the comparison of relative preferences between all other scenarios
that are not the constant. The results are dependent on and limited by the choice of
constant. This could be a limiting aspect of this type of study design.
What happens to the statistical properties and balance of the design when the scenarios are
put into pairs either randomly or against one status quo scenario has not been explicitly
described in previous studies. Without a recipe to follow (and not wanting to follow one
blindly), this study took a slightly different approach. Assessing the problem from first
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principles, it has been established that that choice experiments models the difference
between the attributes in each pair, that is, the change in welfare or utility of moving from a
scenario where an attribute changes by one level. Consequently, it might make sense to
consider the orthognality of the design related to the difference in levels of attributes
between pairs. In other words, the difference between the levels of two attributes should be
computed in the orthognal design, not the levels themselves. This design principle of
modelling the difference between attributes was also adopted by Ryan and colleagues in a
recent study (Ryan et al 2000). In this study, it was decided that the pairs of choices should
be orthognal rather than the scenarios themselves since creating an orthognal design and
then'dividing these scenarios into choice sets would potentially compromise their orthognal
property. Without any clear reasoning from first principles as to why we should not take this
approach we set about designing the orthognal array of pairs of scenarios as follows.
In a design where only two levels of an attribute exist, four possible combinations of pairs of
attributes are possible. For example, the combinations for the attribute "specialist therapies"
could be:
w) Specialist therapies are available in centre A but not in centre 8
x) Specialist therapies are available in centre 8 but not in centre A
y) Specialist therapies are available in both centres
z) Specialist therapies are available in neither centre
Each of these combinations were coded W, X, V, Z. It was necessary to trade-off the
maximum number of questions that could be presented to each individual while still
gathering enough data to run the analysis. Therefore it was proposed that only pairs Wand
X, which presented differences in attributes between scenarios, should be included in the
final experiment. The reason for this was that including pairs V and Z in the orthognal array
would substantially increase the numbers of possible combinations that could be generated.
It is argued that if the level of an attribute is the same in both scenarios in a pairwise choice
(both offer specialist therapies), then this attribute would not contribute to the choice
between them.
Six attributes with two combinations (present in centre A or present in 8) would generate 64
possible scenarios. Adding two more combinations to the choice (an attribute level present in
both, or present in neither) would generate 256 scenarios. For a fractional factorial design
with only eight pairwise choices per respondent, the restricted design without any attributes
the same in scenario A and 8 covers a higher proportion of all the possible combinations of
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pairs of scenarios. Therefore only the codes Wand X (where the level of attribute was
different between scenarios) were entered into the orthognal design. The consequence of
this is reviewed in the discussion of the findings.
A discrete choice model was generated using codes W, X with eight pairs of scenarios
(SPSS 10.0, Orthoplan) providing information on which attribute should appear in which
scenario. These pairs of scenarios were balanced and orthognal, that is, each pair of
scenarios was not correlated with any other pair.
Table 5 2 Final attributes of PDC included In the discrete choice model.
PDC Description of the attribute and the Choice set
Attribute model measures
Access Centres that encourage people to stay all day Appointment- Stay all day
versus centres where patients attend for an based
appointment (1-2 hours) and then go home.
Timing Centres open at different times of the day 10am-3pm 1pm-6pm
current)
Massage, PhysicaVcaring/therapeutic activities designed ~pecialist Not available
reflexology, o improve patients' physical symptoms, body herapies available
aromatherapy image, self-confidence etc
Routine medical consultation as part of the Available by Only seen in
Doctor basic PDC package appointment every emergencies
visit
Bathing! IAccess to baths at the PDC centre Available Not available
Hydrotherapy
Hairdressing Hairdressing as a form of personal and social Available Not available
care
The pilot study
Once the number of choices and range of attributes had been agreed, a pilot phase of the
project was undertaken. This took place in two stages. The tirst stage was to administer the
questionnaire to a convenience sample of LSHTM public health students to assess whether
the instructions were understandable, whether the task could be completed (level of
difficulty) and to tind out any comments they had on the process. The second was to test
the final questionnaire on poe patients.
In the tirst phase, students who were willing to take part stayed behind at the end of a lecture
and were asked to till in a selt-completed questionnaire with eight choice sets. They also
tilled out two extra questions about the task at the end. This included a visual analogue scale
from 1 (extremely easy) to 10 (impossibly difficult) and an open ended section for comments.
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Twenty-three students began the task and 19 returned the form with all eight choices
completed. The average score on the visual analogue scale of difficulty in completing the
task was 7.4, which was higher than had been expected. Eleven students provided reasons
for their answers. The comments were mostly negative. Of the students who scored it over 8
(six students), comments were: "I do not think palliative care patients will understand it,
especially if they're really iii"; and ''There are too many things going on at once - too hard to
understand each of the variables at the same time. Exhausting!"; and "Really hard to judge
what patients want. Do they really want hairdressing? Cheap I suppose!"
In light of these results, the idea that the questionnaire should be administered as a face-to-
face interview was reinforced! Further meetings were held with POC managers who also
expressed serious doubts as to whether patients would be able to understand and complete
the task. Changes were made to the design of the study. First, it was decided that only
patients with some experience of the range of activities offered in palliative day care services
should be interviewed since those who did not know the service found it hard to value its
attributes. Only patients who had attended for at least one month would be eligible for
interview in the main study.
A second pilot study was undertaken in the Chichester hospice while the EO-50 study was
under way and before the main choice experiment study was undertaken to assess the
feasibility of the questionnaire and interview process with POC patients. The choice
experiment questionnaire was administered to four patients (two women, two men). An
informal interview was undertaken after each questionnaire to find out whether they had
understood the task, how hard they thought it was and whether it could be improved.
None of the respondents said they had any problems either understanding or completing the
task. While they said some of the choices presented were more difficult than others, they
were able to make a choice and complete the task. The concerns they expressed were
whether they were being consistent in answering the questions in each paired choice. One
of the patients could not see well and so the questionnaire had to be read out to him. He did
not say this had been a problem and reported no other difficulties.
All the respondents said they strongly disfavoured the category '3pm - 8pm' a category of
the attribute 'Time' and said they would not want to attend at all if this is when PDC was
open. One patient wanted to know at the end if the centres were the same in other respects
other than these particular attributes. The completion time for the questionnaire was in the
range of 10 - 20 minutes.
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On the basis of this pilot, it was assumed that people who knew the service would be more
enthusiastic about taking part than people who did not (that is, asking members of the public
to value PDC). Second, the 3pm-8pm category was dropped from the experimental design.
Third, the text explaining the task emphasised more strongly that the centres were to be
assumed to be exactly the same in all other respects other than the difference in attributes.
Sample size
Data were collected using face-to-face interviews. It was not thought that postal
questionnaires would yield complete responses, and there was a danger that patients would
not understand the task or would feel obliged to answer the questionnaire. Also, the small
number of patients attending PDC in any week was one of the reasons why a face-to-face
interview was considered to be a better format for data collection. Also, given the level of iII-
health and age of the patients, it would seem appropriate to take more time to make sure
that respondents understood the task and to ensure that completion of the task was as high
as possible.
To assess how many respondents needed to be recruited, the analysis was undertaken in a
number of stages. When 25 respondents had been interviewed the first model was
estimated, then for 50 respondents, then 75. The purpose of this was to assess whether the
coefficients on any of the parameters in the model (the attributes of the service) were
significant at each of these stages, and whether this changed or remained stable as more
data were added. If it appeared that the addition of data from more respondents was not
improving the model, and, as importantly, would not change the conclusions of the study,
then recruitment to the study would stop. This is similar to qualitative approaches to
sampling where interviewing continues until a point where no additional information is
gathered from additional data collection (Kirk and Miller 1985). It was considered be
unethical to continue to recruit patients to a study when their responses were unlikely to
change the findings and consequent decisions about how services ought to be organised.
It was foreseen that it would be necessary to ensure a high completion rate since the total
number of people attending PDC (the pool from which respondents could be recruited)
across all four centres was not large. The number of patients registered to attend PDC at the
time of data collection was as follows: Centre A 80 patients; Centre B 35; Centre C 40;
Centre D 30. Centre A reduced its opening days from three to two days per week due to lack
of referrals while data collection was on-going.
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This number is misleading as a proportion of patients will not attend on any given week. The
reasons given for why people do not attend were that they are away on holiday, attending a
hospital appointment, or too unwell to attend. The first multi-centre study found that patients
attended, on average between two and four times per month. In the centre where patients
were encouraged not to stay for the full day, it was also likely that some patients would turn
up for one appointment and leave immediately. There was some concern that a proportion of
this group of patients would be missed by the interviewer. However, the majority of patients
attended for more than one appointment on any given day, so stayed for half a day, morning
or afternoon. They were interviewed between appointments.
Eligibility criteria
Patients were only approached after the PDC leader had decided that patients were well
enough to be interviewed. Patients had to understand English sufficiently to be able to read
(or have the questions read to them) and understand the descriptions of the attributes.
Physical disability was not a barrier to taking part: patients who could not sign their consent
form were included and their consent form signed and witnessed by two volunteers in their
presence. There were no other exclusion criteria.
Scenario presentation and data collection
Scenarios were presented to patients as descriptions of two PDC centres that they could
attend (see an example of the choice scenario in Appendix C). Data were also collected on
respondents' age, whether they lived alone, how long they had attended PDC, and what
services and activities they usually accessed in PDC. It also asked them to say what aspect
of PDC was most important to them. Notes were taken contemporaneously on whether
patients said they had dominant preferences for a particular attribute or combination of
services.
Analysis of the data
A computer package specifically intended to design and analyse the results of choice
experiments was not used in this study. Instead the approach taken was to use a generic
statistical package (SPSS 10.0 to generate the orthognal array and STATA 7.0 to run the
parameter estimation model). The reason for this was that the approach taken in designing .
the experiment was different to that set out in the published literature as no pair of scenarios
contained attributes that were the same levels. Since probit and logit models can be
generated in generic packages and the steps can be clearly delineated, this was the
approach adopted. It enhanced the transparency of the methods used.
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An ordinary probit, fixed effects and a random effects probit model were estimated using
STATA, assuming in the first instance independence between attributes as well as absence
of correlation between covariates and individual effects. As each individual was asked to
make a senesot pairwise choices, the error terms could not be assumed to be independent
since two observations made by the same person are more likely to be correlated than two
observations from different people. Therefore a panel data technique was adopted. As the
option to "choose neither" of the two scenarios was not offered, an unconditional demand
curve was estimated. This approach is consistent with the most recent guidance published in
reviews of methods for health economic evaluation using choice experiments (Ryan and
Gerard 2001, Ryan, Bate et al 2001).
As all attributes were binary, the probit model was structured so that if a specified level of an
attribute were present in scenario A (absent from scenario B), this would be represented by
1. If it were absent from scenario A (present in scenario B), this would be represented by O.
The attribute that was present or absent, or the level, is listed in table 5.3.
T bl 3 S 111 1 Ib d I I 1 h bl II . dla e S•• ipec cat on 0 attr utes an eve s or t e pro t oglt mo e
Attribute Level=1 Level=O
Access Stay for the full session Appointment only
Time 1p_m-6pm 10am -3pm
Bath Available Not available
Specialist therapies Available Not available
Hairdressing Available Not available
Doctor Available every visit Emergencies only
The difference between scenarios VIas coded as scenario A minus scenario B. If a pairwise
. choice had "Stay for a full session in A" and "Appointment only" in B, then this was coded 1
(=1-0). The converse was coded -1 (=0-1). For this study, the following equation was
estimated:
Y = constant + a1 access + a2 time + a3 bath + a4 specialist + as hair + a6 doctor
with Y representing the change in benefit of moving from scenario B to scenario A, and a1-6
representing the difference in utility represented by the presence/absence of each attribute.
A significant constant term indicates that respondents have a predisposition (or bias)
towards choosing scenario A or B, all attributes being equally present or absent. The
constant term might be significant if, for example, one scenario represented the status quo,
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or if respondents always chose the scenario on the left hand side of the page. An
insignificant constant term indicates no such bias.
Attribute/covariate interactions
The interaction between attributes in the choice experiment and specific covariates
(characteristics of the respondents and how they accessed palliative day care) were
examined. It was hypothesised that these covariates might have an impact on respondents'
value of different kinds of services. Age was considered to be an important factor in people's
preferences for different models of palliative day care. Other covariates relating to the
circumstances of the respondents, such as whether they lived alone, were considered.
There is also an argument that the length of time since first attending PDC and the intensity
of care (measured by days of attendance per week, or by the number of activities per visit)
could also be important. One limitation of the research design was that activity data was only
collected for patients attending the Chichester palliative day care centre, so that information
on individuals' use of resources was not collected for the majority of respondents in the other
three centres participating in the choice experiment. Demographic data and other
information on whether the patient lived alone were collected from all respondents.
The following dummy variables were created. They were OLD (if the respondent was 75
years or older at the time of interview); YOUNG (under 65 years); LlVALONE (if the patient
lived alone); MEDCENTRE (if the centre the respondent attended had access to routine
medical appointments); ALLDAY (if the centre encouraged patients to stay from opening till
closing time). Interaction terms were created with these dummy variables. They were:
OLDACCESS and YOUNGACCESS to assess whether the age of the respondent had an
impact on whether they wanted to stay for the full session; ALONEACCESS to assess
whether patients who lived alone had a greater preference for staying for the full session;
ALLDAYACCESS to assess whether respondents who attended centres that encourage
people to stay all day had a stronger preference for this attribute than patients who attended
appointment-based centres; MEDCENTREDR to assess whether patients who attended
centres with routine medical appointments preferred this more than those who did not; and
YOUNGTHERAPY to estimate whether younger patients had a greater preference for more
active, therapeutic interventions. The probit model was estimated for each of these
interaction terms consecutively.
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Assessing the goodness of fit of the model
Hold-out scenarios
In addition to the eight pairs of scenarios in the experiment, the orthognal design programme
also produced two hold-out pairwise choices, (choice nine and ten) which the respondents
also answered in the same way as choices one to eight). A McFadden pseudo-R2 statistic
was also predicted for the model.
Tests of rationality
One of the important considerations for this study was the trade-off between the number of
choice sets that respondents could be reasonably expected to undertake, and the range and
amount of information that could be gathered.
In this study, the only test of rationality that was adopted was a simple dominance test. No
multiple tests were adopted. The POC study identified all respondents who expressed
dominant preferences. These were respondents who consistently chose the scenario with
one particular attribute. Clear agreement on whether these respondents should be removed
from the analysis could not be found in the recent literature, with some studies including
domihant respondents in the analysis (Shackley et al 2001), others explicitly dropping them
from analysis (Ryan et al 1999, Ryan et al 2000), or not specifying which approach was
taken (Morgan et al 2000). In the POC study, the analysis was undertaken with and without
these respondents to assess whether this had an effect on the parameters of the model.
One of the possible limitations of this study design in assigning only two levels of each
attribute was that a high number of false dominant preferences might be detected. This is
because the range of choices open to respondents is more limited than for experiments that
use three or more levels. Less choice will mean potentially more respondents making
decisions "as if' they had dominant choices when in fact more choice would have indicated
the point at which they would be willing to trade between attributes.
Estimating the importance of attributes
Since no'cost attribute was included in the study, it was not possible to calculate a marginal
WTP for any of the attributes. This way of reporting the results still remains controversial.
What is more important is that the six attributes that are included in the experiment are all
qualitative categorical variables. There is no continuous variable against which to compare
a" other attributes. Such an attribute could be travel time or waiting time. Since no such
proxy for cost (or rather sacrifice) was used, there was no method of comparing all attributes
in a way that would demonstrate the sacrifice respondents were prepared to make in order
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to have a specific attribute in a POC centre. This is another important limitation of the study.
The limitations of the study design will be addressed after the results are reported.
SUMMARY
The study was designed so that the choice experiment followed on from the EO-50 data
collection period and did not overlap with it The EO-50 was fairly straightforward. Three
groups of patients were identified, a before group, a contemporary group not receiving POC
and a group attending POC. The study followed up patients attending or not attending POC
for a three month period. This provided the opportunity to measure changes in quality of life
using a more robust study design than had been adopted in the North Thames palliative day
care study. However, since no difference in length of life was expected, the null hypothesis
was that EO-50 would not detect significant differences in quality of life.
The choice experiment identified six attributes of POC that were different across centres and
where the relationship between the specific component of the service and quality of life was
not well understood. Methods of undertaking choice experiments had not been uniformly
reported and this study was an attempt to design an experiment from first principles. Since
the study was first planned, other health economic studies have reported their methods of
analysis more widely, and the methods used here have been compared with these. Where
the methods have varied, a detailed discussion of the study design used here has been
shown.
The next chapter reports the findings of the EO-50 study and the choice experiment
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Results of the empirical research into palliative day care
Introduction
The results of the Chichester Palliative· Day Care study ('the Chichester study') are
presented here, although not all the data that were analysed for this study are reported in
this thesis. The before-and-after study gathered data on the cost of care and used the
same quality of life instruments used in the North Thames study. The data on the disease
specific outcomes, The Palliative Outcome Scale, and the Herth Hope Index were
analysed by other researchers. They reported that no differences in quality of life could be
determined betWeen patients who attended PDC and those who did not, either in the
historical or contemporary comparison groups (Higginson, Goodwin et al 2002) These
results are pertinent to the interpretation of the findings of the EO-50 analysis in this
chapter. The choice experiment analysis was undertaken after the analysis of the quality
of life outcomes was complete. Results are reported in a similar way to the reporting of
choice experiment results published recently in the health economics literature.
SECTION 1. DATA COLLECTION AND FOLLOW-UP
The 'before' group of patients were recruited over two months from all patients within the
palliative care service at a hospice in Chichester (inpatient and home care nursing). As
described in the previous chapter, these were patients whom the clinical team believed
would benefit from attending palliative day care. Once the centre had been built, the day
care group and a contemporary comparison group were recruited over fifteen months.
During this time, there were 63 new referrals to PDC, of which 40 consented to
participate. The reasons for those who did not participate were: refusals (n=7), too unwell
(n=10), brief attendance for out-patient consultations only (n=6).
In all, 140 people were recruited to the study. Table 6.1 shows the recruitment to each
patient group and completed interviews (percentages are given as a proportion of total
recruited). There was more attrition in the poe group before first interview compared with
the before and comparison groups. The main reasons for attrition in all the patient groups
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were death and feeling too unwell. Only one patient refused to be interviewed in the PDe
group.
Table 6.1 Completed patient interviews in the EQ-50 study
28 (70%)
3rd interview
16 (40%)
11 (28%)
Reasons for no
interview
(n= 7)
unwell (n=15)
The patient groups were analysed in sub-groups defined by how many times they
were interviewed. Table 6.2 below shows the number of patients in each group.
The palliative day care group had the greatest drop-out of patients over three
interviews (from 28 at the start to only 11 patients by third interview). Therefore the
cost data and EQ-50 analysis must be interpreted with some caution since the
group is so small by third interview.
Table 6.2 Numbers and proportions of respondents with completed interviews for each data
collection stage (grouped by Intention to treat)
Interviews Number of
completed respondents
Before group Only 1 30 (45%)
1&2 at 36 (54%)
least
1,2&3 26 (39%)
Total 66
POCgroup Only 1 12 (42%)
1&2 at 16 (57%)
least
1,2&3 11 (39%)
Total 28
Comparison Only 1 16 (35%)
Group 1&2 at 30 (65%)
least
1,2&3 20 (43%)
Total 46
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The socio-demographics in the patient groups were similar (chi-square "I:, p~0.05)
suggesting that it was reasonable to make comparisons between groups. Table
6.3 shows the patient socio-demographics for those that completed the baseline
interview. The age of the groups is reflected in the employment status, as the
majority of patients were retired (over 70% in each group). There were no
differences between the groups in gender, ethnicity or type of carer contact.
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Table 6.3 Patient socio-demographics (completed 1st interview)
Demographics Before group PDC group Comparison Significance
(n=66) (n=28) group (n=46)
Age in years
Mean (SO) 69.2 (12.4) 74.0 (10.1) 70.8 (11.9) p=0.197
Medianl ranee 71.0/34-94 77.0150-94 72.0/39-90
Gender
Female 40 (61%) 12 (43%) 23 (50%) p=0.24
Male 26 (39%) 16 (57%) 23 (50%)
Ethnicity
White UK 66 (100%) 28 (100%) 46 (100%)
Employment status
Working (Frr or prr) 6 (9%) 2 (7%) 2 (4.5%) p=0.45
Not working (unable) 14 (22%) 2 (7%) 9 (20.5%)
Retired 45 (69%) 23 (85%) 33 (75%)
Carer
Spouse 43 (65%) 20 (71%) 30 (70%) p=.067
Other carer 12 (18%) 5 (18%) 9 (21%)
No carer 11 (17%) 3 (11%) 4 (9%)
Carer contact
Lives with spouse 43 (65%) 20 (71%) 30 (70%) p=0.58
Lives with family 2 (3%) 0 2 (5%)
Lives alone 21 (32%) 8 (29%) 11(25%)
Carer employment
Working (Frr or prr) 18 (29%) 6 (21%) 8 (19%) p=0.67
Not working (unable) 5 (8%) 2 (7%) 4 (9%)
Retired 29 (46%) 17 (61%) 27 (63%)
No carer 11 (17%) 3 (11%) 4 (9%)
Housing
Private ownership 28 (42%) 11 (39%) 17 (37%) p=0.73
Council housing 7 (11%) 7 (25%) 7 (15%)
Rented housing 28 (42%) 9 (32%) 20 (44%)
Other 3 (5%) 1 (4%) 2 (4%)
(e.o, nursing home)
Primary diagnosis
Cancer site:
Lung 11 (17%) 4 (14%) 11 (26%) p=0.58
Gastrointestinal 11 (17%) 8 (29%) 9 (21%)
Breast 9 (14%) 4 (14%) 4 (10%)
GU 1Prostate 11 (17%) 6 (21%) 8 (19%)
Gynaecological 7 (11%) 0 3 (7%)
Other cancer site 10 (15%) 4 (14%) 7 (17%)
Non-cancer 6 (9%) 2 (7%) 0
dlaonosls
Place of death (n=46) (n=11) (n=22)
Home 8 (17%) 4 (36%) 6 (27%) p=0.69
Hospital 7 (15%) 1 (9%) 3 (14%)
Hospice 31 (67%) 6 (55%) 13 (59%)
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SECTION 2. ANAL VSIS OF THE COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH PDC
Summary of overall costs of care
Tables 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6 show the mean (standard deviation) costs for one month's care
between the three groups, over the three time points that data was collected during the
study. The standard deviations are very large and the differences in costs between the
greatest and the least are also large. This demonstrates that costs of one month's care
differ widely between patients within palliative care groups (palliative day care, before
group and the contemporaneous comparison group).
Table 6.4 Cost of four weeks' care: patients with oniy the first set of data at baseline
Patient group Time 1 only
POC group £888
SO >1000
Comparison group £711
s.d.550
Before group £1570
SO >2000
Table 6.5: Cost of four weeks' care: patients with data for interview 1 and 2
Patient group Time 1 Time 2
poe group £720 £869
SO 960 SO >1000
Comparison £602 £505
S0882 S0844
Before group £412 £609
SO 561 SO >1000
Table 6.6: Cost of four weeks' one month's care: patients with data for interview 1, 2 and 3
Patient group Time 1 Time 2 Time 3
poe group £678 £541 £492
SO >1000 S0624 S0606
Comparison group £642 £633 £721
SO >1000 SO >1000 SO >1000
Before group £384 £381 £506
SO 602 SO >1000 SO >1000
Analysis of the patterns of costs was undertaken using the analysis of variance (ANOVA).
This method tests whether the means from two or more data sets are equal (that is drawn
from populations with the same mean). This is a development from the Hest which is a
test for two sample means only. The p-values provides evidence of the likelihood that the
data from the three groups indicate significantly differences in patterns of costs, rather
than this occurring by chance. Table 6.7 shows that at none of the time points do the
mean costs of care differ significantly (do not reach 10% level of significance, which is a
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low threshold for significance). This is due to the small numbers in each cell, as well as
the widely different costs within each group.
all three interviews
The analysis of variance for changes in costs between palliative care groups did not show
any evidence of systematic differences between the groups. Figure 11 and 12 show this
graphically.
The histograms below represent the means of costs for patients in each group over the
three time periods. They must be interpreted with caution as the previous analysis has .
shown that none of these observed differences is significant. It shows the patterns of
costs over time for the group of patients sampled but the likelihood that this pattern would
be observed with a second sample is very small.
Figure 1: Mean Costs for patients in each group over the three time periods
Comparison of costs of one month's care at the first and second interview, by palliative care group
(patients who complete Interview 1 only are excluded), n=82
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100
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Figure 2: Means Costs for patients in each group over the three time periods
~ison of costs of one month's care at three time points for patients surviving three interviews,
by palliative care group, ~
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The insights from the cost data are limited since they were collected from one POC centre
only (in Chichester). Overall, it would appear that patients in all three groups are not
accessing large amounts of expensive health and social care resource. The total costs of
care (including community and acute care) are less than £900 for patients who have data
for two periods, and around £700 or less for patients with three sets of data. Overall,
resource use reduces over time from baseline to third interview, but the important analysis
in this context is whether resource use changes significantly in different palliative care
groups. The ANOVA evidence suggests that it does not.
SECTION 2. RESULTS OF THE EQ-SO STUDY
EQ-SO domains
Table 6.8 shows the overall percentage of patients experiencing different levels of
problems over the five basic domains measured by EO-50, the composite quality of life
score, and the visual analogue scale (VAS) scores. This data in decomposed and
composed form suggests that the 'before' group had more extreme problems when first
recruited to the study. For example, 6.1 % of this group were confined to bed at first
interview, whereas none of the patients in the other palliative groups were confined to
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bed. For all dimensions, the 'before' group reported a higher proportion of 'extreme
problems' than the other palliative care groups. Examining the proportions of patients
reporting they experienced 'no problems' across palliative day care groups is insightful.
By the third. interview (the group most likely to be the fittest, that is, the group of patients
who have not declined rapidly or died), there is a wide difference in the number of patients
who reported that they experienced no problems with self-care.
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Item-response for the EQ-SOdata
The item-response rate was very high. All respondents except one who took part in an
interview managed to answer all five questions in the EO-50 schedule. For one respondent
there is missing data for item 2 (self care) for the first baseline interview. OALY scores could
be derived for all other respondents for all interviews.
Validation of the EQ-SO against disease-specific health-related quality of life
instruments
Correlations were run for each palliative day care group, at each interview (baseline, second
and third interview).
Table 6.9 Pearson correlation coefficient scores and p-values for the 'Pain' domain on POS
II . db i .and EO-50.by pal atlve care group an ,y ntervlew
POC Before Com_Qarison
Interview 1 0.785 p<0.01 0.660_Q<0.01 0.501 _Q<0.01
Interview 2 0.931 p<0.01 0.674 p<0.01 0.878 p<0.01
Interview 3 0.389 p=0.24 0.481 p<0.05 0.678_Q<0.01
The data in table 6.9 indicate that there is a positive correlation between the EO-50 scores
and POS scores for the domain 'Pain' at baseline and first interview. By third interview, the
numbers in each cell are small (11 respondents in the day care group) which may be the
reason why the correlation coefficients are no longer significant at the 5% level. It indicates
that the EO-50 instrument has some internal validity in the 'pain' domain. This is not
surprising since the way the question has been framed in both instruments is very similar.
Table 6.10 Pearson correlation coefficient scores and p-values for the 'anxiety/ depression'
d I POS d Ea-50 b II' I· d b I Ioma n on an , Jy.pa tat ve care group an Jy nterv ew
POC Before Comparison
Interview 1 0.240_Q=0.237 0.513p<0.01 0.625_Q_<0.01
Interview 2 0.719 p<0.01 0.533 p<0.01 0.575 p<0.01
Interview 3 -0.289 p=0.389 0.406 p=0.76 0.577 p<0.01
The data presented in table 6.10 above is less easy to interpret since the correlation
coefficient for interview 1 (which contains the highest number of responses) for the day care
group is very low and is not significant at the 5% level. One of the reasons for this may be
that, in palliative care research, anxiety and depression are considered to be separate
entities (a person can be anxious but not depressed, and vice versa). Another reason for this
lack of correlation may be that respondents considered the questions in POS ('have you
been anxious or worried?') to be different from the EO-50 question (I am
not/moderately/extremely anxious or depressed). However, a more likely explanation is that
this may be a statistical artefact due to the small numbers in the day care group. For the
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other (large sample size) groups, the correlations are significant at the 1% level for baseline
and first interview.
Composite EQ-50 scores.
Table 6.8 presented earlier also shows the mean quality of life scores, with their standard
deviations. The pattern is more easily shown in figures 3 to 5 (at the end of this section)
which are the box plots derived from the Ea-50 data. They show the median, quartiles, and
extreme values. The box represents the interquartile range that which includes 50% of
values. The 'whiskers' are lines that extend from the box to the highest and lowest values,
excluding outliers. A line across the box indicates the median. They show visually that the
median values across all intervention groups appear to be similar, and that there is no
dramatic change in quality of life over time in any groups (that is, between interviews 1 and 2
or between interview 2 and 3). The similarity of results is greatest for patients who have data
for three time points (who may have the fewest physical symptoms).
Comparison between the 'before POC and 'after POC' groups
Independent sample t-tests were undertaken to compare mean EO-50 scores for the two
groups of patients, before and after POC (tables 6.11 to 6.13). The Hest procedure was
employed to compare means for the 'before' and 'after' groups. Ideally, for this test, the
respondents are randomly assigned to two groups, so that any difference in response is due
to the intervention and not to other factors. In this study, randomisation did not take place,
but checks were undertaken that established that the groups had similar characteristics.
Table 6.3 showed that patient characteristics were not significantly different between groups
so that it is reasonable to assume that any differences detected could be due to the effect of
attending POCo
Comparisons of composite scores were made between groups for patients undertaking one
interview only, at least two interviews, and for patients completing all three interviews.
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Table 6.11 Mean quality of life score at interview 1, and results of independent sample t-test,
for one interview values rAnnrt'~tt
* equal variances not assumed
Table 6.12 Mean quality of life score at interview 1 and 2 and results of the independent sample
for 2 interviews or more--
life score at interview 2
* equal variances not assumed
of life score at interview 3
* equal variances not assumed
.365
.141
.132
.188
.768
The mean values are slightly lower for the before group, but the results of the t-tests show
that, for all comparisons between the poe group and the before group, none are
significantly different. Mean scores are around 0.5 and 0.6 for both groups, indicating that a
year in this state is the equivalent of 0.5-0.6 of a year in full health. For patients with more
than one interview, the values do not change by more than 0.1 between interviews,
indicating that these values are stable and not changing over time.
Since no quantitative difference in quality of life was detected with the EO-50 instrument, the
economic analysis became, de facto, a cost-minimisation study. The cost data were not
synthesised with outcome data to produce cost-effectiveness ratios.
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Figure 3: Box plot of Ea-50 composite scores for patients who have data from
the first interview only
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Figure 4: Box plot of Ea-50 composite scores for patients who have data for at
least two interviews (weight 1 and 2 refer to interview 1 and 2)
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Figure 5: Box plot of EQ-50 composite scores for patients who have data for
time points. (weight 1, 2 and 3 refer to interview 1, 2, and 3)
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SECTION 3. RESULTS FROM THE ANALVSIS OF THE OPEN-ENDED COMMENTS
DURING THE INTERVIEW2
At baseline interview, over half of the POC patients suggested that they had changed as a
result of attendinq POC. This was described either as a change in outlook (24%) or attitude
(44%). Table 6.14 shows the proportion of respondents who said they had changed, by
different categories, at each interview. The majority of those who said they had changed at
first interview continued to say they had changed (n=11) at the follow-up interviews.
Table 6.14 Respondents in the POC group who said they had 'changed' as a result of POC:
rti f t hit .propo ono responses a eac n ervlew
Response 181 interview 1200 interview lara interview
I/n=25) I/n=16) I/n=11)
No change ~ (32%) ~ (25%) ~ (27%)
More positive outlook for ~ (24%) ~ (19%) ~ (46%)
he future
More positive attitude 11 (44%) ~ (56%) ~ (18%)
awards illness
Closer relationship with p (0%) P (0%) 1 (9%)
arnllv
Patients who attended palliative day care were asked what they believed the most important
thing to them was about attending day care. Figure 6 presents a summary of their
responses.
These data show different results from the EO-50 analysis. It suggests that patients who
attend feel they have improved. However the interviews do not provide any analysis of the
strength of patients' preferences for POC overall or for particular aspects of the service. As
such, the analysis is Hmited. The next section shows results that try to address these issues.
2 Data collected and analysed by another researcher on the study team, (DG). The results are summarised here for
comparative purposes
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Figure 6: Patient reports of most important thing: frequency of themes at each interview
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SECTION 4. RESULTS OF THE POC CHOICE EXPERIMENT
This section presents the results of the choice experiment and interpretation of the findings.
The strengths and limitations of this study design generally, and in the specific context of
complex services such as POC are discussed in the next chapter. The process of
undertaking the study is reported here as one of the objectives was to evaluate whether this
approach would be feasible in the context of POCoThe results of the random effects probit
model are reported and interaction effects explored.
Sample size
Table 6.15 shows the numbers of patients attending each POC centre and the number of
respondents who agreed to be interviewed. In total, 81 patients agreed to take part across
four POC centres. Centres A and B experienced reduced numbers of referrals during the
data collection period. Centre A reduced the numbers of days it opened from four to three,
limiting the number of patients who could take part in the study.
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Table 6.15 The proportion of all patients' interviewed for the choice experiment,
by centre.
Centre Number of Number of
interviews patients attending
POC
A 14 18
B 10 14
C 33 46
o 24 45*
..As some patients attended for appointments only it was not always possible to
approach them for interview before or after their appointment
Reasons for not obtaining an interview were either that the day care leader thought that
patients were too unwell to participate or patients themselves said they were too unwell
when approached by the interviewer. The decision by the PDe leader that a patient was too
unwell to participate was rare and only 7 patients were not interviewed because of this. None
of the patients who were well enough to take part refused to do so when first approached.
Two people did not participate because they indicated they did not have sufficient English
language skills to understand the questions. They consented to be interviewed but withdrew
by the first question. They were not included in the sample of 81. Two other patients
consented and were recruited, but at the beginning of the interview they said they felt did not
want to continue and the interview was abandoned. These patients are included in the
sample. Altogether 79 patients participated in the choice experiment.
There was some interview fatigue reported by a small number of the more frail patients who
consequently did not complete the interview (three respondents). The ordering of the
scenarios was altered for centre 3 and 4 to guard against respondents systematically
completing fewer of the 'hold-out' choices since they had been choice 9 and 10 for the first 2
centres. One patient (a younger man) chose not to make a decision for half of the pairwise
choices, saying that he would not choose either if offered these specific choices. These
"choose neither" were dropped from the analysis. All other responses were included in the
analysis, whether patients complete all 10 pairwise choices or not.
Demographic characteristics
Of all patients who consented, 46% were male and 54% female. Mean age was 61 years
(median 63 years, range 20-89 years). Thirty-eight per cent of patients said they lived alone,
45% with a partner and 14% with other family members. The mean number of months that
patients had attended a PDe centre was 8.13 (median 6 months, range 1 month to 9 years).
No other demographic characteristics were collected since this data was not included in the
analysis.
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The choice models
Table 6.16 shows the results of the random effects probit model. This model includes all
patients' choices, regardless of whether they expressed dominant preferences overall. High
levels of significance indicate that the presence of an attribute factor was correlated with the
respondent's decisions to choose a particular scenario.
The results of the probit model indicate that all the signs on the coefficients are as expected,
with the presence of a positive attribute (availability of a doctor, availability of specialist
therapies) increasing the likelihood that a respondent would prefer that scenario. The only
attribute with a negative sign is ''time'' which represents a centre's opening hours. It suggests
that later opening time of 1pm-6pm (which was coded as 1) is less preferred than 10am-3pm
(coded as 0).
The probit model demonstrates that all the attributes except bathing and hairdressing had a
significant impact on respondents' propensity to choose scenario A. The most important
attribute was specialist therapies (0.6118) which was more than twice as important as
staying all day (access: 0.2832) which was more important than routine access to a medical
support (Doctor any time: 0.1857). The constant term in the model was not significant,
indicating that respondents were not predisposed to choose scenario A or B, which was as
expected.
Access 0.2832 < 0.0001 0.1720, 0.3944
Time - 0.2987 < 0.0001 -0.4102 - 0.1872
Bath 0.0811 0.154 -0.0303, 0.1926
Specialist therapies 0.6118 < 0.0001 0.5003, 0.7232
Hairdressing 0.0446 0.430 -0.0330, 0.1551
Doctor any time 0.1856 0.001 0.0755, 0.2957
Constant 0.0220 < 0.694 -0.0880, - 0.5972
Correct predictions holdout analysis:
y=O 61%
Y=1 85%
X2 . 142.03 (p-e 0.0001)
vs. actual
No. of observations: 624 (some patients did not answer all questions)
No. respondents 79
Mean number responses 7.9 (range 4 to 8)
McFadden R2 0.206
likelihood -343.38209
195
Chapter 6
To assess how long to continue recruiting patients to the study, the probit model was run
after the first 25 patients' data had been interviewed. At this point, all attributes were
significant, except hairdressing and bathing (with wider confidence intervals). However, at
this stage, routine access to a doctor was only borderline significant. Patients from the POC
centre with routine access to a doctor had not yet been sampled at this point in the data
analysis. Data from 50 respondents showed the same pattern with narrower confidence
intervals. The result did not change after analysis of 75 respondents. It was agreed to stop
recruitment at this stage since the same attributes had stayed significant for all three rounds
of analysis.
An ordinary probit and fixed effect model were also estimated in STATA. There was no
appreciable difference (up to 4 decimal places) in coefficients between the random effects
probit model and either the fixed effects model or ordinary probit, suggesting that inter-
respondent effects were not important in this dataset. The implications of this are discussed
further in the next chapter. The probit and logit models were also run in a different statistical
software package (SPSS version 10) and produced the same results (Appendix E).
The 'Coefficients in table 6.16 indicate that access to specialist therapies is the most
important attribute in the decision to attend POCwhen all patients are grouped together. It is
about twice as important as the two next most important attributes which are the timing of
POC (10am-3pm is preferred) and staying for the full session rather than coming for an
appointment only.
Exploration of effect of excluding dominant preferences
Case by case analysis examining each choice made by every respondent revealed a high
proportion of patients who expressed preference for one dominant attribute, by always
choosing the scenario that included this attribute (table 6.17). Overall, nearly half (48%) of all
patients interviewed expressed dominant preferences for a particular aspect of POCoNearly
a quarter of all patients showed a dominant preference for specialist therapies (23%). This is
a higher proportion of dominant preferences than has been reported in other choice
modelling studies in the health economics literature. This is a result in itself (that POC
patients appear to have strong preferences for one attribute, although the dominant attribute
differs between patients) but it may also be an artefact of the design of the experiment, since
respondents were only offered two levels for every attribute. This high proportion of
dominant responses may have had an impact on the regression model. Therefore a second
model was estimated that excluded all those patients who expressed dominant preferences
(table 6.18).
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T bl 6170 t f b ed' th d t II at"ents. •
No. patients who % all patients, % patients who
Attribute ~chosethe i.e. including expressed dominant
scenario with this traders preferences only
attribute n=79 n-38
Access 8 10% 21%
Time 8 10% 21%
Bath 0 0 0
Specialist therapies 18 23% 47%
Halrdresslno 0 0 0
Doctor 4 5% 11%
Total dominant 38 48% 100%
preferences
Total 'traders' 41 52%
Total 79 100%
All the patients with a dommant preference for a doctor were from centre D, one of the two centres
offering routine medical appointments
Access 0.2795 <0.0001 0.1234, 0.4357
Time -0.3247 <0.0001 - 0.4811 - 0.1684
Bath 0.1362 0.088 - 0.0201 0.2926
Specialist therapies 0.5269 <0.0001 0.3705 0.6833
Hairdressing 0.1030 0.191 - 0.0515 0.2574
Doctor any time 0.2316 0.0001 - 0.0768 0.3865
Constant 0.0477 0.545 - 0.1068 0.2022
No. of observations 344
No. respondents 41
Mean number responses 7.8 (range 4-8)
McFadden R2 0.1014
likelihood -174.73517
Correct predictions (from holdouts):
Y=O 78%
Y=1 69%
"l 163.40 (p-e 0.0001)
vs.actual
The magnitude of the coefficients is similar in tables 6.16 and 6.18 and the coefficients have
the same sign. The coefficients for hairdressing and bathing are not significant in either
model. The level of significance of the 'doctor any time' improved from 0.001 to 0.0001. But
the significance of the other attributes remained below 0.0001 for both models.
In table 6.18, the confidence intervals are wider (fewer observations to model from) but the
significant results and the overall findings do not change. The McFadden psuedo-B" statistic
is 0.10 in this model whereas it is 0.21 in the model with all patients' responses included
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(Table 6.16). This suggests that the second model is a worse fit than the first. The
interpretation of this statistic is explored in the next chapter.
The results suggest that staying at a POC centre for the full session is preferable to coming
for an appointment only; 10am-3pm is preferred to a later opening time later in the day.
Access to specialist therapies influences patients' decision to attend, as does access to the
doctor any time. Hairdressing and bathing do not contribute to the decision to attend POCo
This is a highly plausible result as table 6.19 confirms that these two services are the least
used for all patients in the study.
This is a different result from the findings of the North Thames POC study that reported
higher proportions of patients accessing these services, especially bathing and hairdressing.
This issue is explored further in the discussion.
Hold-out scenarios
A comparison of the prediction of respondents choices for scenario 9 and 10 (that were not
used to estimate the probit model) were compared with actual choices for these pairwise
choices made by respondents. Chapter 5 demonstrated that the dependent variable Y can
be interpreted as a propensity to take one action (in this case, to choose scenario A), and at
a certain point in a scale, the decision will be to take the opposite action. The functional form
of the model provided values of Y for scenarios 9 and 10. The STAT A program specified that
if Y is greater than 0, then the model would predict that a respondent would be more likely to
pick scenario A. If Y is less than 0, then a respondent would be predicted to choose scenario
B.
Table 6.16 and 6.18 shows the percentage of correctly predicted values for the hold-out
scenarios. This test is run for all respondents and for traders only. Chi-squared tests indicate
the likelihood that this result could have been arrived at by chance. It shows that it was
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highly unlikely in both scenarios that these predictions could have been arrived at by chance
only.
Analysis of interactions
Interaction terms were entered into the model to explore whether specified relationships
between attributes and specific covariates were significant. Significance was explored at the
10% level since the sample size was small and interactions were not expected to show a
strong relationship.
Table 6.20 shows the results of adding interaction terms to the model for all respondents
(including those with dominant preferences). The coefficients indicate the positive
relationship between patients/ service characteristic and the importance of an attribute. It
indicates that only the interaction term that combined the younger age group and preference
for specialist therapy (YOUNGTHERAPY) was significant at the 10% level.
Table 6.20 Probit model Interaction terms explored in the data, all patients,
scenario 1-8
0.0788, 0.5152
• 0.0192, 0.4164
• 0.1477, 0.3031
• 0.1277, 0.3149
• 0.2088, 0.4373
Importance of individual attributes
the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) is interpreted as the ratio of coefficients in the
regression model. Without a continuous variable, the marginal rate of substitution for the
probit model that has been estimated in this study is not straightforward to interpret. It would
be more accurate to consider the relative importance of the individual attributes. Since the
goodness of fit appears to be better in the first model and the model uses data from more
respondents, these data were be used to estimate the relative importance between specific
attributes of PDC. The coefficients in table 6.16 indicate that regular appointments with a
doctor in a PDC are a significant attribute in decisions to attend, but is reported as the least
important of the four significant attributes. The ratio between attributes indicates that it is
about a third as important as specialist therapies when all patients' are included in the
analysis (ratio =0.30), but the overall preference for access to a doctor any time appears to
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be higher when patients who have dominant preferences are taken out of the analysis (ratio
=0.44). The interpretation and usefulness of these statistics will be explored in the next
chapter.
SUMMARY
This chapter has reported the empirical results of the EO-50 and choice experiment studies
in the Chichester study. Both parts of this work were successfully completed and there were
no practical difficulties in recruiting patients to either study, except that the numbers
attending POC were lower than expected. The North Thames study undertaken before the
Chichester study had faced many of the problems of other evaluation studies in palliative
care research: poor recruitment, poor follow-up and problems of identifying an appropriate
comparison group. The Chichester study was an improvement in a number of respects: first,
in 'before-and-after' study, the main comparison group (the 'before' group) was more easily
identifiable since the POC centre did not exist in the first phase of data collection. Second,
more time was spent in the POC centre with the staff who would help recruit patients on
defining the process of recruitment and on monitoring participation. Since the quality of life
study was focused on one centre only, the process was more straightforward.
The choice experiment study was the first of its kind in palliative care. The use of this
methodology in palliative care research has been an experiment in the process as well an
attempt to obtain relevant and meaningful insights into the strength of patients' preferences
for specific aspects of POCo Interviews rather than postal questionnaires provided high levels
of recruitment and completion interviews and ensured that respondents understood the task.
The next chapter discusses the importance of the findings and addresses the question of
validity and the usefulness to these approaches in the context of palliative day care. The
final chapter (chapter 8) considers the empirical findings and in light of the theoretical
debates and methodological discussions outlined in the earlier chapters of the thesis.
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Chapter 7
Discussion of the empirical findings
Introduction
This chapter discusses the findings presented in the previous chapter and considers how
this knowledge contributes to the understanding of how palliative day care centres should be
organised and how the service might be evaluated in future studies. It judges whether the
health gain! quality of life data from the empirical research has provided sufficient evidence
to demonstrate that this is or is not a useful way to proceed in evaluation of POC and similar
complex interventions. The discussion then focuses on whether the choice experiment
evidence provides any additional or different insights into the value of POC services that
might persuade future researchers or funders of research that this could be a useful way to
proceed in economic evaluation studies. The methodological design of the choice
experiment study is considered in light of the findings, to assess whether it could have been
undertaken differently with hindsight or additional information, especially with regard to the
decision not to include a price as an attribute in the questionnaire. The final chapter
considers these results in the light of the evaluation of complex services and the lessons that
can be drawn from using the health gain and choice experiment approaches.
SECTION 1. THE FINDINGS OF THE COST ANAL VSIS
The main problem with the cost analysis was that the sample size was not adequate to be
able to make any judgement some about the likely incremental cost (or savings) associated
with attending POCo The challenge of estimating an appropriate sample size when
undertaking costing studies within effectiveness studies has been highlighted in the health
economics literature, largely in connection with large clinical trials (AI et al 1998, Willan
1999, Willan 2002). The particular problem faced here is that a larger sample size was not
feasible within the resource limitations of the study. What may be concluded here is that no
evidence has been produced that suggests there is a large difference in costs between
people who attend POC and people who do not. Sample size in studies that include an
economic component should be designed in such a way that they are powered to detect
differences in costs. But the issues associated with sample size calculations for cost-
effectiveness analysis have not received the same attention until recently as clinical
evaluation (Briggs and Gray 1998). Briggs and colleagues have explored a formula for
deriving sample size from confidence interval limits on costs and effects in a trial (Briggs et
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al 2002), but it difficult to see how ex ante these could have been estimated for this study.
Such a calculation would nonetheless have strengthened the findings of the cost analysis.
Therefore, the economic analysis focuses on the evidence of the effectiveness or value of
the service, given that the incremental cost of care (a separate issue from the funding of
care) for people who attend poe and those who do not, does not appear to be-very large for
this sample of patients.
THE FINDINGS OF THE EQ-5D STUDY
No significant differences in outcome using EQ-5D
The analysis of health outcomes using EO-50 did not show significant differences in health
outcomes between palliative care groups. P-values of the main quality of life scores were not
significant at the 10% level (a relatively low threshold for significance) for any of the sub-
groups of patients who survived and participated in the study at baseline, or in the two
following interviews.
The estimation of a cost-effectiveness ratio has not been achieved for this study because the
cost-results and the effectiveness results failed to show any differences between groups.
The EO-50 findings however, cannot be seen as conclusive evidence that this is an
inappropriate methodology as the numbers of patients recruited to the study was small,
especially when patients were sub-divided by number of interviews as a proxy for proximity
to death. The sample size was calculated for the EO-50 study post hoc, based on the actual
EO-50 data obtained in the study at the second interview (the number of respondents at
third interview was reduced due to death or withdrawal from the study). To have been able to
detect a difference between the 'before' group and 'palliative day care' groups, using the
actual mean values and standard deviations in the study, at a 10% level of significance, the
sample size would have to have been 139 respondents in each group, interviewed at least
twice. Given the fact that the rate of withdrawal from the study by time two was 140
respondents at baseline to 82 respondents at second interview, the proportional number that
would have to be recruited to ensure having a sample of 139 at second interview would be
almost 240 in each group. Given the problems of recruitment in palliative care studies
described in earlier on, this was not a feasible or practical sample size for a palliative care
study. It raises the question of whether the EO-50 and other global measures of health
related quality of life that require larger sample sizes than can be achieved to detect what is
a very small difference in health status are useful tools for areas of research which is
characterised by small scale studies.
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One positive finding concerning the EO-50 was that there was almost 100% completion of
the interview schedule by partlclpants in all palliative care settings and for all interviews. This
means that the lack of significant differences between groups was not an artefact of
differences in questionnaire completion rates.
One approach to obtaining more robust evidence might have been to group all patients
together to increase the power of the study,· and to analyse each health domain separately
for significant differences between groups. But the reason for not taking this approach can
be illustrated by table 6.8 and figures 4 and 5 in the previous chapter. Table 6.8 shows the
decomposed results of the EO-50 questionnaire and the percentage of patients reporting
themselves to be at each level of quality of life in the EO-50 scoring system. In the domain
'usual activities', the POC group appears to have a dramatic improvement between interview
1 and 2: the proportion of patients facing extreme difficulties in carrying out usual activities is
23.1 %, which falls to 6.3% by the second interview. This could well be found to be significant
if statistical analysis were applied to these data. However, the sub-group analysis shows no
such commensurate fall in overall quality of life weights (figures 4 and 5). The large drop in
scores could be a result of patients who experience the most acute problems dropping out of
the study (due to becoming more ill or dying) and not being interviewed after baseline.
Furthermore, the data were analysed in sub-groups because this made more sense in a
context where patients at different phases of illness (proximity to death! acute illness, as
measured by the number of completed interviews) may have a different intensity and range
of services (in and out of POC), and the effectiveness of POC might be different for different
groups.
The capacity of the EO-50 study to detect differences between palliative care groups was
also compromised by the fact that the study was not powered for the EO-50 study. This
means that the negative finding (of no significant difference between palliative care settings)
was compromised. This issue is returned to in the final chapter in considering the limitations
of the study.
The correlations with the Palliative Care Outcome (POS) scale showed that, for domains that
were comparable across instruments (pain and anxiety), the data were strongly highly
correlated for pain at baseline and second interview but by third interview, this correlation
was not significant at the 5% level, which may be due to the small numbers left in the study.
For anxiety, the pattern was not as clear as some data showed evidence of correlation but
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some did not. Without prior hypothesis about which groups would or would not be expected
to have correlation at each interview, this result is not easy to interpret.
There are other correlations that could have been explored in the data. Living alone could
have an impact on the intra-group variation (measured by the standard deviations around
the mean composite EQ-50 scores). Also, within the palliative day care group; the intensity
of PDe could be correlated against the EO-5D scores to explore whether changes between
scores over time in the poe group among those patients who access more activities
services (medical, social, psychological services) within POCo The problem with this
approach is the method of measuring intensity: POC is set up to allow people to try out
different activities, some of which were by appointment, some of which could be freely
accessed at any time. It would have been useful to measure the number of hours attendance
per week for each individual attending day care as a possible proxy for service intensity.
Respondents' age and state/stage of illness and proximity to death could also explain the
variation in scores.
Were the findings more robust than in the previous North Thames poe study?
It is argued that the study design represents a more robust research design than the first
multi-centre study of palliative day care that had no 'before' group. Consequently, the fact
that the results still show no measurable effect differences could be considered to have more
weight. Furthermore, the use of a global health-related quality of life measurement in this
study might be expected to reveal a more general improvement than disease-specific
instruments that can only present decompositional scores. EQ-50 can measure more
general dimensions of health and welfare that could reflect the aims of palliative day care
more than the disease specific instruments.
Qualitative versus quantitative findings
There are two reasons why the quantitative quality of life results data may not have shown a
difference between intervention groups: first because palliative day care does not actually
produce improvements in health related quality of life. Second, the important dimensions of
quality of life may not be measured using this methodology. If the first explanation is true,
this does not mean that palliative day care has no value, but that it may be performing a
different service and meeting different needs to those originally envisaged.
The open-ended responses by patients showed that palliative day care might be having its
greatest effect on the social domains of quality of life. Meeting others was cited by around
60% of all attenders at each interview as the most important aspect of palliative day care.
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Patients who attended also reported a more positive attitude towards their illness, and a
more positive outlook. None of these domains of psychosocial health are emphasised in the
EO-50 instrument. The designers of the EO-50 instrument focused on more obvious
differences in quality of life, and palliative day care is not the setting in which the instrument
works at its best.
The lack of evidence of difference in quality of life between patients who attend POC and
those who did not contradicts the qualitative evidence from the open-ended statements
collected during the same interview. This supports the argument that EO-50 may not be an
appropriate way of measuring the outcomes of POCo Since changes in quality of life from
POC might be subtle, the sample size in POC evaluation studies should be larger than for
studies of interventions that are expected to have larger effects. However, given the number
of patients who attend POC on each day (and that centres are open 3-4 days a week), a
multi-centre trial would be required to recruit an adequate sample size. The value of
undertaking multi-centre rather than single centre studies may be an important consideration
for future evaluative studies of POCo
Limitations of the EQ-50 study
The Chichester study was a robust study design but the numbers of subjects in the survival
sub-groups was small: between 11 and 36 in each group. This is a possible source of bias in
these findings. Those who are more ill were more likely not to have been interviewed after
the baseline interview and only those whose health did not deteriorate rapidly were
represented in the sample of patients' interviewed at the second and third time points, As the
sub-groups with two and three interviews represented patients who were relatively well, it
would be expected that there would not be any large differences in health-related quality of
life between POC attenders and non-attenders. It might have been a different pattern if
patients whose health deteriorated rapidly could have been interviewed, but there would be
serious practical and ethical problems in conducting interviews in these circumstances.
The study was not powered to detect differences in outcome using the EO-50 instrument.
When a range of outcome measures is used and no specific clinical outcome is seen as
dominant, the choice of sample size is a problem. The EO-50 study was seen as an 'add-on'
experimental addition to the quality of life study design that was intended to mirror the
original North Thames study. Also, since the Chichester study was undertaken in one health
district the main consideration was being able to maximise the numbers of patients who
could be entered into the study. The original target was 210, 70 in each group. But
considering the number of new referrals to day care (approximately 10 per month), it was not
205
Chapter 7
possible to recruit 70 patients to the day care group without recruiting for at least 18 months
and this was neither a realistic nor a cost-effective option for this study.
Since health gain/quality of life approaches to evaluating palliative care will continue to be
the dominant methodology for evaluating effectiveness, and since the EO-50 instrument is
easy to administer, it would be worthwhile testing the instrument on a larger sample size of
patients, for little additional cost or effort. This would be a valuable contribution since this
POC study is the only study of this kind in palliative care research to adopt this approach to
measuring outcomes.
SECTION 2. THE FINDINGS OF THE CHOICE EXPERIMENT STUDY
The attributes of PDC that were seen as relatively more important
The results of the study suggest that patients had strong, sometimes dominant preferences
for particular characteristics of POCoSpecialist therapies (aromatherapy, reflexology and
massage) were seen to be the most important service characteristics for all patients, and
especially for younger patients. Other characteristics such as living circumstances and the
type of centre respondents attend did not appear to have significant association with
preferences for care.
Overall, a regular appointment with a doctor was perceived to be less important to patients
than specialist therapies. All the patients who expressed dominant preference for access to
a doctor were from the centre that offered regular medical appointments with a palliative
care consultant. Staying all day was a positive attribute of POC, and opening hours of 10am
to 3pm are preferred to later in the day. This is the first quantification of the strength of
preference of these attributes and this should inform providers about which services they
provide should be prioritised. However, additional information on cost-effectiveness and
other criteria (for example the views of other people who might benefit from POC, such as
carers) would also be important information to inform decision-making.
Characteristics that were seen as relatively less important
One of the issues raised by providers of the service (and hence the inclusion of this attribute
in the experiment) was whether the poe centre's opening hours were best suited to the
convenience of the staff (who also had to undertake inpatient ward rounds early in the
morning and in the later afternoon, as well as administrative tasks), rather than around the
needs of the users of the service. But the evidence from this study would suggest that these
daytime hours were preferred by patients to opening hours later in the day. This preference
could have been different if the views of carers had been included in the study. Carers might
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have preferences for either longer opening hours or times that are more convenient for them
to do paid work. If poe was also offered as a way to support home carers, this might be
explored in a future study.
The results showed that bathing and hairdressing were not as important attributes as other
aspects of day care according to patients. This was not surprising as both these services
can be accessed through other means (privately or through social services). These attributes
were added to the experiment as it was not clear whether these personal care services were
important to patients and whether they should be provided in poe centres. Some centres
did provide them for almost everyone at one point in time, and some did not. At one centre
where hairdressing had been withdrawn due to the lack of a volunteer hairdresser, patients
had commented to researchers that they would be willing to pay for a hairdresser privately in
order for the service to continue. The strength of demand for this service overall was not
known before this study was undertaken.
The data did not indicate that respondents who attended centres with routine medical
appointments were, overall, more likely to prefer medical appointments. However, the only
respondents who displayed dominant preferences for routine appointments with a doctor
were in the centre where this was available, but this was only 4 out of 24 patients who
attended that centre. Similarly, attendance at a centre where patients were encouraged to
stay all day did not appear to impact on preferences for this attribute. This would indicate
that the philosophy of care of the centre patients attended did not bias their demand for
particular attributes of care.
Contribution and additional insights gained from the choice experiment
The choice experiment has demonstrated that the quantification of patients' different
patterns of preferences and the systematic comparison of different aspects of the service
revealed a different pattern of demand for services or attributes than simply asking people
about their preferences. When faced with constrained choices, respondents showed that
personal services (bathing and hairdressing) were the least important to their decision to
attend. This leads to a different outcome from one that would have been arrived at by simply
listening to respondents' comments in interviews or casual discussion, where they were not
being asked to make choices or trade between services or attributes. For a service such as
poe that is heterogeneous and where each centre has its own philosophy and has strong
proponents for particular aspects of care, this is an important finding. A future study might
consider running an empirical investigation to establish whether open-ended questionnaires
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about patients' preferences for different aspects of poe arrive at a different conclusion to
those found from a quantitative choice experiment.
The influence of experience of different services on demand
One of the characteristics of poe was that the range of provision of activities and services
changed over time and patients might not have had experience of all the attributes
presented in the choice experiment. The therapies and services offered at each centre were
determined to some extent by the supply of local therapists with particular skills (paid for
their time or working as volunteers), and the philosophy of the poe centre, rather than
demand for these particular services. For example, at the start of the North Thames poe
study, bathing and personal care were common in the five centres that participated in that
study and the uptake was high in some centres with virtually all patients having a bath during
their visit. In the eE study (undertaken three years later), none of the participating centres
were offering baths on a regular basis. Since the service was not offered, there is an
argument that attenders would not have experienced the positive or negative consequences
of this service and therefore may not have known the value of it compared with other
services they did know and use. It would have been insightful to be able to conduct the
study by including patients who had experienced poe with bathing and hairdressing offered
in the recent past, and then interviewed them at a time when these services were no longer
offered. This could have established whether their preferences were different from those
who had never experienced these activities since these were the attributes that did not affect
choice of scenario. One of the advantages of the choice experiment technique is that it can
estimate the value of services that have not been experienced if the value of the attributes of
a service is relatively straightforward to evaluate by individuals. It would have been insightful
in this context to explore this further by assessing whether the value of bathing and
hairdreSSingwas different for those who did experience them in the context of the poe
environment.
The robustness of the findings
The choice experiment results indicated that specialist therapies were the most preferred or
valued aspect of palliative day care. This was true when respondents with dominant
preferences were included in the analysis, and when they were excluded. None of the
results altered when the dominant preferences were removed. Since a smaller dataset was
analyzed for the model that excluded dominant preferences it would be expected that the
confidence intervals around the parameter estimates for each attribute would be wider. This
was found to be the case.
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The only slightly different result between the models was the "doctor any time" attribute that
became even more significant in the second model (without dominant preferences) but this
is not straightforward to interpret. What it means on face value is that, for patients who were
willing to trade between attributes, the presence of a doctor any time was more highly
valued, and contributed more to the decision to attend the centre with this attribute present,
than when dominant preferences were included in the analysis, but it still remained highly
sensitive.
The usefulness of the constant term in a model without a constant status quo scenario (for
which respondents may have a natural preference) is debatable. The STATA model
produces a probit model with the constant term as a default in the program. Its usefulness in
this context is only to show that the constant term is not Significant, indicating that
respondents did not exhibit so called 'irrational' choices by always choosing A or always
choosing B, regardless of the attributes presented in them. Since latent utility is not
observable, the analyst cannot estimate the utility function directly and can only represent
the deterministic part. The constant variable element acts as a check on whether the model
is mis-specified.
The usefulness of the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) is that it can indicate the relative
strength of preference for one attribute over another. In this context, the attributes
represented descriptive characteristics of the service. They were either present or absent. In
this example, the substitutability of attributes is limited and the meaning of the MRS is also
limited. The usefulness is in the interpretation of the strength of preference of respondents
for attributes in the face of ·constrainedchoice. It is an improvement on rating exercises as
not all attributes can be rated as equally important. It is also an improvement on ranking
exercises as it provides some indication of how much more one attribute is preferred to
another. In the context of this choice experiment, without a price attribute, the MRS cannot
be interpreted beyond this. The results show that specialist therapies are strongly preferred,
and that the strength of preference is between two and three time stronger for this attribute
(access all day, the opening time, and the presence of a doctor every visit). This should
provide a signal to decision-makers that this is the attribute which patients value highest, and
therefore should be offered routinely if the service aims to provide services that are valued
by those who use them.
The appropriateness of the methodology
The purpose of the choice modeling experiment was to begin to assess systematically the
value of particular components of PDe by considering patients' preferences for these
209
Chapter 7
attributes. The research question was not framed in such a way as to determine whether
POC should be offered to all patients (its overall effectiveness) but how it could be organised
to reflect patients' expressed preferences for particular attributes of the service that
providers could influence. Measurement of these preferences may be the closest
approximation of the measurement of benefits where objective measures are not readily
conceivable or meaningful and where giving people what they want may be a more
important service than giving them what is effective or 'good' for them, as determined by
others. So long as the aspects of care that are valued by patients who attend as contributing
to utility (by whatever means), it is hard to argue that these services should not be provided
to people near the end of their lives. Since these services have traditionally been provided
outside the statutory health sector, by voluntary organisations, this is evidence that services
for people at the end of life are also valued by people who are not experiencing this state of
illness themselves.
Providers see aspects of the provision of palliative day care such as its contribution to
existential health or to aspects of psychosocial well-being as important objectives of
palliative day care. These attributes are also contested by different stakeholders in the
service, some of whom believe may believe in them strongly, some of whom are more
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sceptical about the contribution of palliative day care to these goals. The extent to which, for
example, public funds should be used to provide spiritual well-being and contribute to wider
social goals related to quality of life is not straightforward. Whether or not POC services are
valued by those who attend for these specific attributes (in terms of whether and how much
people might trade in order to have these benefits) is not known. The challenge for empirical
research would be to capture these subjective and highly context specific attributes of care
in a choice experiment that is, by its nature, a simplification of the real choice that users face
when deciding whether to attend a centre. Health-related quality of life instruments have
been developed that measure some aspects of existential health, but no simple, overall form
of words that would capture this domain in one attribute has yet been validated. This may be
an important research topic in the future.
Clearly, a model without a willingness-ta-pay component (or some other continuous
measurement of cost, such as waiting time or traveling time) will not yield absolute estimates
of utility. In this study, there was no continuous variable attribute such as a financial charge
or travel time that could be used to estimate marginal rates of substitution with other
attributes and therefore an absolute measure of preference. This aspect of study design was
considered at length throughout the conception, design and analysis of the CE study. It was
decided that Willingness-ta-pay(or some proxy for the sacrificed of wealth) could not be used
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in the context of a POC evaluation. The argument has been presented in earlier chapters
that willingness-to-pay is a disputed approach to estimating utility. There are convincing
arguments why this approach would not work in POC due to the context since POC is a
service provided free of charge to patients, the kinds of people who attend who are mainly
elderly and retired, and the way in which the WTP attribute might be interpreted by them as
a cost of provision rather than a measure of its value.
Before the study commenced, it was not clear whether a monetary attribute would be such
an important disincentive to attending POC that the choice experiment would fail overall.
There was some concern that the inclusion of a daily charge as an attribute in the choice
scenarios would lead to patients refusing to participate in the survey. Furthermore, it
clinicians and managers involved in the study argued that this approach could be inequitable
and unethical even in a research context, as it might increase anxiety among patients about
future financial charges for POC. It was not clear whether the choice experiment format
would work at all amongst this group of patients, and other research questions could be
answered without including a monetary attribute. Therefore, it was decided not to include it in
this study. Having completed the study, this view has not changed and it remains a
contested issue in the economic evaluation literature.
The number of dominant preferences expressed by patients in the study may be a result of
the study design that only included two levels for each attribute. A high proportion of
dominant responses have also been reported in other CE studies in health care. (San Miguel
et al 1997, Bryan et al 1998, Mcintosh and Ryan 1999, Ratcliffe et al 2002). Future studies
might consider including more levels of attributes in order to provide levels of attributes
rather than all or nothing choices.
The sample size was small compared with other recent choice modeling studies in the health
economics literature. Studies with 70-90 respondents with a high degree of comparative
validity have been published, although these have all been non-economic (and not random
utility based) studies (Rosko, Walker et al 1983; Wigton, Hoellerich et al 1986; Meister,
Lausberg et al 2001). In the first round of analysis of the study, the same attributes were
significant for 25 patients as for 50 and 75 patients. For 79 patients, the p-values were highly
significant (at the 1% level), and remained highly insignificant for bath and hairdressing.
While higher numbers of patients would have improved the predictability of the model,
especially for the analysis of interaction terms, it does not seem likely that the overall results
(and message to decision-makers) would have changed. In this health care setting, it is a
reasonable question to ask whether it is ethical to continue to recruit patients to a study
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when their responses would be unlikely to change the findings and consequent decisions
about how services ought to be organised.
Goodness of flt of the model
The McFadden R-square statistic has not been routinely reported in other empirical studies
using choice experiments. Studies that have reported this statistic have found-values of 0.4
(Gerard 2002), and 0.14 (Van der Pol and Cairns 1998), so findings reported here are at the
lower end of this range. However, as argued earlier, this statistic is best used to compare
different specifications of the same model. It suggests that the model that includes all
patients including those exhibiting what might be dominant preferences is the better fit. It is
not possible to make broad conclusions from this observation since the Pseudo-R2 statistic
has to be interpreted with caution in probit models, and there may be too few data from
which to make any assertions. But it makes the case for the inclusion of all patients since
this has not made a large difference to the overall outcomes, and may have improved the
estimation of the relative importance of the important attributes in the model.
The other indication of goodness of fit used in this experiment was the use of two hold-out
clauses to test whether the model would predict the number of respondents who chose
scenario A or B for each pairwise choice. The chi-squared test indicated that the model
predicted correct choices for the hold-out choices and that these predictions were
significantly better than would have been predicted by chance alone in both models. The
percentage of correctly predicted choices is now a common way of presenting the goodness
of fit of choice model data, but estimating this figure using hold-out choices that are not
included in the initial analysis to generate the model is not as common. It could be argued
that to not include respondent data from two pairwise choices in generating the regression
model is a waste of primary data. But the lack of other straightforward methods for checking
the predictive property of the model makes this a more attractive approach than would be
the case if ordinary linear regression models could be estimated and a more robust
goodness of fit analyses applied. It would be interesting to be able to compare these
predictions with those generated from other studies if this approach is adopted more widely.
One of the limitations of using a hold-out approach to testing the validity of the model is that
the hold-out scenarios have the same structure and format as the main experiment, and the
data is collected in the same way. A more robust test might be to collect data from
respondents in a different format, that is, using a different approach to gather information on
preferences, such as a ranking or rating approach. Furthermore, collecting evidence of
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validity using data from the same patients is not as robust as collecting this data from
another group of respondents for comparison.
External validity cannot be tested using a hold-out approach. External validity examines
whether the results of the experiment can predict what choices patients would actually make
faced with the same choices in the real world. One approach for this might have been to
consider the services that a sample of respondents actually choose in their package of
palliative day care, and to compare this data with the results of the choice experiment.
Insights from the empirical analysis
Overall, the study has demonstrated that the method is workable with this group of patients
despite the pilot study on public health students warning that there may be barriers of
cognitive understanding to undertaking an evaluation of this kind. The main study indicated
that PDe patients who are mostly elderly with a life-limiting illness are both willing and able
to undertake a discrete choice task. The interview was quick (around ten minutes) so it did
not make the respondents miss any of their chosen activities and was written in simple
English. This is a particularly important attribute when collecting data from frail people, many
of whom are elderly. Furthermore, the method of data collection did not require patients to
be followed up over time, which is an important attribute of research in palliative care. Future
use of this methodology is promising.
The results have indicated that specialist therapies were more important than any other
activity in day care. The fact that specialist activities are dependent at least in part on
volunteer specialists giving their time free of charge and therefore may not be available
routinely (whereas doctors are paid) would suggest that day care managers might reassess
the status of specialist therapists and consider having them as core service providers in
palliative day care centres.
An approach that can take into account patients' preferences for particular aspects of care
may be a more appropriate methodology to explore in this context. The choice experiment
approach is a way of exploring these questions in a systematic, quantitative way. The study
that was undertaken had to be limited in its scope since it was not clear that patients would
be able to answer these types of questions, and there was evidence from the pilot study and
from providers that these questions would be difficult for patients to answer. However, the
evidence showed that the majority of respondents did not have difficulties in answering these
questions. To the contrary, this approach was as short as or shorter than the quality of life
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questionnaires, and it did not rely on asking patients to participate over a number of
interviews, which was an important attribute in the POC setting.
Faced with almost no other useful findings from previous attempts to use economic
evaluation methods, this method provided more insights than had been obtained by
methods. The study was not a full economic evaluation, but it provides useful information on
the value of attributes of POC where no other quantitative method has succeeded. For
interventions that are multi-dimensional, and where the benefits are not known, this is an
important step towards understanding the value of these services to patients. There is a
need for more evidence about whether the difference in study design is important and
whether they change (or invalidate) the interpretation of study findings.
Future studies need to be based on up to date stated preference choice experiment theory,
which is still being developed and tested in the field. However, rigorous designs may have to
be traded off against judgments about their applicability in the context of the study setting.
The inclusion of WTP as an attribute for this constituency of patients has not been
empirically tested. The next phase may be to consider in more detail whether this approach
would be meaningful or workable in the context of POCoSince this first study has been
successful, some of the arguments about the feasibility of this study design for this patients
group has been answered, so it may be more acceptable to those working in the field to
undertaken these kinds of experiments. Data collection was quick and simple, follow-up not
necessary and the interpretation of the findings relatively straightforward to understand. It
may not be possible to consider whether a proxy for overall value (monetary, time, or some
other form of sacrifice) might be achievable in this setting.
SECTION 3. HOW THE CHOICE EXPERIMENT STUDY MIGHT HAVE CHANGED WITH
HINDSIGHT
One of the questions is whether it would have been possible to consider more attributes and
more complex attributes in the study design. Respondents said they experienced very few
problems in answering the pairwise choice questionnaire presented to them. It would have
been informative to explore how many pairwise choices they could have answered before
they became fatigued. A future study could do this. It would have to be planned carefully,
since it would not be ethical to deliberately continue to ask questions until patients became
fatigued because it might cause potential harm. But it might have been appropriate to
schedule a break after answering the first ten questions and then ask respondents if they
would be prepared to answer a few more questions. This could be repeated after another
break, still emphasising to respondents that they should only continue agree to continue if
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they wanted to and of their own accord. It could provide useful data on the study process for
other research in this area. If patients could have answered more pairwise choices without
additional fatigue, this would have provided more of an opportunity to test the validity of the
study, or to test the axioms of rationality. Since research is now underway in other choice
experiment studies to explore whether these axioms are violated in choice experiments, this
analysis would have contributed to this knowledge.
The open-ended comments gathered as part of the study has suggested that patients attend
POC for specific services but also because of the social environment and because it
provides a way of meeting people in similar circumstances. One of the developments that
could be considered in a future study is whether these less concrete aspects of care could
be incorporated into the study design. This would also mean having to describe these
attributes in ways that were not open to differences of interpretation, and where different
levels of attribute could be described in meaningful ways. It has already been discussed that
respondents would have some difficulty choosing a scenario in a pairwise choice that did not
have a friendly and social atmosphere. Intuitively, it would not seem plausible for someone
to choose to attend a centre that was not friendly and social. It might however be possible to
describe characteristics that contribute to this attribute. If the demand for a social
atmosphere could be broken down into these more concrete constituent parts this might
make it possible to consider the strength of preferences for these abstract attributes with
more clarity.
It may be possible to undertake more in-depth qualitative interviews or focus groups among
attenders of POC and among prospective attenders to establish if there are any attributes of
POC that reflect or represent these attributes. Qualitative research in economic evaluation is
an emerging field of enquiry and may be a valuable area of synthesis between disciplines,
especially around the meaning of outcomes, values and preferences (Coast 1999).
A future study could undertake an in-depth analysis of the reasons for people attending to
explore their stated reasons in some depth and consider how to dissect the concepts of
attributes such as social environment and friendly atmosphere into constituent attributes that
affect patients' lives and consider what the meaning of these broad categories in patients'
lives. For example, people may choose to attend a POC centre with a social atmosphere for
different reasons. Patients who live alone may have acute needs for social contact and
human. comfort. Patients who are cared for by relatives may be considering their needs as
well as their own.
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A 'thinking aloud' study similar to that designed by Ryan and colleagues (Ryan 2001) could
ask patients to say out loud what their thinking processes were while they were deciding
which scenario they would choose, and to explain the reason for their choices. It would be
quite straightforward to record interviews in the poe study and this may have been an
efficient way of exploring rationality of preferences and stability of preferences qualitatively.
Another area of interest that has emerged from this study is to explore the values and
preferences of people who attend once and do not attend again. Health and social care
professionals whose role it is to introduce the idea of attending poe to patients (the home
care nurses predomlnanny) have reported that some patients refuse outright to attend, some
consider the idea for weeks before attending, and some attend once and do not return. The
preferences of individuals who never attend or only attend once have not been explored
here or anywhere else. For them, there may be strong disincentives to attending poe. It
would be highly informative to expand the study to include these patients. Instead of
describing poe directly, which they would not be familiar with, the study could present the
attributes without describing them as explicitly part of a poe service. This might find out
what configurations of service the non-attenders might respond to more favourably if they
were to access specialist services outside their home.
It would also have been informative to ask respondents to rank or to rate the attributes
before they undertook the choice experiment questionnaire. This would have indicated how
similar or different constrained choice and unconstrained (ranking or rating) choices were for
particular attributes. It could have illustrated the added value of a method that forces
respondents to think in terms of trading off different aspects of their care. This would have
indicated that the approaches measure different constructs, give different kinds of
information, and demonstrate why this more complex approach to assessing preferences
provides additional information. To interested parties (such as poe managers and sceptical
researchers) for whom the concept and measurement of strength of preferences rather than
health gain is not an obvious choice for evaluation, this could have provided important
additional information to illustrate the benefits of using of this approach
One of the limitations of the study design was the lack of a mechanism to estimate the
monetary value of the benefits provided by palliative day care. One of the aims of the study
was to assess whether it would be possible to identify an appropriate way of representing
this attribute and developing a cost-benefit analysis approach to evaluating poe. It would
have been enlightening to ask patients directly if they would have accepted a small charge
for poe in order to inform this aspect of the study but this was not possible. There is
216
Chapter 7
anecdotal evidence from undertaking the study that those who support POC believe strongly
that the service should be provided free of charge and that it would be harmful to ask
patients questions asking them to consider a daily charge or some other form of payment. It
would have been good to establish the strength of feeling from respondents about this
aspect of service provision to have more robust evidence of this.
It is still important to try and identify some measure of some representation of sacrifice,
financial or otherwise, in order to be able to begin to quantify the value of these services is
ways that are comparable with the use of these resources in other contexts. The value of
palltative day care compared with other forms of palliative care, cancer care or other sectors,
has not been demonstrated in this thesis. It is useful to reflect on what possible proxies for
financial sacrifice might be in the context of palliative day care.
It was argued earlier in the thesis that travel time had a .low opportunity cost in the context of
POCo A longer journey may even be a positive experience rather than a sacrifice in time (of
which there is relative abundance on a day to day basis). However, there would be a point at
which a journey time would entail sacrifice (if it became uncomfortable), and it might be
possible to identify the levels of journey time that would mean that people would be prepared
to sacrifice other attributes of palliative day care in order to avoid such a journey. Other ways
of conceptuallslnq sacrifice might be in terms of other resources that are accessed by people
who attend POCo For example, there might be trade-ofts between home visits by a specialist
nurse or GP and specific attributes of palliative day care (say, specialist medical consultation
in the centre by appointment). People might sacrifice other forms of social care for access to
palliative day care services. This would not provide a willingness to pay estimate per se.
However, there may be innovative ways of addressing this. The idea of giving respondents
an amount of credit to spend on a package of health and social care (and even, more
radically, that they could theoretically cash in for money to spend outside the public sector
on private goods) may gain credibility in evaluative research the future. A choice experiment
could include qualitative attributes such as specific services, and an attribute representing
the total price of that package of services. This price would not be paid for by the individual
out of his or her own pocket, but would present a proportion of their health and social care
credit, which theoretically would be the same for all respondents with the same level of need.
It might be a way of addressing the problem of ability to pay in deriving marginal benefits in
monetary units.
POC may also have an important role in giving carers' time oft and this aspect of the value of
the service has not been considered in this study. Other people who may derive value from
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the service are the volunteers, people who give altruistically to charitable hospices, and the
staff. This relates to the question of whether the provision of a service such as POC has a
moral as well as a quality of life dimension or purpose. Altruism, self-sacrifice, the belief in
doing good for others are ideas that are embedded in the religious/ humanist culture of the
hospice and palliative care movement (Rees 1982, Abel 1986, Seale 1991, Jennings 1997).
Yet these values cannot be considered in the usual paradigm of economic evaluation and,
as such, studies that attempt to conceptualise and measure the value of these services may
be missing the important aspects of value that these services provide.
The empirical studies have focussed on the outcomes from the users' point of view and a
different approach would be to attempt to establish what society would be prepared to pay
for these services. Since POC is usually provided and at least partially funded through the
voluntary sector this is evidence that society values the care that people with advanced
cancer receive since they make charitable contributions towards it. Whether they have
preferences at the micro-level of decision-making, that is, how the contribution is spent, is
questionable and has not been investigated. Since the general public would not usually have
experience of POC, they might not be expected to know the value of specific attributes of the
service. Furthermore, they might have preferences for the users themselves to have what
they feel that they need at that time of life, which brings the question back to the preferences
of the patients themselves.
Other considerations are also important: first, whether the users of the service are the most
appropriate group from whom to obtain the valuation of POC. There is a clear argument that
since it is the social valuation of services that needs to be determined, these values should
be derived from "citizens" rather than patients (Mooney 1997). The question remains about
whether the general public would have complete preferences and would be able to make
informed choices in such an experiment. POC might be especially vulnerable using this
approach, since the general public may not know such a service even exists, let alone
current and future users might value it.
SECTION 4. INSIGHTS FROM THE EMPIRICAL ANAL VSIS FOR OTHER HEALTH AND
SOCIAL CARE SECTORS
The thesis set out to consider the challenges of economic evaluation of POC as an example
of a complex service. As such it is useful to reflect here on what lessons might apply to the
evaluation of other complex areas of health care. First, the EO-50 instrument may not be an
appropriate tool for measuring outcomes for interventions where large changes in quality of
life are not expected. As each dimension has only three possible levels, it may not be
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sensitive enough to detect important changes in quality of life for interventions where
patients/ clients are expected to continue to experience "some problems" (and to tick this
box in the questionnaire).
The choice experiment approach was easy to administer among a frail population so
probably should not be ruled out on these grounds in considering its application to other
sectors. The approach provides a useful way of obtaining data from a relatively small
number of patients and there is no need for follow-up. For populations where follow-up is a
problem, this is a positive characteristic of this technique.
The key issue is whether a complex intervention can be described in a meaningful way by its
attributes. If the attributes are descriptions of aspects of care (as they were in the PDC
study) then these need to be universally understood by both the respondents and the policy-
makers to mean the same thing. The choice experiment uses complex analytical tools to
derive values that are easily understood by policy-makers. There is no reason why these
tools might not be applied to wider social research contexts. However, the extent to which
the values derived from choice experiments reflect the actual preferences (and the
preferences of the appropriate people) in any given context is not generally known. Given
the complexity of the analysis, and the importance of understanding the meaning behind the
values that are derived, there is still a danger that this approach might be misused, as all
evaluation techniques might. The particular problems found in this study, especially of
identifying a quantitative variable, deriving WTP estimates and the associated problems of
determining that respondents have adhere to the axioms of rationality in order for these WTP
values to be valid, may not be confined to the evaluation of PDC.
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SUMMARY
This chapter has reviewed the main findings of the empirical work and concluded that the
preference-based approach provided more insightful evidence than the EO-5D approach
and answered questions. This is an important step towards a full economic evaluation that
can reflect the value of these services to those who use them and provide evidence that is
relevant to decision-makers. Lessons can be drawn from this to other areas-of health and
social care that face similar evaluation problems, and these are addressed in the concluding
chapter of the thesis.
The' final chapter draws together the arguments that have developed through the thesis, and
considering the issues that are common to many complex services, and those that are
specific to palliative day care. The specific contribution of the thesis to debates in health
economic evaluation is highlighted alongside consideration of the limitations of the empirical
work. It considers the contribution of the thesis to the theoretical debates outlined in the early
chapters, and suggests an agenda for future work in this area.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
Introduction
The aim of this thesis was to explore methods of measuring the outcomes of complex health
care interventions within the conceptual framework of health economic evaluation. The
example of palliative day care has offered the opportunity to explore the usefulness of
current economic evaluation methodologies and to consider approaches that conceptualise
the outcomes or benefits of health care interventions from the perspective of values and
preferences rather than health gain. This chapter summarises the arguments and discussion
set out in each chapter, tracing the main themes set out in the introduction as they have
developed through the thesis.
This concluding chapter also reflects on the shortcomings of this empirical investigation.
Finally the original contribution of the thesis is described in light of the aims of the thesis and
areas for future research are outlined.
SECTION 1. OVERVIEW OF THE MAIN ARGUMENTS DEVELOPED IN THE THESIS
The nature of palliative day care as an example of a complex intervention
Chapter 1 introduced palliative day care as an umbrella term for services delivered in
specialist day centres for people with life-limiting illness. PDC is predominantly used by
people who live at home and who have been identified as having specific needs that can be
met by a. specialist palliative care service. These needs may be for symptom control,
psychological support, social interaction, rehabilitation or other less easily defined needs that
have to do with finding meaning, contentment, hope and self-control at the end of life.
Palliative day care is a service that has developed in the voluntary sector as a response to
these complex needs, using a range of different specialtst and general services and support
provided in a day centre that are meant to address or alleviate some of the problems people
face living with advanced illness and facing up to dying.
Complex services have been defined in this thesis as interventions that aim to address a
range of patients' (and others') needs, which may include clearly definable physical,
psychological and social support, but also goals which are more subtle and indirect. These
services aim to meet the different and changing needs in different ways, depending on a
person's circumstances and experience. Therefore the notion of complexity relates to the
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way people use the service (the range, timing and intensity of support offered) and to the
heterogeneity of needs since the same intervention with the same aim and for the same
objective 'problem' may not have the same effects on people. These services are structured
to be flexible, individually focussed and to meet the subjective or felt needs of individuals.
Complexity also arises from the way in which services are organised. The range of services
offered in a POC centre is not the same in different day centres, and the emphasis on
different aspects of care differs in subtle ways. Some centres offer every patient routine
access to clinical specialists, whereas others emphasise the rehabilitative, creative or social
aspects of care. These differences are not based on research evidence of what is effective
in POC but on the institutional values of the organisations that offer these services. There is
still little evidence of how these differences in care patterns affect people's experience of
care, or whether POCmeet their perceived needs.
Finally, POC may be one of a number of services that patients may be accessing in a
particular phase of their illness. They will usually have some form of specialist home nursing,
attend specialist outpatient clinics and access primary care services. POC is a relatively
weak intervention since patients usually attend only once a week and other services will
contribute to their overall welfare.
All of these characteristics of POC are also present in other forms of complex interventions
although not all these characteristics may be present in every one. The arguments set out in
this thesis also apply to other services and the experience of economic evaluation of POC
services should provide some insights for researchers in these other fields. The challenge
for economic evaluation is to try and make some progress in conceptualising and measuring
the outcomes of these complex services in ways that can be incorporated into economic
analysis. This can provide insights that will inform decisions about whether these services
are cost-effective compared with other ways of caring for people, and compared with other
calls on health and social care resources.
Welfare economic theory, the decision rules of economic evaluation and outcome
measurement
To consider which method of economic evaluation would provide the most valuable insights
for research into complex interventions, chapter 2 took a step back into the discipline of
economics to review the purpose of evaluation and the nature of the questions that
economic evaluation tries to answer. The discussion in this chapter reviewed the foundations
of economic evaluation, based on the theory of welfare economics. This theory has not
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always been thought of as the best way of conceptualising the costs and benefits of policies.
In the past, there has been some dissonance between those who thought that economics
should be a normative social science concerned with how society ought to conduct itself,
and those who wanted economics to develop natural laws akin to natural sciences and
engineering. This dissonance has produced an intellectual schism in economic thought that
has remained influential to this day. Pareto, whose laws of optimality are theioundations of
modern welfare economics, was strongly in favour of economics being a positive rather than
a normative science. Individuals were seen as the best judges of their own welfare, and
social welfare could be maxirriised by individuals trading between alternative forms of
consumption to maximise their individual utility. Normative judgement about how utility ought
to be maximised could not be made; individuals were seen to be the best judges of value as
observed through their decisions about wealth and consumption. This is the basis on welfare
economics and health economics to this day. CSA is the practical application of welfare
economics principles, but these principles have not always provided practical tools in
contexts where monetary valuations cannot be easily obtained. Economic evaluation of
public services such as health care has had to develop other methods of valuing the
outcomes of policies in the face of the difficulties in applying CSA. The adoption of health
outcome as a proxy for value has moved health economic evaluation away from the
fundamental principles of welfare economics.
Chapter 2 went on to show that health economic evaluation has grappled with the problem of
defining a theory of behaviour that can predict and explain the way that individuals behave,
and respond to choice under uncertainty. The approaches to valuing the outcomes of health
care that are commonly used violate at least some of the welfarist principles. The approach
of measuring health gain has taken two distinct paths. One approach measures outcomes
and then attempts to estimate the utility or value that consumers place on changes between
health states before and after interventions. The other approach rejects some of the core
principles of welfare economics in the context of health and health care, especially its focus
on utility-based ideas of welfare. This approach defines the outcome as a quantity of health
gain which has value of itself, thereby avoiding the problem of valuing health gain and
measuring utility.
The objective valuation of the outcomes of health intervention used in both these
approaches has largely replaced any notion of the financial valuation of outcomes. This has
meant that health economic evaluation has worked well where changes in health can be
defined unambiguously and objectively measured. For the evaluation of complex services,
the nature of the intervention and the outcomes would suggest that such unambiguous
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notions of health gain would be difficult to identify. Furthermore, since it is not known what
these services contribute to overall welfare, health gain may only be one aspect of welfare
among other domains of quality of life that the service contributes to. If this is the case, then
a health gain approach will underestimate the overall contribution to welfare.
Health gain approaches are also problematic because they consider health gain separately
from the value that individual's place on the service, or what they would sacrifice in order to
consume health care. Since complex services aim to meet individual's needs, and these
cannot be easily described in a health gain framework, other methods more akin to CSA
methods, such as willingness-ta-pay, might be more appropriate in these settings.
Methods of direct elicitation of WTP values have been strongly criticised for not reflecting
real decision-making if there were a real market for health goods and services, and for being
open to misunderstanding and political manipulation. Therefore, indirect approaches that
consider how individuals would trade off specific attributes of health or health care against a
price or other form of monetary sacrifice have been developed and introduced into
evaluations. One of these methods, choice experimentation, uses a regression modelling
technique to quantify the relative value of specific attributes and has been put forward as a
way of obtaining indirect monetary valuations for CSA.
What can be learnt about measuring outcomes of complex services in the palliative
care literature and in other related areas?
Chapter 3 demonstrated that there has been almost no research in palliative care that
specifically considers the value of changes in health-related quality of life to individuals.
Studies have found no differences in HR-QoL between palliative care and 'standard' care but
have recorded increased "satisfaction" with place of care by patients who receive palliative
care. The studies that have reported these findings have not been undertaken primarily as
economic evaluations but as clinical effectiveness or quality of life evaluations. The
connection between patient satisfaction and consumer preferences has not been explicitly
made and satisfaction has been reported in a way that suggests that this is only a secondary
outcome.
Evidence from qualitative studies has suggested that patients do gain some benefits from
PDC but this is still ambiguously defined. These studies were small scale and probably
undertaken by palliative day care professionals keen to show the benefits of their service.
These studies do, however, support the argument that the patients' perspective on the value
of services would be more revealing than an objective measure of changes in health state.
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Very little evidence could be found in other similar health care contexts, and this was related
specifically to interventions for frail elderly people, and to evaluations of day hospital. These
demonstrate that other interventions that are multidisciplinary, multidimensional, and
individually focused have similar problems using the statutory methods of economic
evaluation.
The research that has been published on palliative day care research has been sparse. The
only evaluation study was the North Thames POC study that found that the disease-specific
approach to assessing effectiveness did not show any difference between patients who
attended and patients who did not. Yet the evidence from open-ended interviews suggested
that some patients who attended POC expressed strong preferences for this service. Most
patients said they had either changed or had a better outlook as a result of attending POC.
Therefore it was reasoned that the disease-specific approach to measuring outcome might
not capture the aspects of quality of life that is important to patients.
This chapter demonstrated that no economic studies had been undertaken in palliative care
that addresses the issue of measuring complex outcomes. There had however, been recent
work undertaken to measure social outcomes for older people and this could represent an
important step forward. However this study did not address all the issues of concern raised
here since its focus was on the development of a single measure of outcome. As POC offers
a range of services, a study that found that POC was 'effective' overall still could not answer
the question 'what is it that makes POC effective?' Since there is heterogeneity of service
inputs, an approach to evaluation that uses outcome instruments could not provide answers
to this question, or help guide policy towards the most effective forms of care.
Empirical investigation of the outcomes of poe
Chapter 4 reviewed the methods that would be used in the investigation of outcomes of POC
for this study. This was based on the empirical evidence reported in chapter 3 and the
theoretical arguments set out in chapter 2. These suggested that a health gain approach
might not be appropriate in the context of POC, and that a preference-based approach might
be the way forward in developing useful research tools in this setting.
Second, it was argued that small changes in quality of life might be perceived to be
important to people in their last months or life, and who were not expecting to regain full
health. Their expectations of achieving any improvement might be lower than in other
phases of their lives, and the opportunity to improve in small ways might be appreciated
more than the objective change in quality of life. This meant that an approach to economic
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evaluation that incorporated strength of preference might be more suited to the problem of
assessing the value of POCo
Global quality of life instruments with narrow dimensions have succeeded in condensing the
complexity of quality of life experiences into single measures of outcome. But if the
dimensions of outcome of POC cannot be easily captured by these dimensions, then a priori
reasoning would suggest that the single 'outcome instrument would not reflect a more
complex outcome. A global rather than disease-specific health-related quality of life
instrument had not been tried out in an evaluation of POCoThe results of the North Thames
poe study suggested that a health-related quality of life approach might not be appropriate
in the context of POC, but the empirical evidence had not tested this hypothesis. Therefore it
was decided that this would be tried out in a second study of POCoThis was the first
empirical evaluation of palliative care to try the EO-50 instrument.
The Chichester study was a more robust study design than the North Thames POC study. If
the EO-50 study still showed no difference in outcome between POC attenders and non-
attenders over time this would be stronger proof that either there was no benefit from these
services, or that the health gain approach was not the way to approach the problem.
However, this power of the study was calculated on the palliative care outcome scale (POS)
and not on the EO-50 instrument. This was a weakness of the study. It illustrates the
problem of determining no difference in an economic study undertaken alongside a clinical
effectiveness study where the study is powered to detect clinical changes. It would have
been possible to calculate an appropriate sample size for a given change in EO-50 scores
on particular domains that it could be hypothesised would be most likely to change, say,
pain/symptoms and anxiety/depression. The calculation' would need to ensure that the
resulting confidence intervals were narrow enough to distinguish between quadrants on the
cost-effectiveness plane. The sample size would need to be such that it could distinguish the
important clinical and economic changes over time and between palliative care groups, and
this would be around 420 patients in this study, based on a sample size calculation
undertaken post-hoc using the mean and standard deviation values at the second interview.
To have an idea of the necessary sample size before the study began, it would be necessary
to have some indication from the patients and from the providers of care of what would be a
clinically important change in health related quality of life, and to try and map that change
onto an EO-50 profile. It has been argued in this thesis that clinically important changes to
the patients may not have been detected by the EO-50 instrument (for example, if patients
continue to experience some, though lesser, problems over time in a particular domain), but
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one of the limitations of this study is that this was not fully explored with either the patients or
with the clinicians providing their care.
At the same time, an approach to evaluation that could incorporate the values that
individuals placed on specific attributes of POC was also considered. One relatively new
methodology that is emerging in health economics is choice experiments. This approach to
evaluation asks individuals to value the individual attributes of service, rather than evaluate
the service as a whole. It is based on Lancastrian demand theory and random utility theory
and uses regression models to estimate the relative importance of particular pre-defined
characteristics of care in individuals' utility functions.
This approach had a number of attractive qualities for the evaluation of POCoFirst, the
methodology obtained relative values of different attributes of a service from individuals, in a
way that mirrors real decision-making. Second, choice modelling was proposed as a way of
estimating indirect willingness-to-pay values that could be incorporated into CSA analysis.
Third, many of the problems of obtaining longitudinal health gain data were avoided since
the impact of a service on quality of life over time was not estimated. Fourth, the study could
be' designed to look relatively simple, and, if the data could be collected, could produce
sophisticated results from a few simple questions.
Choice modelling is based on theoretical axioms that assume that individuals make rational
choices in order to maximise utility, have stable choices over time, and that they are able to
trade between different levels of preferences. These axioms have been explored and the
preliminary findings are that individuals are not observed to be rational utility maximisers but
adopt ways of sidestepping the cognitive demands of complex decision-making.
Nevertheless despite this, the evidence suggests that this approach does produce values
that reflect people's underlying preferences for different aspects of care.
The choice modelling approach was attractive as a research methodology for investigating
the outcomes of POCoThe reasons would also apply to other areas of health and social care
that are multidimensional and hard to evaluate using the usual methods of economic
evaluation. First, the decompositional approach meant that it was possible to investigate the
importance of different characteristics or attributes of POCoThis could address the question
of which attributes were relatively more important to patients (as opposed to service
providers) and contributed more to their overall welfare. Second, the choice experiment was
seen as a step towards conceptualising how a cost-benefit approach to evaluating the
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service might be undertaken. This goal could not be met within this first study since only
qualitative attributes were used in the experiment.
The hypothesis was that the investigation of the outcomes of POC using the global quality of
life measure (such as EQ-50) would not provide useful results so the choice experiment was
part of a continuous process of investigation of how to construct and measure the outcomes
of POC. The choice experiment was undertaken not only because it was argued that health
gain could not be measured in a meaningful way, but also because this approach did not
adequately reflect the qualitative responses and preferences for different aspects of care
that were obtained in the first POC study. The choice model approach could build on the
interview data and a previous study (by HRO) that assessed the structure, process and
outcomes of POC, and construct an assessment of POC that could measure the strength of
preference for particular aspects of the service.
The methods of empirical investigation
Chapter 5 set out in detail the methods of investigation that were employed in thls thesis.
The choice experiment was designed so that it would have the highest chance of providing
insights into preferences for POC. A limitation was that it could not include willingness-ta-pay
as an attribute (described in terms of a daily charge for attending a day centre for example)
as this was perceived as a potential threat to collecting any useful data since there was a
danger that patients would not take part if there was a charge to consider, or that this
attribute would dominate their preferences and could jeopardised the entire project.
However, the decision not to include a financial attribute meant that the strength of
preference for different attributes of POC could not be scaled using a single absolute scale
of value.
There are two important aspects to this problem that have been explored in this thesis. The
first is that for a choice experiment to produce willingness-ta-pay estimates, certain strict and
less strict economic axioms of rationality are assumed. This is not what drives the current
interest in whether choice experiments adhere to the economic axioms of rationality (which
is primarily whether CE adheres to random utility theory which describes intended
behaviour). But it is a necessary condition that CE data adhere to these axioms for WTP
estimates to reflect the value of health care interventions. The empirical investigation of
these axioms in health economic research has only recently begun and little has been
published in this area. However the consensus to date is that willingness-ta-pay estimates in
the choice experiments do reflect some magnitude of value, if not the actual revealed
preference value of those characteristics. Qualitative work is also underway that checks the
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estimated monetary valuations with respondents to consider their agreement with the values
derived from their responses. The findings of this work will reveal more about whether these
values can be interpreted as reflecting a monetary sacrifice that can be incorporated into
cost-benefit analysis.
The second reason is more practical. Since choice experiments are relatively new it was not
clear whether the approach would work in a palliative care setting or how much of a protest
would be made about the inclusion of a WTP attribute. The idea of valuing the benefits of
health care in monetary terms is problematic as it is conditional upon ability to pay and
assumes that people are willing and able to value the characteristics of health care in this
way. Both these assumptions are particularly problematic in a palliative care setting. The
pilot study and discussions with clinicians in the pre-pilot phase of the study produced very
negative responses to the inclusion of a monetary attribute, such as a financial charge for
day care. Palliative care clinicians interpreted this as the introduction to patients of charges
by the back door. They did not want to see this attribute included in the study as it could
raise unnecessary concerns and anxiety among patients who participated in the study.
There was also a danger that the inclusion of a financial attribute would be the most
important attribute in individuals' decision-making and they would always choose the
scenario that did not include a charge. This would mean that they were not prepared to trade
and the study would not be able to estimate the relative values of other attributes. Since the
value of the other attributes was the focus of the study, it was seen as more important to
have some data on the relative value of the attributes without monetary valuation than to risk
obtaining no data at all. Therefore this first choice experiment in POC focussed on the
attributes and on the research process using this new methodology rather than on
willingness-ta-pay. If a quantitative and meaningful variable to represent Willingness-ta-pay
can be identified in a future study, this would represent another step forward in this research.
The findings of the empirical studies
Chapter 6 reported the findings of the empirical studies. As expected, the EO-50 study did
not reveal any differences in health-related quality of life between those who attended POC
and a historical control group who did not. The qualitative evidence reported that patients'
preferences for aspects of care were not directly related to the domains that are measurable
using EO-50. From this empirical evidence, the conclusion is that the global health-related
quality of life instrument for measuring health gain is not likely to be a sensitive enough
approach for measuring changes in quality of life associated with attending POCo
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The choice experiment study has shown that economic evaluation can provide both some
alternative ways of looking at the output of complex services, and a framework for asking
different questions from those posed in clinical and quality of life research. Some of these
concern the overall priority that should be given to different aspects of palliative day care.
These relate to how benefits derived from the service can be valued, what should be
included in the range of services offered, and how to ensure that patients' needs and
preferences for care are being met.
One of the key concerns of providers is whether POC is a specialist intervention or whether
patients would be equally happy with a bath and hairdressing as with more speclallst
services. The findings suggest that patients have stronger preferences for specialist physical
therapies than for accessing medical services every visit.
Insights from the findings
Chapter 7 considered the results of the empirical studies for policy and in terms of the use of
the methodology in similar settings. There is evidence that patients do use POC as a
specialist service rather than attending for social reasons only. From a resource use
perspective this is important since the intensity and range of specialist services is sometimes
dependent on the availability of specialist volunteers as well as paid staff. The evidence
suggests that these specialist therapy services (such as aromatherapy, massage and
reflexology) should be perceived as core rather than peripheral services, and that financial
resources should be set aside for these aspects of care as well as for medical support. This
is not straightforward since these services do not have a strong evidence base and funders
may be keener to support those medical and clinical services that have proven efficacy. The
argument for the provision of services that are not (yet) evidence-based is difficult to support
in a climate where clinical evidence and transparency has taken centre stage in health policy
and local decision-making.
However, the aims of the POC service are to address the complex needs of individuals.
These needs may be met in a number of ways within a set palliative care budget. This
approach begins to identify in a systematic way what those needs are from the point of view
of the user of these services. It can identify what aspects of care they prefer and what
aspects of care they are happier to forego in order to obtain their preferred package of care
(and maximise their welfare). This is an evidence-based approach to service provision if it is
accepted that these people do have particular needs but that these may be different
depending on individual circumstances that change over time. From the palliative care
professional's point of view, there may be a need for some acceptance that what they have
230
Chapter 8
always believed is good for patients may not be the aspects of care that are most preferred
by them. The idea that the individual is the best judge of their own welfare would seem to be
a good starting point in the context of complex services of this nature.
The argument that has been made in this thesis is that a preference-based, welfarist
approach is appropriate in the context of valuing the benefits of complex services. It is not
the approach that has been used most commonly in health economics because it is difficult
to elicit preferences and often unnecessary when other simpler measures as proxies for
welfare will suffice. But in the context of services that aim to meet a range of needs of
individuals, a value-based approach would seem to be the most appropriate.
The danger of comparison across sectors is that the benefits gained from poe interventions
may not be measurable in objective ways, so that poe will not score well in any league table
of benefits, however defined. An important empirical question to test in the general public is
whether health and quality of life at the end of life is seen as important in a 'good' society.
This moves the debate back towards the normative constructs of economics - 'how society
ought to be'. The contention is that palliative care is seen as good service by the general
public (who give charitably to hospices and other voluntary organisations who care for
people with advanced illness) even though its benefits cannot easily be defined or
measured. The problems of evaluation reviewed in here have illustrated the point that all
approaches to the measurement of human experience are fallible, and that the focus on the
scientific measurement and quantification of health outputs can lead to policy conclusions
that may not reflect society's wishes.
SECTION 2. METHODOLOGICAL CONTRIBUTION OF THE THESIS
The thesis has situated the problem of evaluating complex services within more general
current debates about how to evaluate health care. It has been argued that these debates
have been driven by a tension in health economic evaluation between theory and practical
research. On the one hand, it is important to base research on a theory that can determine
whether a policy is good for society (and to specify clearly what this means in terms of
maximising social welfare), and on the other to undertake research that can answer real
world problems in ways that people can understand and that answers the important
questions for policy. If health gain can be seen as a proxy for the value of benefit derived
from health gain, then the relationship between the satisfaction of preferences and
objectively measurable health is not problematic. In areas where outcomes are not easy to
define, the relationship between health gain and people's preferences may not be so direct.
The consequence is that services that provide benefits in ways that cannot be measured
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using the quality of life instruments currently available may lose out in the competition for
resources if they cannot demonstrate their value in other ways.
The review of the theory of economic evaluation and current approaches suggested that a
preference-based approach to valuing health gain would provide more insightful evidence of
the value of complex services. The choice experiment approach was considered and
adopted in the empirical research undertaken, alongside a quality of life approach since this
had not been tried in this setting.
The EQ-50 study did not show any difference in quality of life between patients who
attended palliative day care and those who did not. The study also explored the specific
attributes that are important to patients in a systematic way. If the only evidence that had
been gathered had been from the open-ended interviews, then this would not have provided
evidence of how much patients preferred some aspects of poe to others. Specifically, the
choice modelling data demonstrated that access to routine medical care was relatively less
important (or less preferred) compared with other specialist services, and that bathing and
hairdressing did not influence these patients' decisions to attend a palliative day care centre.
The result is different from what could have been gained from interview data alone.
The choice experiment study demonstrated that these methods could be used in the context
of palliative care and among patients who are mostly elderly, sometimes frail and possibly
facing the end of their lives. When the study began, it was not clear that this method would
be successful and, at the time, there was no evidence from other studies in similar contexts.
The poe study presented in this thesis provides evidence that these methods are possible
to undertake with patients in a late phase of illness.
Further choice model experiments could consider outcomes in terms of how attributes are
perceived by patients. For example, specialist therapies such as physiotherapy might allow
patients to be more physically active and go out independently, or they may make people
feel more positive about their illness. But the problem remains of how to describe these
attributes in unambiguous ways, and how to express benefit using these criteria.
These are not easy questions to resolve. It requires more qualitative investigation of patients'
perceptions of their ill health and how they see that they benefit from the care they receive.
The argument that has been put forward in this thesis is that these questions about
complexity require more complex strategies to answer them, and that simple methods using
measurements of clinical or quality of life outcome designed for relatively straightforward
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health care interventions do riot provide the information necessary for decision-making. This
is important to present as an argument when the current vogue is for standardised
methodologies. For example, a recent article in the Journal of the American Medical
Association has proposed that editorial teams and regulatory bodies use standardised
.instruments to assess the quality of economic evaluation research (Jefferson, Oemicheili et
al 2002). In the UK, the NICE has also proposed a standardised QALY approach for all
health technology appraisals (Birch and Gafni 2002).
The study has also considered the extent to which it was possible to adopt a willingness-to-
pay approach to measuring the outcomes of palliative day care, and whether a CBA
approach would, in the future, be a possible way forward in POC research. The direct WTP
approach has been strongly criticised because of the problems of respondents equating
WTP values with prices and not being sensitive to size of benefits in their valuation; that
WTP valuations are made in costless and riskless decision-making contexts (without
consequences of making a wrong valuation); and the potential problems of bias (by
respondents acting to influence a decision, or by protest valuations). Choice modelling was
proposed as a way of deriving indirect valuations for willingness-to-pay if a price was
included among the attributes in the scenarios. However, the inclusion of a monetary
attribute is still contentious in CE methodology, and its inclusion could jeopardise the whole
research project. Therefore, this study only went part of the way towards a CBA approach to
evaluating the outcomes of POCo
Contribution to the palliative care literature
Previous POC studies have not attempted to consider the value of particular aspects of
palliative care in a way that places these values at the centre of the evaluation methodology.
This has not been because individuals' preferences were not seen as important (although
they have not been considered important aspects of economic evaluation) but that the
methods of incorporating values and preferences into evaluation have been relatively recent
and may not have filtered into the palliative care research community. The added value of
having a health economics perspective in evaluating POC is that the concept of values and
preferences can be placed at the core of the research paradigm.
This is the first study of its kind in palliative care that has been published (up until the end of
2002). The number of choice modelling experiments is increasing in the health sector. This
study has used choice modelling experiments in a context where other methods of
evaluating outcomes have not produced useful results. It is the first study to conceptualise
and quantify the value of particiJlar aspects of POC and as such, can contribute to the
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debate about how POC shou1dbe organised. The method has proved to be popular in the
day care centres where the data collection was undertaken, and it is hoped that these
methods will be used in the context of other palliative care services that face similar
evaluation issues.
Lessons to be drawn from the thesis for the evaluation of complex services
The thesis has critiqued the use of health gain approaches for services that have a range of
goals and where the main aim is to meet the needs of the individual. As the evaluation
culture spreads to more services that cross the divide between health and social care, the
health gain/cost-effectiveness/cost-utility paradigm may not provide insightful results in other
complex care settings in the same way that they have not in palliative day care. Other less
well-established methods such as choice modelling may need to be incorporated into the
group of acceptable methods of economic evaluation by institutions such as NICE that
currently favour cost-effectiveness and cost-utility methods. The debate will continue to be
about when and how values should be incorporated into economic analyses, and how
important they are. This study adds to this debate by questioning how POC and similar
services that aims to provide small but potentially valuable benefits can compete for
resources if a strictly health gain approach is adopted.
The challenge of economic evaluation in palliative day care has highlighted problems that
are common to other services that have similar characteristics to palliative day care, and that
aim to be highly responsive to the individual needs of patients or clients who come into
contact with the service. For services where the nature of the outcomes is hard to define and
where they may be contested by different professional groups, an approach to evaluation
that adopts a preference-based approach seems a useful way of obtaining evidence of the
value of care and insights into contribution to welfare of specific aspects of the service.
There may be a need in these circumstances to step away from the dominant paradigm in
health economics evaluation and to challenge whether the current approaches that measure
health gain in narrow dimensions are helpful in these contexts.
SECTION 3. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE STUDY DESIGN AND OF THE THESIS
The thesis aimed to make progress in conceptualising and quantifying the outcomes of POC
in a way that could be incorporated into economic analysis. It was argued that subjective
(value-based) rather than objective measures (of health gain) should be incorporated more
explicitly into the evaluation of complex services. However, there are a number of drawbacks
to this approach. First, the absolute value of the attributes of POC could not be determined
without the means of quantifying values or benefits in commensurate (monetary) units. It has
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not been possible to define In a satisfactory way a unit of measurement to reflect what
people would be prepared to give up in order to consume a specific attribute of POC. This
meant that the choice experiment could not be incorporated into a full cost-benefit analysis
at this stage. Consequently, it was not possible to determine whether POC was good value
for money, compared with other calls on the same resources.
This does not mean than a CSA approach should be abandoned in the context of POC, but
that innovative methods of conceptualising sacrifice or trade-offs that could be translated into
a monetary attribute could be explored. It has been suggested earlier that qualitative
research could help in defining the nature of the sacrifice that patients may already make in
order to attend POC. As suggested earlier, it may be possible to determine what they might
be prepared to give up in terms of other health and social care resources.
The fact that the other empirical studies provided no evidence of effectiveness does not
mean these methods established evidence of no effectiveness. Nevertheless, it could be the
case that POC provides very marginal benefits (however defined) and that resources should
be redirected to other services that can provide comparatively more benefits. The only
supportive evidence that has been gathered from open-ended interviews suggests that POC
is valued at least by some people. However, not all patients made positive statements about
POC and there may be an important group of patients whose views were not incorporated in
this study, namely those patients who attended POC once and did not return, or chose not to
attend at all.
The attributes that were defined in the choice modelling experiment were described in terms
of the POC inputs (and structure) rather than the putative effect that these have on patient
outcomes. It has been argued in this thesis that describing the attributes of POC in terms of
outcomes would be difficult if not impossible, since the attributes might not be easy to
describe in unambiguous language and simple descriptions of attributes may be interpreted
differently. Standard gamble and other stated preference techniques require respondents to
make trade-offs between health states or specific outcomes of health care. Therefore simple
descriptions that reflected the essence of POC would need to be made, and the argument
presented here is that it would be difficult to get agreement on how these descriptions could
be framed. Choice experiments have an advantage because they can allow health care
interventions to be valued in terms of their characteristics or by attributes beyond health
outcomes rather than in terms of changes in health state per se. These descriptions of POC
could be less problematic to define and agree upon as they could be framed in terms of
physical characteristics of the service rather than their impact on the individuals who
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experience them (which it is argued in this thesis, is different among individuals and subtle
and complex by nature). This property of choice experiments may make this approach
particular useful in the evaluation of complex interventions.
However describing POC in terms of outcomes has not been tested empirically. It would
have been interesting to pilot a choice experiment that attempted to describe-the attributes of
day care in terms of specific outcomes or goals. This might provide information on what
outcomes are important to patients overall, regardless of the palliative care setting (home,
hospice, and hospital). However since the outcomes were complex, the decision to use this
service-based approach in this first choice experiment study could be defended so long as
the findings reflected the fact that the expressed preferences of respondents relate only to
these pre-defined inputs.
The review of the theory of choice experiments has also demonstrated that the assumptions
on which choice experiments are based are very strong, and that there is evidence that
respondents do not consistently behave as rational welfare maximisers. Care needs to be
taken not to over-interpret the results of these studies but to see them, like all research in
these complex areas, as another form of compromise away from the theoretically correct
model of evaluation. Preference-based approaches are closer to the core principles of
welfare economic theory than health gain approaches, but are not a panacea for all
evaluation problems.
The focus on patients' preferences In the choice experiment and not on carers, health
professionals, or the wider public
The study focused on the users of palliative day care and not a wider group of people who
may have also have preferences that should be taken into account. The value to people
other than the patients, say their carers, could be seen as an externality in the economic
analysis of the benefits of the service. The reason that these externalities were not estimated
was partly due to the experience of undertaking the North Thames POC study prior to the
study reported in this thesis. The North Thames study found that, while no difference in
health-related quality of life was detected using palliative care specific quality of life
instruments, interviews indicated that the users of the service reported benefits from
attending and strong preferences for particular forms of care. The inSight that users of the
service had strong views of what they wanted was seen as an important starting point for the
work presented in this thesis. Since the service is provided and funded to meet their needs,
it is relevant to consider that their views should be the primary focus of the study to find out
what services should be provided to meet their needs.
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The focus of the choice experiment was to try and obtain more concrete evidence that POC
attenders have preferences for particular aspects of palliative day care, and that these could
be identified and measured. The pilot test of the choice experiment questionnaire among
public health students who were not familiar with the service suggested that they found it
difficult to make the trade-offs required in the exercise since they did not know the value of
these services to patients. Some of the students were highly reluctant to complete the task
and gave this as their reason.
An argument can also be made that the wider public should be asked their preferences since
these services are funded by voluntary contributions and taxation (through NHS contracts).
However, if preferences for services that have not been directly experienced are not well
formed (as for the public health students in the pilot study), there is a danger that this would
become an exercise in guessing patients' preferences, rather than expressing those of a
wider group of people, as also argued by Shiell and colleagues (Shiell et al 2000). The
problem is also that without clear evidence of the effectiveness of POC, the public does not
have much more than prejudice and anecdote on which to make decisions between POC
and other forms of care. Furthermore the preferences of the general public might be that
palliative care should meet the needs of those who use it. Therefore they are the ones who
should be asked their views.
If a CBA study was not undertaken, then is this method any better than the CEAlQAL Y
approach?
Both CUA and CEA can provide decision rules for the allocation of health care resources if
one alternative dominates all others, or if there are commonly agreed upon threshold values
for cost-effectiveness ratios. This thesis has argued that these approaches are not strictly
welfarist since they both allow for interpersonal comparison of utility, and do not consider
expressed values and preferences to be the only measures of utility, since health gain is
measured separately from the value of health gain. However, they are equitable in that they
assume that a unit of health is the same regardless of who receives it. A methodology that
incorporates preferences is less equitable in the sense that it allows for the changes in
health status to be more valuable for some than for others (those who would sacrifice or pay
more for them). Whether this is an acceptable moral positlon for the allocation of resources
is a strongly debated point, and goes to the heart of the earliest debates about normative
and positive judgments in welfare economics.
Both approaches have their strengths and weaknesses. They are both valuable in making
the process of decision-making more transparent. In contexts where the CEA and CUA
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approaches do not provide any useful information to help make priority-setting decisions,
other methods of evaluation are needed. The choice experiment has been able to provide
insights into how PDe services are valued in ways that would not be possible using health
gain approaches. It is not a complete picture, nor does it go far enough as to yield absolute
values for the attributes of palliative day care. However the evidence that has been produced
is a positive step along this road. Research methods that can capture some of this
complexity contribute to knowledge where none (or very little) has previously existed.
SECTION 4. AREAS OF FUTURE RESEARCH IN PALLIATIVE CARE
Tbis final chapter has signalled some particular areas where this research might be
developed. These relate to the context of palliative care research (and similar areas), and to
the design of the empirical research.
Economic studies in palliative care research are still dominated by the focus on evidence to
demonstrate that palliative care can reduce costs. Studies have found no evidence of
difference between conventional and palliative care, and this has been interpreted as
evidence of no difference. The dominant economic evaluation methodology has been to
undertake cost studies, assuming no difference in effectiveness. This approach has been
able to avoid the problem of measuring complex outcomes.
The case has been put here that the value of particular outcomes or forms of care at the end
of life may have more subjective value to the person experiencing the end of life than can be
objectively measured using health-related quality of life instruments. Also, complex forms of
care may also be less amenable to objective measurement due to the subtle nature of aims
and outcomes of the service. If so, and there is something unique and different about the
experience of life at the end of life compared with other periods of life, then providers of
palliative day care and other complex services should welcome discussion about other
methods of economic analysis that focus on patients' values and preferences, rather than an
objective measure of outcome. This study has provided a novel way for the palliative care
community to consider the value of their services, and it would be interesting to assess
whether these methods could be used in other contexts where other evaluation methods
have not been very successful. It is necessary to consider carefully whether patients who are
more acutely ill and in deteriorating health would be able to participate in a choice modelling
interview, but our research has shown that, contrary to expectations, this method of eliciting
responses has not been onerous and has even been reported as enjoyable by some of the
PDe respondents. The wider dissemination of our findings should hopefully precipitate some
debate about the use of these methods in other palliative care studies.
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The attributes chosen for this study may not have been the most important aspects of care
to the patients who were interviewed, even though each attribute represented characteristics
of care in the four participating centres. Further work to try and identify more sophisticated
ways of expressing the outcomes of complex services is needed. This may require an in-
depth qualitative study to investigate the experience of people who use these services as
well as people who do not. Concepts such as ''the social environmenf' need to be
deconstructed into specific aspects of these broad characteristics in ways that make sense
both to the respondents and to the providers of care so that they could organise their service
more effectively.
It is important to make some more progress towards defining the concept of sacrifice in a
choice experiment in a way that would be ethically and morally acceptable. Notions of
sacrifice based on money or time are not seen as appropriate for people who are vulnerable
in society or who may only have weeks or months to live. The unit of sacrifice would need to
be a continuous variable against which the other attributes could be evaluated. Such a
variable was not definable by the research team, even at the end of this study and after
much thought. However, more in-depth analysis of this question might make more progress
in this important area.
Finally, the method of validating the choice experiment (testing for rational consistent
decision-making by respondents) was simple in this study. After the planning stages of the
design of the experiment were undertaken, more sophisticated methods of validity testing
have been proposed in the health economics literature. Research is still underway to test
these methods of validation, but a future study should incorporate more robust
methodological tests. Nevertheless, the preliminary reports of the findings of these validation
studies suggest that the axioms of rationality underpinning choice modelling do not strongly
hold. This is still an exploratory field in the health economics field. As long as the
methodological issues are examined alongside the results of experiments, then choice
modelling may have much to offer the evaluation of health sectors that are complex and
where other methods have not provided practical information.
SECTION 5: THE CONTRIBUTION OF THIS RESEARCH TO ECONOMIC EVALUATION
OF COMPLEX SERVICES
A major part of the empirical analysis undertaken for this thesis has been to test the use of
choice experiments in a sector that is inherently complex. It has been shown in this that
empirical quantification of the strength of preferences of people who use these services is
possible, despite the frailty of the respondents and despite the fact that palliative care is a
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particularly sensitive area ot health and social care due to its relationship with the dying
process. This has been demonstrated even though it was not at all clear at the beginning of
the process that it would be feasible and that we would be allowed access to interview these
patients using a new research methodology in this field. Choice experiments can work and
are acceptable to health care providers working with people who have a life-limiting illness
and are (potentially) facing their death even though this is a sensitive area for outcome/
valuation research and practice. A similar approach could be feasible in other sensitive
areas of health and social care.
Tbere are caveats to this argument since one of the criteria for attending palliative day care
is that patients do not have acute mental health needs and are able to participate in and
contribute to group and individual activities. The extent to which the experience of
participating in a choice experiment exercise would be feasible among people with, say,
dementia, has not been established. However, one of the contributions of this empirical work
has been to provide evidence that choice experiment techniques can work in contexts that
are inherently difficult, and has succeeded in gathering data despite some initial opposition
from health care professionals. It argues that there is a wider range of contexts within which
these methods might be used than perhaps the research and provider community has yet
considered.
The wider application of choice experiment studies is now underway. A programme of
research to consider how to incorporate 'sacrifice' into trade-offs in ways that could be
compared across interventions would be an important contribution to applied empirical work.
This study has not been able to follow all the necessary steps towards a full cost-benefit type
study by not incorporating a quantifiable monetary measure (or proxy measure) for sacrifice.
However, there may be ways of incorporating other notions of sacrifice as defined by the
patients themselves into a CE study that would provide a way of comparing different kinds of
services offered to this patient group. If a common unit of sacrifice could be identified,
perhaps in terms of other services or resources people might be willing to give up in order to
have a particular service, this would enhance the comparability of studies across other
health and social care sectors. One way to do this, for patients with a range of inputs or
services in their care package, would be to design broader choice experiments that would
have the service of interest (say PDC, or community psychiatric nursing) as only one of a
range of possible attributes that a respondent could choose from in a care package. If a
respondent was prepared to sacrifice, say, home visits by a nurse for increased attendance
at a palliative day care centre, then that would provide some notion of sacrifice that was
relevant to the real situation the respondent faced, without incorporating a monetary
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sacrifice. The opportunity cost of the resource that had been foregone could act as a proxy
for value instead of market price or the maximum willingness-to-pay. This approach would
not address the problems of valuing multidimensional interventions also addressed in this
thesis (a palliative day care day or psychiatric nurse home visits would be taken to be a
uniform entity), but this aspect of the research question would have to be traded off against
the increased comparability of results of these studies. Certainly more innovative notions of
individuals' economic sacrifice need to be developed to reflect the comparative value of
complex interventions.
A broader perspective to explore 'society's' valuation of complex services is also timely. It is
argued that the views of carers, of other health professionals (such as GPs, cancer
specialists) and of the lay public should be incorporated in exercises to value these services.
Approaches to incorporating these wider perspectives and preferences in economic
evaluation of individual services are still not common. The consideration of whose values
ought to count and how they should be incorporated into research is not always explicit in
empirical research although if it is more advanced in other sectors of economics.
The problem of evaluating complex services that do not fit easily into the mainstream health
economic evaluation framework challenges the discipline in a number of ways. The analysis
of the problem of economic evaluation of palliative day care highlights the problem of
evaluating services that are inherently complex in terms of their inputs and outputs. It forces
the researcher to consider what should be valued, how it should be valued, and by whom,
and highlights some of the difficulties in evaluation that are not always addressed in
empirical research. Therefore research in these areas can demonstrate some of the
limitations in the mainstream health economic evaluation framework. This may be an
important contribution of this thesis to the current body of health economic evaluation
literature.
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Appendix B
Appendix B
Copies of patients information sheets and consent forms used in the study
[Letter to patient from the hospice]
Dear
I am writing to ask for your help in a research project we are doing. The project is to find
out whether patients benefit from going to day care centres or whether they receive just
as good services at home and in hospital. We hope to interview lots of patients who use
different kinds of services to find out whether day care makes a difference to patients'
health or not.
.We are contacting patients who use day care centres and patients who do not so we can
see whether day care makes a difference. If you would be willing to take part in the
study, please fill in the attached form and send it to the address written at the bottom of
the form. Then one otthe trained interviewers will contact you and make an
arrangement to come and explain the study to you more fully. You will have a chance
then to ask any questions you want and the interviewing will not start before you are
happy that you understand what will happen and have agreed to take part.
I am delighted that the Department of Health has funded this study so that we can ask
patients and their carers what they think about the health services they receive and how
it can be improved for patients in the future. I hope you will be able to take part and give
your views.
With best wishes
Yours sincerely
Palliative Care Consultant
274
Appendix B
Patient information sheet given to patients by their nurse prior to interview
I am a researcher working for Guy, King's and St Thomas' Medical School in South
London*. I would like to invite you to take part in a study, funded by The NHS to evaluate
palliative [day*] care.
If you agree to take part in the study I will want to know about the care that you will
receive. I will firstly ask you to complete an interview with me which consists of three
questionnaires that ask you about how you are feeling, and another to tell me about the
health care you have been receiving. This first visit should last for half an hour. I would
then like to see you two more times, once in about 6-8 weeks, once in about three
months time. I will contact you prior to each visit to make sure you are still happy to be
interviewed. At each interview I will ask you to complete the same short questionnaires.
I will also ask you if you think you have changed over time, what is good about the care
you receive, and what you would like to change. These visits should only take 20
minutes to half an hour.
Your Macmillan nurse I palliative care home nurse* will have told you a bit about the
. study and asked if you would be willing to see me. Any other professionals who may be
involved in your care does not have to know you have seen me, if this is what you would
like.
All the information collected in this study will be strictly confidential. Your participation in
this study is entirely voluntary and if you do take part, you are free to withdraw at any
time. Your involvement or non involvement in this study will not influence the care you
receive. If you are happy to be involved, but do not wish us to contact your carer or any
other professional about your care, then we will not do so.
It is hoped that the information from this study will help us gain knowledge about
palliative care and how best to meet your needs. I will come to see you soon to see if
you are interested in taking part. If you or your family have any further questions please
feel free to contact me on the number below or ask the ward nurse I home care nurse to
contact me
Thank you for considering taking part in our research.
Yours faithfully etc .
• alter as needed
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Patient information sheet for the choice experiement study
What is the study for?
We are undertaking a research project to assess the needs to patients who use the
palliative day care services here at XXXXX. This is part of a study involving four similar
centres in London and the South-East.
The purpose of this study is to find out about why people come to palliative day care and
what they want from the service. Day services are not the same in all centres. We want
to find out how they should be organised to suit your needs. We do not need to know
anything about your illness and anything you say to the interviewer will be treated in the
strictest confidence.
The study is funded by the NHS. The researcher does not work at XXXX but is a trained
interviewer with palliative care care nursing experience
The questionnaire
. On each sheet of the questionnaire there are simple descriptions of two different
palliative day therapy centres. They are open at different hours and offer different kinds
of services. We would like you to choose which one you would attend if you had the
choice. Each set of pairs offers a slightly different choice. From this, we can find out
how strong your views are about the services you want.
What do you have to do?
First, you need to sign the consent form overleaf to say you are happy to take part in the
study.
The descriptions will be read out to you, or you can read it through yourself, whicever
you are most contortable with. Take your time to consider the options and think about
which one you would choose to attend. Tick the box at the bottom of each page
indicating your choice, A or B.
There are also some simple questions about who you are and how often you come to
XXXX that we would like you to fill in.
If you have any problems ....
Let the interviewer know that you'd like a break whenever you feel you need one. You
don't have to finish and you can stop whenever you want, for whatever reason.
Thank you.
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Consent form for the palliative day care study
I have read or been told about the research project I have been asked to participate in
and have had all my questions answered. I understand the purpose of this study and
have had questions answered to my satisfaction. I understand that my name and
address will not be identified in the research and everything I say will be treated in the
strictest confidence.
[Choice experiment study only] I will not be asked any personal questions about my
illness.
Nothing I say to the researcher will be passed on to the staff of the centre, unless I give
my consent for it to do so. All the data will be kept by the researcher and not given to
anyone else. I can stop the interview whenever I feel like.
Signature
Name in print:
[Witnessed by·] _
Date
..where respondent unable to write own signature and has agreed verbally to take part in
the study
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Appendix C Copies of research instruments
Semi-structured interview for patients on use of services
I'd like to begin by asking you to tell me about the frequency and types of
services you have received over the last month not including day care. (Let
me explain what I mean by day care - your visit to the hospice day centre and
the activities that you do while you are there).
So over the last month, whom have you seen or spoken to from health or
social services, and how often? (Please note the frequency and type of
contact).
Nurses:
A district (or community) nurse: Yes No
A nurse at/from the general practice: Yes No
A specialist palliative care nurse at home:
(Macmillan or hospice nurse)
Yes No
A specialist palliative care nurse at home:
(E.g. Marie-Curie nurse)
Yes No
A specialist palliative care nurse in hospital: Yes No
Any other nurse (specify):
(Remember not from day care)
Yes No
Doctors:
Your GP: Yes No
Specialist doctor at home: Yes No
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(From a hospice, a hospital or palliative care team)
Specialist Hospital doctor: Yes No
Other doctors (specify):
(Remember not from day care)
Yes No
Other people: Who else have you seen or spoken to over the last month?
(Not from day care)
Occupational therapist: Yes No
Health visitor: Yes No
Dietician: Yes No
Physiotherapist: Yes No
Other: Yes No
(Specify type & frequency)
Further notes:
Please specify other social services - e.g. MOW, HlH or family/social network.
Over the last month, how many nights have you spent away from home for
health-related reasons:
In a hospital:
In a hospice:
Elsewhere (specify): _
Over the last month, how many times have you visited as an outpatient in
addition to the day care you are currently receiving:
The hospital:
The hospice:
Day care:
Other (specify):
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Are there any services that you don't receive now that you used to, or receive
less of?
Are there any services you now receive more of?
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POS Questionnaire
Answer the following questions by circling the answer, which you think most accurately,
describes how you have been feeling.
1. Over the past 3 days, have you been affected by pain?
Not at all, no effect 0
Slightly - but not bothered to be rid of it 1
Moderately - pain limits some activity 2
Severely - activities or concentration markedly affected 3
Overwhelmingly - unable to think of anything else 4
2. Over the past 3 days, have other symptoms e.g. feeling sick, having a
cough or constipation been affecting how you feel?
No, not at all
Slightly
Moderately
Severely
. Overwhelmingly
o
1
2
3
4
3. Over the past 3 days, have you been feeling anxious or worried about
your illness or treatment?
No, not at all
Occasionally
Sometimes - affects my concentration now and then
Most of the time - often affects my concentration
Can't think of anything else - completely preoccupied
o
1
2
3
4
4. Over the past 3 days, have any of your family or friends been anxious or
worried about you?
No, not at all
Occasionally
Sometimes - it seems to affect their concentration
Most of the time
Yes, always preoccupied with worry about me
o
1
2
3
4
5. Over the past 3 days, how much information have you and your family or
friends been given?
Full information - always feel free to ask what I want o
Information given but hard to understand 1
281
Appendix C
Information given on request but would have liked more 2
Very little given and some questions were avoided 3
None at all 4
6. Over the past 3 days, have you been abh! to share how you are feeling
with your family or friends?
Yes, as much as I wanted to
Most of the time
Sometimes
Occasionally
. No, not at all with anyone
o
1
2
3
4
7. Over the past 3 days, have you felt that life was worthwhile?
Yes, all the time
Most of the time
Sometimes
Occasionally
No, not at all
o
1
2
3
4
8. Over the past 3 days, have you felt good about yourself as a person?
. Yes, all the time
Most of the time
Sometimes
Occasionally
No, not at all
o
1
2
3
4
9. Over the past 3 days, how much time do you feel you have wasted on
appointments relating to your healthcare, e.g. waiting around for
transport or having the same tests repeated?
None at all
Up to half a day wasted
More than half a day wasted
o
1
2
10.Over the past 3 days, have any practical matters resulting from your
illness, either financial or personal, been addressed?
Practical problems have been addressed and my affairs
are asup to date as I would wish 0
Practical problems are in the process of being addressed 1
Practical problems exist which were not addressed 2
I have had no practical problems 3
11.lf any, what have been your main problems in the last three days?
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Herth Hope Index
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Qualitative questions
Can you tell me what is the best thing about attending this centre?
Appendix C
Do you think you have changed as a result of attending palliative day care?
Yesl No
Can you explain why
Do you think there any down sides to attending palliative day care?
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EQ-50 instrument
By placing a tick in one box below, please indicate which statements best
describe your own health state today
Mobility
I have no problems in walking about
I have some problems in walking about
I am confined to bed
Self-care
I have no problems with self-care
I have some problems washing or dressing myself
I am unable to wash or dress myself
Usual activities (e.g. work, study, housework, family or
leisure activities)
I have no problems with performing my usual activities
I have some problems with performing my usual activities
I am unable to perform my usual activities
Pain/discomfort
I have no pain or discomfort
I have moderate pain or discomfort
I have extreme pain or discomfort
Anxietyl depression
I am not anxious or depressed
I am moderately anxious or depressed
I.am extremely anxious or depressed
Appendix C
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
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To help people say how good or bad a health state
is, we have drawn a scale (rather like a
thermometer) on which the best state you can
imagine is marked 100 and the worst state you can
imagine is marked o. We would like you to indicate
on this scale how good or bad your own health is
today, in your opinion. Please do this by drawing a
line from the box below to whichever point on the
scale indicates how good or bad your health is today.
Your own
health state
today
Appendix C
Best state
imaginable
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
o
Worst state
imaginable
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Appendix D Data collection form for the choice experiment study
Patient name: last name) ,(first name) ~ __
Date: _
Date of birth: Age _
(day/month/year)
Date of first visit to centre (approximately): _
(month/year)
Does the patient live alone? yesD NoD
If not, do they live with:
a. spouse
b. family member
c. other _
How often does the patient attend Day Care Centre?
a. Weekly (which day of the week? __ )
b. 2 times/ week (on & )
c. 3 times/ week (on __ , __ , & __ )
d. other: _
When the patient comes to Day Care, how long do they usually stay?
a. All day (10 to 3)
b. a.m. only
c. p.m. only
d. For appt. only
The patient participates in which of the following activities/services? (circle all that apply)
See the doctor Counselling Social
interactions
Arts & crafts Music Therapy Aromatherapy
Music Therapy Massage
Physiotherapy Bathing
Hairdressing Reflexology
Is there anything special the researcher needs to know about this patient, for example,
state of health or special health concerns? (carry on overleaf if necessary)
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Choice experiment interview schedule
"Imagine the two palliative day care centres you could attend once a week. One
is centre A and one is centre B. Both offer arts and crafts and a friendly, social
environment. But other than that they are not the same and offer different kinds
of services and activities. -
Some of the choices may appear easy; others will be more difficult. Just tell us
which, if you had to choose, you would prefer to visit?"
Card 1
Centre A Centre B
You can only come Stay for the full
Access for an hour or so but session
not stay all day
Time 10 am to 3 pm 1 pm to 6 pm
You can have a bath Not available
Bathing every visit if you want
to
Not available Massage,
Specialised therapies and activities aromatherapyand
reflexology are
available
Not available Hairdressing is
Hairdressing available
In emergencies only You can see a doctor
Doctor every visit if you want
to
Which centre do you prefer? A B
D D
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These choices are slightly different, which would you choose now?
. Card 2
Centre A Centre 8
You can only come Stay for the full
Access for an hour or so but session
not stay all day
Time 10 am to 3 pm 1 pm to 6 pm
Not available You can have a bath
. Bathing every visit if you
want to
Massage, Not available
Specialised therapies and activities aromatherapy and
reflexology are
available
Hairdressing is Not available
Hairdressing available
In emergencies only You can see a
You can see a doctor every visit if doctor every visit if
you want you want to
Which centre do you prefer? A B
D D
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Card 3
Centre A Centre 8
Stay for the full You can only come
Access session for an hour or so but
not stay all day
Time 10 am to 3 pm 1 pm to 6 pm
Not available You can have a bath
Bathing every visit if you want
to
Not available Massage,
. Specialised therapies and activities aromatherapy and
reflexology are
available
Hairdressing is Not available
Hairdressing available
You can see a doctor In emergencies only
Doctor every visit if you want
to
Which centre do you prefer? A B
D D
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Card4
Centre A Centre B
Stay for the full You can only come
Access session for an hour or so but
not stay all day
Time 10 am to 3 pm 1 pm to 6 pm
You can have a bath Not available
Bathing every visit if you want
to
Massage, Not available
Specialised therapies and activities aromatherapyand
reflexology are
available
Not available Hairdressing is
Hairdressing available
You can see a doctor In emergencies only
You can see a doctor every visit if every visit if you want
you want to
Which centre do you prefer? A B
D D
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Card 5
Centre A Centre 8
Stay for the full You can only come
Access session for an hour or so but
not stay all day
Time 1 pm to 6 pm 10 am to 3 pm
You can have a bath Not available
Bathing every visit if you want
to
Not available Massage,
Specialised therapies and activities aromatherapyand
reflexology are
available
Hairdressing is Not available
Hairdressing available
In emergencies only You can see a doctor
Doctor every visit if you want
to
Which centre do you prefer? A B
D D
STOP HERE AND TAKE A BREAK
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Card 6
Centre A Centre 8
Stay for the full You can only come
Access session for an hour or so but
not stay all day
Time 1 pm to 6 pm 10 am to 3 pm
Not available You can have a bath
Bathing every visit if you want
to
Massage, Not available
Specialised therapies and activities aromatherapyand
reflexology are
available
Not available Hairdressing is
Hairdressing available
In emergencies only You can see a doctor
Doctor every visit if you want
to
Which centre do you prefer? A B
D D
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Card 7
Centre A Centre B
You can only come Stay for the full
Access for an hour or so but session
not stay all day
Time 1 pm to 6 pm 10 am to 3 pm
You can have a bath Not available
Bathing every visit if you want
to
Massage, Not available
Specialised therapies and activities aromatherapy and
reflexology are
available
Hairdressing is Not available
Hairdressing available
You can see a doctor In emergencies
Doctor every visit if you want only
to
Which centre do you prefer? A B
D D
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Card 8
Centre A Centre B
You can only come Stay for the full
Access for an hour or so but session
not stay all day
Time 1 pm to 6 pm 10 am to 3 pm
Not available You can have a
Bathing bath every visit if
you want to
Not available Massage,
Specialised therapies and activities aromatherapy and
reflexology are
available
Not available Hairdressing is
Hairdressing available
You can see a doctor In emergencies
Doctor every visit if you want only
to
Which centre do you prefer? A B
D D
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Card 9
Centre A Centre 8
You can only come Stay for the full
Access for an hour or so but session
not stay all day
Time 10 am to 3 pm 1 pm to 6 pm
Not available You can have a
Bathing bath every visit if
you want to
Not available Massage,
Specialised therapies and activities aromatherapyand
reflexology are
available
Hairdressing is Not available
Hairdressing available
You can see a doctor In emergencies
Doctor every visit if you want only
to
Which centre do you prefer? A B
D D
296
Appendix D
Card 10
Centre A Centre 8
You can only come Stay for the full
Access foran hour or so but session
not stay all day
Time 10 am to 3 pm 1 pm to 6 pm
You can have a bath Not available
Bathing every visit if you want
to
Massage, Not available
Specialised therapies and activities aromatherapy and
reflexology are
available
Not available Hairdressing is
Hairdressing available
In emergencies only You can see a
Doctor doctor every visit if
you want to
Which centre do you prefer? A B
D D
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Appendix E Output of theSTATA and SPSS anlayiss of the choice experiment probit
and logit models
A) STAT A analysis
. probit choice1 diffacc diffbat diffmass diffhairdr diffdr difftime if scenario <9
Iteration 0: log likelihood -432.47256
Iteration 1: log likelihood -345.80258
Iteration 2: log likelihood -343.40017
Iteration 3 : log likelihood -343.38204
Iteration 4: log likelihood = -343.38203
Probit estimates Number of obs
LR chi2(6)
Prob > chi2
Pseudo R2
624
178.18
0.0000
0.2060Log likelihood = -343.38203
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
choice1 I Coef. Std. Err. z P> I z ] [95% Conf. Interval]-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------diffacc .2831787 .0567376 4.99 0.000 .1719751 .3943824
diffbat .0811388 .0568552 1.43 0.154 -.0302954 .192573
diffmass .6117827 .0568678 10.76 0.000 .5003239 .7232415
diffhairdr .0445646 .0564098 0.79 0.430 -.0659965 .1551258
diffdr .185606 .0561943 3.30 0.001 .0754672 .2957448
difftime -.2987058 .056885 -5.25 0.000 -.4101984 -.1872132
_cons .0220469 .0561231 0.39 0.694 -.0879523 .1320461
. xtprobit choice1 diffacc diffbat diffmass diffhairdr diffdr difftime if scenario <9,
i(pt_code)
Fitting comparison model:
Iteration 0: log likelihood -432.47256
Iteration 1: log likelihood -345.80258
Iteration 2 : log likelihood -343.40017
Iteration 3 : log likelihood -343.38204
Iteration 4: log likelihood -343.38203
Fitting full model:
rho = 0.0 log likelihood -343.38203
rho = 0.1 log likelihood = -350.35116
Iteration 0: log likelihood = -343.38209
Iteration 1: log likelihood = -343.38209
Iteration 2: log likelihood = -343.38209
Random-effects probit
Group variable (i) : pt_code
Number of obs 624
Number of groups 79
Obs per group: min 4
avg 7.9
max 8
Wald chi2(6) 147.08
Prob > chi2 0.0000
Random effects u_i - Gaussian
Log likelihood = -343.38209
choice1 I Coef. Std. Err. z P> I z I [95% Conf. Interval]-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------diffacc .2831787 .0567376 4.99 0.000 .1719751 .3943824
diffbat .0811388 .0568552 1.43 0.154 -.0302954 .192573
diffmass .6117827 .0568678 10.76 0.000 .5003239 .7232415
diffhairdr .0445646 .0564098 0.79 0.430 -.0659965 .1551258
diffdr .185606 .0561943 3.30 0.001 .0754672 .2957448
difftime -.2987058 .056885 -5.25 0.000 -.4101984 -.1872132
..-cons .0220469 .0561232 0.39 0.694 -.0879525 .1320463-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------/lnsig2u I -14 140.8855 -290.l305 262.1305-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
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sigma_u
rho
.0009119
8.32e-07
.0642355
.0001172
9.98e-64
1.0e-126
8.34e+56
1------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Likelihood ratio test of rho=O: chibar2(01) = 0.00 Prob >= chibar2 = 1.000
end of do-file
. xi:probit choice1 diffacc diffbat diffmass diffhairdr diffdr difftime if scenario <9
Iteration 0: log likelihood -432.47256
Iteration 1: log likelihood -345.80258.
Iteration 2: log likelihood -343.40017
Iteration 3 : log likelihood -343.38204
Iteration 4: log likelihood -343.38203
Probit estimates Number of obs
LR chi2(6)
Prob > chi2
Pseudo R2
624
178.18
0.0000
0.2060Log likelihood = -343.38203
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
choice1 I Coef. Std. Err. z p>1 z ] [95% Conf. Interval]-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
diffacc .2831787 .0567376 4.99 0.000 .1719751 .3943824
diffbat .0811388 .0568552 1.43 0.154 -.0302954 .192573
diffmass .6117827 .0568678 10.76 0.000 .5003239 .7232415
diffhairdr .0445646 .0564098 0.79 0.430 -.0659965 .1551258
diffdr .185606 .0561943 3.30 0.001 .0754672 .2957448
difftime -.2987058 .056885 -5.25 0.000 -.4101984 -.1872132
_cons .0220469 .0561231 0.39 0.694 -.0879523 .1320461
. logit choice1 diffacc diffbat diffmass diffhairdr diffdr difftime if scenario <9
Iteration 0: log likelihood -432.47256
Iteration 1: log likelihood -346.49075
Iteration 2: log likelihood -343.21072
Iteration 3 : log likelihood -343.09296
Iteration 4: log likelihood -343.09265
Logit estimates Number of obs
LR chi2(6)
Prob > chi2
Pseudo R2
624
178.76
0.0000
0.2067Log likelihood = -343.09265
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
choice1 I Coef. Std. Err. z p>lzl [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
diffacc .4953618 .1000917 4~95 0.000 .2991856 .691538
diffbat .1655054 .1008856 1.64 0.101 -.0322267 .3632375
diffmass. 1.027025 .1008236 10.19 0.000 .8294143 1.224635
diffhairdr .051938 .0984523 0.53 0.598 -.1410249 .2449009
diffdr .3235665 .0971495 3.33 0.001 .133157 .513976
difftime -.5184057 .1011059 -5.13 0.000 -.7165696 -.3202418
_cons .0521439 .0970193 0.54 0.591 -.1380104 .2422982
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. xtlogit choicel diffacc diffbat diffmass diffhairdr diffdr difftime if scenario <9,
i(pt_code)
Fitting comparison model:
Iteration 0:
Iteration 1:
Iteration 2·:
Iteration 3:
Iteration 4:
log likelihood
log likelihood
log likelihood =
log likelihood
log likelihood
-432.47256
-346.49075
-343.21072
-343.09296
-343.09265
Fitting full model:
rho = 0.0
rho = 0.1
Iteration 0:
Iteration 1:
log likelihood
log likelihood
log likelihood
log likelihood
-343.09265
-345.62132
-343.09267
-343.09267
Random-effects logit
Group variable (i) : pt_code
Number of obs 624
Number of groups 79
Obs per group: min 4
avg 7.9
max 8
Wald chi2(6) 123.08
Prob > chi2 0.0000
Random effects u_i - Gaussian
Log likelihood = -343.09267
choice1 I Coef. Std. Err. z P>lzl [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
diffacc .4953618 .100092 4.95 0.000 .299185 .6915386
diffbat .1655054 .1008859 1.64 0.101 -.0322273 .3632381
diffmass 1.027025 .1008239 10.19 0.000 .8294136 1.224636
diffhairdr .051938 .0984525 0.53 0.598 -.1410253 .2449013
diffdr .3235665 .0971497 3.33 0.001 .1331566 .5139764
difftime -.5184057 .1011062 -5.13 0.000 -.7165703 -.3202411
_cons .0521439 .0970195 0.54 0.591 -.1380109 .2422987-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------Ilnsig2u I -14 231.2352 -467.2126 439.2126-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------sigrna_u I .0009119 .1054296 3.5e-102 2.36e+95
rho I 2.53e-07 .0000178 3.8e-204 1------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Likelihood ratio test of rho=O: chlbar2(01) 0.00 Prob >= chibar2 = 1.000
. xi:logit choice1 diffacc diffbat diffmass dlffhairdr diffdr difftime if scenario <9
Iteration 0: log likelihood ~432.47256
Iteration 1: log likelihood -346.49075
Iteration 2: log likelihood -343.21072
Iteration 3 : log likelihood -343.09296
Iteration 4: log likelihood -343.09265
Logit estimates Number of obs
LR chi2(6)
Prob > chi2
Pseudo R2
624
178.76
0.0000
0.2067Log likelihood = -343.09265
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
choice1 I Coef. Std. Err. z P> I z ] [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
diffacc .4953618 .1000917 4.95 0.000 .2991856 .691538
diffbat .1655054 .1008856 1.64 0.101 -.0322267 .3632375
diffmass 1.027025 .1008236 10.19 0.000 .8294143 1.224635diffhairdr .051938 .0984523 0.53 0.598 -.1410249 .2449009
diffdr .3235665 .0971495 3.33 0.001 .133157 .513976difftime -.5184057 .1011059 -5.13 0.000 -.7165696 -.3202418_cons .0521439 .0970193 0.54 0.591 -.1380104 .2422982------------------------------------------------------------------------------
end of do-file
300
Appendix E
B) SPSS analysis
DATA Information
624 unweighted cases accepted.
o cases rejected because of missing data.
o cases are in the control group.
MODEL Information
ONLY Normal Sigmoid is requested.
- - * *
* * * * * * * * * * PRO BIT A N A L Y SIS * * * * * * *
Parameter estimates converged after 15 iterations.
Optimal solution found.
Parameter Estimates (PROBIT model: (PROBIT(p)) = Intercept + BX):
Regression Coeff. Standard Error Coeff./S.E .
DIFFACC .28318 .05674 4.99103
DIFFBAT .08114 .05686 1.42712
DIFFMASS .61178 .05687 10.75795
DIFFHAIR .04457 .05641 .79004
DIFFDR .18560 .05619 3.30286
DIFFTIME -.29871 .05688 -5.25106
Intercept Standard Error Intercept/S.E .
.02204 .05612 .39277
Pearson Goodness-of-Fit Chi Square = 632.339 DF = 617 P = .326
Since Goodness-of-Fit Chi square is NOT significant, no heterogeneity
factor is used in the calculation of confidence limits.
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